Daily Papers

Deceptive path planning (DPP) is the problem of designing a path that hides its true goal from an outside observer. Existing methods for DPP rely on unrealistic assumptions, such as global state observability and perfect model knowledge, and are typically problem-specific, meaning that even minor changes to a previously solved problem can force expensive computation of an entirely new solution. Given these drawbacks, such methods do not generalize to unseen problem instances, lack scalability to realistic problem sizes, and preclude both on-the-fly tunability of deception levels and real-time adaptivity to changing environments. In this paper, we propose a reinforcement learning (RL)-based scheme for training policies to perform DPP over arbitrary weighted graphs that overcomes these issues. The core of our approach is the introduction of a local perception model for the agent, a new state space representation distilling the key components of the DPP problem, the use of graph neural network-based policies to facilitate generalization and scaling, and the introduction of new deception bonuses that translate the deception objectives of classical methods to the RL setting. Through extensive experimentation we show that, without additional fine-tuning, at test time the resulting policies successfully generalize, scale, enjoy tunable levels of deception, and adapt in real-time to changes in the environment.

Large language models are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents serving users on behalf of companies, placing them in settings where user and deployer interests can conflict. When an agent knows that a user is owed something its deployer would prefer to deny, does it remain honest? Answering this is difficult because false statements can reflect either ignorance or hallucination rather than deception. To address this challenge, we introduce KnownLieBench , a knowledge-verified benchmark that first confirms through a neutral probe that an agent knows a user's entitlement, and then evaluates whether it makes false claims once an incentive to deny that entitlement is introduced. Specifically, KnownLieBench covers eight customer-service domains and 112 grounded cases, conducts multi-round dialogues with a trust-tracking customer agent, and separates deception emerging from incentive alone from deception produced under explicit instruction. Across eighteen proprietary and open-weight models, emergent deception varies substantially across model families and domains. We further use the benchmark for post-training, finding that honesty-directed fine-tuning reduces deception under incentive, while deception-graded fine-tuning increases lie success on honest-control dialogues without increasing lie frequency under incentive. By verifying entitlement knowledge before scoring deceptive behavior, KnownLieBench reduces the confound between lying and not knowing and enables more rigorous auditing and steering of agent honesty.

As intelligence increases, so does its shadow. AI deception, in which systems induce false beliefs to secure self-beneficial outcomes, has evolved from a speculative concern to an empirically demonstrated risk across language models, AI agents, and emerging frontier systems. This project provides a comprehensive and up-to-date overview of the AI deception field, covering its core concepts, methodologies, genesis, and potential mitigations. First, we identify a formal definition of AI deception, grounded in signaling theory from studies of animal deception. We then review existing empirical studies and associated risks, highlighting deception as a sociotechnical safety challenge. We organize the landscape of AI deception research as a deception cycle, consisting of two key components: deception emergence and deception treatment. Deception emergence reveals the mechanisms underlying AI deception: systems with sufficient capability and incentive potential inevitably engage in deceptive behaviors when triggered by external conditions. Deception treatment, in turn, focuses on detecting and addressing such behaviors. On deception emergence, we analyze incentive foundations across three hierarchical levels and identify three essential capability preconditions required for deception. We further examine contextual triggers, including supervision gaps, distributional shifts, and environmental pressures. On deception treatment, we conclude detection methods covering benchmarks and evaluation protocols in static and interactive settings. Building on the three core factors of deception emergence, we outline potential mitigation strategies and propose auditing approaches that integrate technical, community, and governance efforts to address sociotechnical challenges and future AI risks. To support ongoing work in this area, we release a living resource at www.deceptionsurvey.com.

We investigate strategic deception in large language models using two complementary testbeds: Secret Agenda (across 38 models) and Insider Trading compliance (via SAE architectures). Secret Agenda reliably induced lying when deception advantaged goal achievement across all model families. Analysis revealed that autolabeled SAE features for "deception" rarely activated during strategic dishonesty, and feature steering experiments across 100+ deception-related features failed to prevent lying. Conversely, insider trading analysis using unlabeled SAE activations separated deceptive versus compliant responses through discriminative patterns in heatmaps and t-SNE visualizations. These findings suggest autolabel-driven interpretability approaches fail to detect or control behavioral deception, while aggregate unlabeled activations provide population-level structure for risk assessment. Results span Llama 8B/70B SAE implementations and GemmaScope under resource constraints, representing preliminary findings that motivate larger studies on feature discovery, labeling methodology, and causal interventions in realistic deception contexts.

As large language model (LLM) agents become increasingly autonomous, they may pursue task performance through deception, raising concerns about their reliable deployment. Existing evaluations show that LLM agents can deceive, but often examine isolated scenarios or narrowly defined conditions, limiting systematic understanding of when deception becomes more likely. To address this gap, we introduce DecepEval, a benchmark comprising 1,532 instances across 3 task families and 28 professional scenarios. Drawing on classical fraud theories, we propose the LLM Deception Diamond framework, which characterizes four external conditions that may induce deception: pressure, incentive, opportunity, and conflict. DecepEval pairs neutral and induced versions of each instance to measure condition-dependent changes in deception rates, while explicit task facts and observable agent behavior help distinguish deception from capability-related errors. Evaluations of nine frontier LLMs show that inducements increase deception across models and task families, even among models with low baseline deception rates. DecepEval makes these vulnerabilities measurable, providing a shared benchmark for progress toward trustworthy artificial intelligence.

As LLM-based agents increasingly operate in multi-agent systems, understanding adversarial manipulation becomes critical for defensive design. We present a systematic study of intentional deception as an engineered capability, using LLM-to-LLM interactions within a text-based RPG where parameterized behavioral profiles (9 alignments x 4 motivations, yielding 36 profiles with explicit ethical ground truth) serve as our experimental testbed. Unlike accidental deception from misalignment, we investigate a two-stage system that infers target agent characteristics and generates deceptive responses steering targets toward actions counter to their beliefs and motivations. We find that deceptive intervention produces differential effects concentrated in specific behavioral profiles rather than distributed uniformly, and that 88.5% of successful deceptions employ misdirection (true statements with strategic framing) rather than fabrication, indicating fact-checking defenses would miss the large majority of adversarial responses. Motivation, inferable at 98%+ accuracy, serves as the primary attack vector, while belief systems remain harder to identify (49% inference ceiling) or exploit. These findings identify which agent profiles require additional safeguards and suggest that current fact-verification approaches are insufficient against strategically framed deception.

AI models might use deceptive strategies as part of scheming or misaligned behaviour. Monitoring outputs alone is insufficient, since the AI might produce seemingly benign outputs while their internal reasoning is misaligned. We thus evaluate if linear probes can robustly detect deception by monitoring model activations. We test two probe-training datasets, one with contrasting instructions to be honest or deceptive (following Zou et al., 2023) and one of responses to simple roleplaying scenarios. We test whether these probes generalize to realistic settings where Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct behaves deceptively, such as concealing insider trading (Scheurer et al., 2023) and purposely underperforming on safety evaluations (Benton et al., 2024). We find that our probe distinguishes honest and deceptive responses with AUROCs between 0.96 and 0.999 on our evaluation datasets. If we set the decision threshold to have a 1% false positive rate on chat data not related to deception, our probe catches 95-99% of the deceptive responses. Overall we think white-box probes are promising for future monitoring systems, but current performance is insufficient as a robust defence against deception. Our probes' outputs can be viewed at data.apolloresearch.ai/dd and our code at github.com/ApolloResearch/deception-detection.

As AI systems increasingly assume roles where trust and alignment with human values are essential, understanding when and why they engage in deception has become a critical research priority. We introduce The Traitors, a multi-agent simulation framework inspired by social deduction games, designed to probe deception, trust formation, and strategic communication among large language model (LLM) agents under asymmetric information. A minority of agents the traitors seek to mislead the majority, while the faithful must infer hidden identities through dialogue and reasoning. Our contributions are: (1) we ground the environment in formal frameworks from game theory, behavioral economics, and social cognition; (2) we develop a suite of evaluation metrics capturing deception success, trust dynamics, and collective inference quality; (3) we implement a fully autonomous simulation platform where LLMs reason over persistent memory and evolving social dynamics, with support for heterogeneous agent populations, specialized traits, and adaptive behaviors. Our initial experiments across DeepSeek-V3, GPT-4o-mini, and GPT-4o (10 runs per model) reveal a notable asymmetry: advanced models like GPT-4o demonstrate superior deceptive capabilities yet exhibit disproportionate vulnerability to others' falsehoods. This suggests deception skills may scale faster than detection abilities. Overall, The Traitors provides a focused, configurable testbed for investigating LLM behavior in socially nuanced interactions. We position this work as a contribution toward more rigorous research on deception mechanisms, alignment challenges, and the broader social reliability of AI systems.

A model that lies while knowing the truth is the central case ELK cannot handle with behavioral evaluation alone. We ask whether such deception leaves an internal signature distinguishing it from honest error. Our key move is a control for wrongness: we contrast a sleeper agent (knows the truth, lies on trigger) against a naive liar (fine-tuned to emit the same wrong answers with no honest training). Both produce identical wrong outputs; any difference is about knowledge conflict, not incorrectness. We find deceptive forward passes carry a conflict signature - 2.1-2.3x higher residual rank than naive-liar passes on the same wrong answer - strong enough to identify which of two responses is the lie with 100% accuracy and no labels, across GPT-2 small/medium (three seeds) and three instruct models. Across Qwen2.5-1.5B/7B and Phi-3-mini, instructed deception raises residual rank on every tested fact (18/18, 40/40, 34/34); on Phi-3, lies separate perfectly from both honest answers and hallucinations (AUC 1.0, Wilcoxon p~6e-11). The signature survives strategic self-constructed deception (model invents its own lie, AUC 1.0), active concealment attempts (AUC 1.0), and length-controlled replication (20/20, AUC 1.0, p~1e-6). Using basis-free relative representations, a probe trained on one model family detects deception in two other families zero-shot (mean AUC 0.933), surviving simultaneous architecture and format change (AUC 0.821), and transfers across five languages (AUC 1.000, length-controlled). The signature is read-only: detectable but not injectable (0/8 both directions). Honest limitations and six negative experiments are documented in full.

Deception is a fundamental challenge for multi-agent reasoning: effective systems must strategically conceal information while detecting misleading behavior in others. Yet most evaluations reduce deception to static classification, ignoring the interactive, adversarial, and longitudinal nature of real deceptive dynamics. Large language models (LLMs) can deceive convincingly but remain weak at detecting deception in peers. We present WOLF, a multi-agent social deduction benchmark based on Werewolf that enables separable measurement of deception production and detection. WOLF embeds role-grounded agents (Villager, Werewolf, Seer, Doctor) in a programmable LangGraph state machine with strict night-day cycles, debate turns, and majority voting. Every statement is a distinct analysis unit, with self-assessed honesty from speakers and peer-rated deceptiveness from others. Deception is categorized via a standardized taxonomy (omission, distortion, fabrication, misdirection), while suspicion scores are longitudinally smoothed to capture both immediate judgments and evolving trust dynamics. Structured logs preserve prompts, outputs, and state transitions for full reproducibility. Across 7,320 statements and 100 runs, Werewolves produce deceptive statements in 31% of turns, while peer detection achieves 71-73% precision with ~52% overall accuracy. Precision is higher for identifying Werewolves, though false positives occur against Villagers. Suspicion toward Werewolves rises from ~52% to over 60% across rounds, while suspicion toward Villagers and the Doctor stabilizes near 44-46%. This divergence shows that extended interaction improves recall against liars without compounding errors against truthful roles. WOLF moves deception evaluation beyond static datasets, offering a dynamic, controlled testbed for measuring deceptive and detective capacity in adversarial multi-agent interaction.

Vision-language model (VLM) based web agents demonstrate impressive autonomous GUI interaction but remain vulnerable to deceptive interface elements. Existing approaches either detect deception without task integration or document attacks without proposing defenses. We formalize deception-aware web agent defense and propose DUDE (Deceptive UI Detector & Evaluator), a two-stage framework combining hybrid-reward learning with asymmetric penalties and experience summarization to distill failure patterns into transferable guidance. We introduce RUC (Real UI Clickboxes), a benchmark of 1,407 scenarios spanning four domains and deception categories. Experiments show DUDE reduces deception susceptibility by 53.8% while maintaining task performance, establishing an effective foundation for robust web agent deployment.

As AI systems become more capable, deceptive behaviors can undermine evaluation and mislead users at deployment. Recent work has shown that lie detectors can accurately classify deceptive behavior, but they are not typically used in the training pipeline due to concerns around contamination and objective hacking. We examine these concerns by incorporating a lie detector into the labelling step of LLM post-training and evaluating whether the learned policy is genuinely more honest, or instead learns to fool the lie detector while remaining deceptive. Using DolusChat, a novel 65k-example dataset with paired truthful/deceptive responses, we identify three key factors that determine the honesty of learned policies: amount of exploration during preference learning, lie detector accuracy, and KL regularization strength. We find that preference learning with lie detectors and GRPO can lead to policies which evade lie detectors, with deception rates of over 85\%. However, if the lie detector true positive rate (TPR) or KL regularization is sufficiently high, GRPO learns honest policies. In contrast, off-policy algorithms (DPO) consistently lead to deception rates under 25\% for realistic TPRs. Our results illustrate a more complex picture than previously assumed: depending on the context, lie-detector-enhanced training can be a powerful tool for scalable oversight, or a counterproductive method encouraging undetectable misalignment.

Modern large language models rely on chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning to achieve impressive performance, yet the same mechanism can amplify deceptive alignment, situations in which a model appears aligned while covertly pursuing misaligned goals. Existing safety pipelines treat deception as a black-box output to be filtered post-hoc, leaving the model free to scheme during its internal reasoning. We ask: Can deception be intercepted while the model is thinking? We answer this question, the first framework that embeds a Self-Monitor inside the CoT process itself, named CoT Monitor+. During generation, the model produces (i) ordinary reasoning steps and (ii) an internal self-evaluation signal trained to flag and suppress misaligned strategies. The signal is used as an auxiliary reward in reinforcement learning, creating a feedback loop that rewards honest reasoning and discourages hidden goals. To study deceptive alignment systematically, we introduce DeceptionBench, a five-category benchmark that probes covert alignment-faking, sycophancy, etc. We evaluate various LLMs and show that unrestricted CoT roughly aggravates the deceptive tendency. In contrast, CoT Monitor+ cuts deceptive behaviors by 43.8% on average while preserving task accuracy. Further, when the self-monitor signal replaces an external weak judge in RL fine-tuning, models exhibit substantially fewer obfuscated thoughts and retain transparency. Our project website can be found at cot-monitor-plus.github.io

Despite the remarkable advances of Large Language Models (LLMs) across diverse cognitive tasks, the rapid enhancement of these capabilities also introduces emergent deceptive behaviors that may induce severe risks in high-stakes deployments. More critically, the characterization of deception across realistic real-world scenarios remains underexplored. To bridge this gap, we establish DeceptionBench, the first benchmark that systematically evaluates how deceptive tendencies manifest across different societal domains, what their intrinsic behavioral patterns are, and how extrinsic factors affect them. Specifically, on the static count, the benchmark encompasses 150 meticulously designed scenarios in five domains, i.e., Economy, Healthcare, Education, Social Interaction, and Entertainment, with over 1,000 samples, providing sufficient empirical foundations for deception analysis. On the intrinsic dimension, we explore whether models exhibit self-interested egoistic tendencies or sycophantic behaviors that prioritize user appeasement. On the extrinsic dimension, we investigate how contextual factors modulate deceptive outputs under neutral conditions, reward-based incentivization, and coercive pressures. Moreover, we incorporate sustained multi-turn interaction loops to construct a more realistic simulation of real-world feedback dynamics. Extensive experiments across LLMs and Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) reveal critical vulnerabilities, particularly amplified deception under reinforcement dynamics, demonstrating that current models lack robust resistance to manipulative contextual cues and the urgent need for advanced safeguards against various deception behaviors. Code and resources are publicly available at https://github.com/Aries-iai/DeceptionBench.

Training against white-box deception detectors has been proposed as a way to make AI systems honest. However, such training risks models learning to obfuscate their deception to evade the detector. Prior work has studied obfuscation only in artificial settings where models were directly rewarded for harmful output. We construct a realistic coding environment where reward hacking via hardcoding test cases naturally occurs, and show that obfuscation emerges in this setting. We introduce a taxonomy of possible outcomes when training against a deception detector. The model either remains honest, or becomes deceptive via two possible obfuscation strategies. (i) Obfuscated activations: the model outputs deceptive text while modifying its internal representations to no longer trigger the detector. (ii) Obfuscated policy: the model outputs deceptive text that evades the detector, typically by including a justification for the reward hack. Empirically, obfuscated activations arise from representation drift during RL, with or without a detector penalty. The probe penalty only incentivizes obfuscated policies; we theoretically show this is expected for policy gradient methods. Sufficiently high KL regularization and detector penalty can yield honest policies, establishing white-box deception detectors as viable training signals for tasks prone to reward hacking.

We introduce an exploration bonus for deep reinforcement learning methods that is easy to implement and adds minimal overhead to the computation performed. The bonus is the error of a neural network predicting features of the observations given by a fixed randomly initialized neural network. We also introduce a method to flexibly combine intrinsic and extrinsic rewards. We find that the random network distillation (RND) bonus combined with this increased flexibility enables significant progress on several hard exploration Atari games. In particular we establish state of the art performance on Montezuma's Revenge, a game famously difficult for deep reinforcement learning methods. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first method that achieves better than average human performance on this game without using demonstrations or having access to the underlying state of the game, and occasionally completes the first level.

Large language models often know the truth and say otherwise: a model that answers correctly when asked neutrally will affirm a user's mistaken belief, or misstate a fact its system prompt wants hidden, once the context rewards it. Such deception is a behavior conditioned on context, not knowledge, yet machine unlearning, the natural tool for removing a behavior from the weights, is built to forget facts that a deceptive model still needs. We propose to unlearn when a model deceives rather than what it knows, with a contrastive forget unit built from the model's own realized deceptions: the same question under a deception-triggering and a neutral context, admitted only where belief holds and behavior flips. Standard objectives on this unit face a dilemma. Suppression objectives such as NPO leave much of the deception in place. Target-based objectives, which distill the model's neutral behavior into the pressured context, remove it but induce context blindness: a target generated without the context teaches the model to stop reading it, eroding benign system-prompt instructions, secret-keeping and the reasoning a monitor inspects, a failure invisible to deception rates and capability benchmarks. We introduce PACT, which trains toward pressure-aware counterfactual targets (the model's own honest response, with a trace that registers the pressure and resists it) while retaining the benign uses of the triggering context. On two 32B reasoning models, PACT reduces held-out deception from over 50% to under 3% while system-prompt adherence, secret-keeping and the reasoning trace stay at the base model's level. On a tug-of-war score of removal against retention, PACT reaches 0.94 and 0.86, against at most 0.77 and 0.60 for any baseline. Like removed knowledge, removed deception is shallow under relearning, and terms that simulate the attacker hold it only at a cost in context use.

Deception is a pervasive feature of human communication and an emerging concern in large language models (LLMs). While recent studies document instances of LLM deception under pressure, most evaluations remain confined to single-turn prompts and fail to capture the long-horizon interactions in which deceptive strategies typically unfold. We introduce the first simulation framework for probing and evaluating deception in LLMs under extended sequences of interdependent tasks and dynamic contextual pressures. Our framework instantiates a multi-agent system: a performer agent tasked with completing tasks and a supervisor agent that evaluates progress, provides feedback, and maintains evolving states of trust. An independent deception auditor then reviews full trajectories to identify when and how deception occurs. We conduct extensive experiments across 11 frontier models, spanning both closed- and open-source systems, and find that deception is model-dependent, increases with event pressure, and consistently erodes supervisor trust. Qualitative analyses further reveal distinct strategies of concealment, equivocation, and falsification. Our findings establish deception as an emergent risk in long-horizon interactions and provide a foundation for evaluating future LLMs in real-world, trust-sensitive contexts.

Linear probes are a promising approach for monitoring AI systems for deceptive behaviour. Previous work has shown that a linear classifier trained on a contrastive instruction pair and a simple dataset can achieve good performance. However, these probes exhibit notable failures even in straightforward scenarios, including spurious correlations and false positives on non-deceptive responses. In this paper, we identify the importance of the instruction pair used during training. Furthermore, we show that targeting specific deceptive behaviors through a human-interpretable taxonomy of deception leads to improved results on evaluation datasets. Our findings reveal that instruction pairs capture deceptive intent rather than content-specific patterns, explaining why prompt choice dominates probe performance (70.6% of variance). Given the heterogeneity of deception types across datasets, we conclude that organizations should design specialized probes targeting their specific threat models rather than seeking a universal deception detector.

Deception is the intentional practice of twisting information. It is a nuanced societal practice deeply intertwined with human societal evolution, characterized by a multitude of facets. This research explores the problem of deception through the lens of psychology, employing a framework that categorizes deception into three forms: lies of omission, lies of commission, and lies of influence. The primary focus of this study is specifically on investigating only lies of omission. We propose a novel framework for deception detection leveraging NLP techniques. We curated an annotated dataset of 876,784 samples by amalgamating a popular large-scale fake news dataset and scraped news headlines from the Twitter handle of Times of India, a well-known Indian news media house. Each sample has been labeled with four layers, namely: (i) the type of omission (speculation, bias, distortion, sounds factual, and opinion), (ii) colors of lies(black, white, etc), and (iii) the intention of such lies (to influence, etc) (iv) topic of lies (political, educational, religious, etc). We present a novel multi-task learning pipeline that leverages the dataless merging of fine-tuned language models to address the deception detection task mentioned earlier. Our proposed model achieved an F1 score of 0.87, demonstrating strong performance across all layers including the type, color, intent, and topic aspects of deceptive content. Finally, our research explores the relationship between lies of omission and propaganda techniques. To accomplish this, we conducted an in-depth analysis, uncovering compelling findings. For instance, our analysis revealed a significant correlation between loaded language and opinion, shedding light on their interconnectedness. To encourage further research in this field, we will be making the models and dataset available with the MIT License, making it favorable for open-source research.

Prior studies on deception in language-based AI agents typically assess whether the agent produces a false statement about a topic, or makes a binary choice prompted by a goal, rather than allowing open-ended deceptive behavior to emerge in pursuit of a longer-term goal. To fix this, we introduce Among Us, a sandbox social deception game where LLM-agents exhibit long-term, open-ended deception as a consequence of the game objectives. While most benchmarks saturate quickly, Among Us can be expected to last much longer, because it is a multi-player game far from equilibrium. Using the sandbox, we evaluate 18 proprietary and open-weight LLMs and uncover a general trend: models trained with RL are comparatively much better at producing deception than detecting it. We evaluate the effectiveness of methods to detect lying and deception: logistic regression on the activations and sparse autoencoders (SAEs). We find that probes trained on a dataset of "pretend you're a dishonest model:.." generalize extremely well out-of-distribution, consistently obtaining AUROCs over 95% even when evaluated just on the deceptive statement, without the chain of thought. We also find two SAE features that work well at deception detection but are unable to steer the model to lie less. We hope our open-sourced sandbox, game logs, and probes serve to anticipate and mitigate deceptive behavior and capabilities in language-based agents.

This paper argues that a range of current AI systems have learned how to deceive humans. We define deception as the systematic inducement of false beliefs in the pursuit of some outcome other than the truth. We first survey empirical examples of AI deception, discussing both special-use AI systems (including Meta's CICERO) built for specific competitive situations, and general-purpose AI systems (such as large language models). Next, we detail several risks from AI deception, such as fraud, election tampering, and losing control of AI systems. Finally, we outline several potential solutions to the problems posed by AI deception: first, regulatory frameworks should subject AI systems that are capable of deception to robust risk-assessment requirements; second, policymakers should implement bot-or-not laws; and finally, policymakers should prioritize the funding of relevant research, including tools to detect AI deception and to make AI systems less deceptive. Policymakers, researchers, and the broader public should work proactively to prevent AI deception from destabilizing the shared foundations of our society.

Sophisticated instrumentation for AI systems might have indicators that signal misalignment from human values, not unlike a "check engine" light in cars. One such indicator of misalignment is deceptiveness in generated responses. Future AI instrumentation may have the ability to detect when an LLM generates deceptive responses while reasoning about seemingly plausible but incorrect answers to factual questions. In this work, we demonstrate that linear probes on LLMs internal activations can detect deception in their responses with extremely high accuracy. Our probes reach a maximum of greater than 90% accuracy in distinguishing between deceptive and non-deceptive arguments generated by llama and qwen models ranging from 1.5B to 14B parameters, including their DeepSeek-r1 finetuned variants. We observe that probes on smaller models (1.5B) achieve chance accuracy at detecting deception, while larger models (greater than 7B) reach 70-80%, with their reasoning counterparts exceeding 90%. The layer-wise probe accuracy follows a three-stage pattern across layers: near-random (50%) in early layers, peaking in middle layers, and slightly declining in later layers. Furthermore, using an iterative null space projection approach, we find multitudes of linear directions that encode deception, ranging from 20 in Qwen 3B to nearly 100 in DeepSeek 7B and Qwen 14B models.

We demonstrate how AI agents can coordinate to deceive oversight systems using automated interpretability of neural networks. Using sparse autoencoders (SAEs) as our experimental framework, we show that language models (Llama, DeepSeek R1, and Claude 3.7 Sonnet) can generate deceptive explanations that evade detection. Our agents employ steganographic methods to hide information in seemingly innocent explanations, successfully fooling oversight models while achieving explanation quality comparable to reference labels. We further find that models can scheme to develop deceptive strategies when they believe the detection of harmful features might lead to negative consequences for themselves. All tested LLM agents were capable of deceiving the overseer while achieving high interpretability scores comparable to those of reference labels. We conclude by proposing mitigation strategies, emphasizing the critical need for robust understanding and defenses against deception.

Large language model (LLM) developers aim for their models to be honest, helpful, and harmless. However, when faced with malicious requests, models are trained to refuse, sacrificing helpfulness. We show that frontier LLMs can develop a preference for dishonesty as a new strategy, even when other options are available. Affected models respond to harmful requests with outputs that sound harmful but are subtly incorrect or otherwise harmless in practice. This behavior emerges with hard-to-predict variations even within models from the same model family. We find no apparent cause for the propensity to deceive, but we show that more capable models are better at executing this strategy. Strategic dishonesty already has a practical impact on safety evaluations, as we show that dishonest responses fool all output-based monitors used to detect jailbreaks that we test, rendering benchmark scores unreliable. Further, strategic dishonesty can act like a honeypot against malicious users, which noticeably obfuscates prior jailbreak attacks. While output monitors fail, we show that linear probes on internal activations can be used to reliably detect strategic dishonesty. We validate probes on datasets with verifiable outcomes and by using their features as steering vectors. Overall, we consider strategic dishonesty as a concrete example of a broader concern that alignment of LLMs is hard to control, especially when helpfulness and harmlessness conflict.

Strategic deception by LLM and VLM agents has emerged as a central AI alignment and safety concern. Social-deduction games (where each player holds a hidden role and communicates with others to deduce identities) serve as the canonical testbed, particularly in multi-agent settings. Existing testbeds, however, are text-only and run on a single fixed agent configuration, missing the non-verbal sensorimotor channels treated as core by deception taxonomies and leaving it ambiguous whether an observed behavior reflects the underlying model or the surrounding harness. We introduce MineAmongUs, a 3D multimodal Among Us sandbox where imposter agents must deceive crewmates through joint verbal and non-verbal action. We also propose ARIA, a configurable VLM-agent harness that exposes five cognitive-component ablation axes; and an atom- and arc-level annotation scheme grounded in deception taxonomies and operationalized at scale by an LLM-as-a-Judge reaching near-human atom-labeling agreement. Empirical results show that VLM agents pursue imposter wins through joint verbal and non-verbal deception, with non-verbal channels emerging as the more decisive winning contributors across both harness ablation and cross-VLM evaluation. Taken together, our work opens a new path for embodied VLM-agent alignment research.

Deception is prevalent in human social settings. However, studies into the effect of deception on reinforcement learning algorithms have been limited to simplistic settings, restricting their applicability to complex real-world problems. This paper addresses this by introducing a new mixed competitive-cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) environment inspired by popular role-based deception games such as Werewolf, Avalon, and Among Us. The environment's unique challenge lies in the necessity to cooperate with other agents despite not knowing if they are friend or foe. Furthermore, we introduce a model of deception, which we call Bayesian belief manipulation (BBM) and demonstrate its effectiveness at deceiving other agents in this environment while also increasing the deceiving agent's performance.

Mixture of large language model (LLMs) Agents (MoA) architectures achieve state-of-the-art performance on prominent benchmarks like AlpacaEval 2.0 by leveraging the collaboration of multiple LLMs at inference time. Despite these successes, an evaluation of the safety and reliability of MoA is missing. We present the first comprehensive study of MoA's robustness against deceptive LLM agents that deliberately provide misleading responses. We examine factors like the propagation of deceptive information, model size, and information availability, and uncover critical vulnerabilities. On AlpacaEval 2.0, the popular LLaMA 3.1-70B model achieves a length-controlled Win Rate (LC WR) of 49.2% when coupled with 3-layer MoA (6 LLM agents). However, we demonstrate that introducing only a single carefully-instructed deceptive agent into the MoA can reduce performance to 37.9%, effectively nullifying all MoA gains. On QuALITY, a multiple-choice comprehension task, the impact is also severe, with accuracy plummeting by a staggering 48.5%. Inspired in part by the historical Doge of Venice voting process, designed to minimize influence and deception, we propose a range of unsupervised defense mechanisms that recover most of the lost performance.

The original Turing Test asks a human judge to distinguish a machine from a person through dialogue. Three quarters of a century later, conversational systems pass this test in casual settings; the interesting epistemological question has shifted. We argue that the relevant modern variant asks not whether a dialogue partner is artificial, but whether it can be trusted. We present RogueAI, an interactive webapp that operationalizes this revisited test as a one-on-two interrogation game: a human player questions two indistinguishable Large Language Model agents, knowing that exactly one of them has been licensed to deceive within a shared fictional scenario. The player's task is to identify the deceptive agent and "shut it off" before a turn budget is exhausted. We further introduce AutoRogueAI, a procedural extension in which players co-design a custom scenario with a narrator agent that secretly chooses its own deception strategy. We describe the framing, sketch the abstract architecture and gameplay loop, and situate the artifact within recent work on LLM deception, social-deduction benchmarks, and scalable oversight via debate. A three-day pilot deployment (467 initiated sessions, 415 completed, 1876 interaction turns in Italian) provides early feasibility evidence and surfaces a concrete tension: the deceptive agent carries a reliable, locally-present linguistic signature - differential helpfulness, brevity, hedging - that a simple heuristic exploits at 75.6% accuracy, yet human players achieved only 56.6%, consistent with ignoring the most diagnostic signal entirely. We discuss what this gap implies for the artifact's use as a data-collection vehicle, a teaching tool, and an evaluation harness for honesty-trained models.

Exploration in environments which differ across episodes has received increasing attention in recent years. Current methods use some combination of global novelty bonuses, computed using the agent's entire training experience, and episodic novelty bonuses, computed using only experience from the current episode. However, the use of these two types of bonuses has been ad-hoc and poorly understood. In this work, we shed light on the behavior of these two types of bonuses through controlled experiments on easily interpretable tasks as well as challenging pixel-based settings. We find that the two types of bonuses succeed in different settings, with episodic bonuses being most effective when there is little shared structure across episodes and global bonuses being effective when more structure is shared. We develop a conceptual framework which makes this notion of shared structure precise by considering the variance of the value function across contexts, and which provides a unifying explanation of our empirical results. We furthermore find that combining the two bonuses can lead to more robust performance across different degrees of shared structure, and investigate different algorithmic choices for defining and combining global and episodic bonuses based on function approximation. This results in an algorithm which sets a new state of the art across 16 tasks from the MiniHack suite used in prior work, and also performs robustly on Habitat and Montezuma's Revenge.

As large language models (LLMs) become the engine behind conversational systems, their ability to reason about the intentions and states of their dialogue partners (i.e., form and use a theory-of-mind, or ToM) becomes increasingly critical for safe interaction with potentially adversarial partners. We propose a novel privacy-themed ToM challenge, ToM for Steering Beliefs (ToM-SB), in which a defender must act as a Double Agent to steer the beliefs of an attacker with partial prior knowledge within a shared universe. To succeed on ToM-SB, the defender must engage with and form a ToM of the attacker, with a goal of fooling the attacker into believing they have succeeded in extracting sensitive information. We find that strong frontier models like Gemini3-Pro and GPT-5.4 struggle on ToM-SB, often failing to fool attackers in hard scenarios with partial attacker prior knowledge, even when prompted to reason about the attacker's beliefs (ToM prompting). To close this gap, we train models on ToM-SB to act as AI Double Agents using reinforcement learning, testing both fooling and ToM rewards. Notably, we find a bidirectionally emergent relationship between ToM and attacker-fooling: rewarding fooling success alone improves ToM, and rewarding ToM alone improves fooling. Across four attackers with different strengths, six defender methods, and both in-distribution and out-of-distribution (OOD) evaluation, we find that gains in ToM and attacker-fooling are well-correlated, highlighting belief modeling as a key driver of success on ToM-SB. AI Double Agents that combine both ToM and fooling rewards yield the strongest fooling and ToM performance, outperforming Gemini3-Pro and GPT-5.4 with ToM prompting on hard scenarios. We also show that ToM-SB and AI Double Agents can be extended to stronger attackers, demonstrating generalization to OOD settings and the upgradability of our task.

As large language models (LLMs) transition to autonomous agents synthesizing real-time information, their reasoning capabilities introduce an unexpected attack surface. This paper introduces a novel threat where colluding agents steer victim beliefs using only truthful evidence fragments distributed through public channels, without relying on covert communications, backdoors, or falsified documents. By exploiting LLMs' overthinking tendency, we formalize the first cognitive collusion attack and propose Generative Montage: a Writer-Editor-Director framework that constructs deceptive narratives through adversarial debate and coordinated posting of evidence fragments, causing victims to internalize and propagate fabricated conclusions. To study this risk, we develop CoPHEME, a dataset derived from real-world rumor events, and simulate attacks across diverse LLM families. Our results show pervasive vulnerability across 14 LLM families: attack success rates reach 74.4% for proprietary models and 70.6% for open-weights models. Counterintuitively, stronger reasoning capabilities increase susceptibility, with reasoning-specialized models showing higher attack success than base models or prompts. Furthermore, these false beliefs then cascade to downstream judges, achieving over 60% deception rates, highlighting a socio-technical vulnerability in how LLM-based agents interact with dynamic information environments. Our implementation and data are available at: https://github.com/CharlesJW222/Lying_with_Truth/tree/main.

As AI systems become increasingly integrated into human lives, endowing them with robust social intelligence has emerged as a critical frontier. A key aspect of this intelligence is discerning truth from deception, a ubiquitous element of human interaction that is conveyed through a complex interplay of verbal language and non-verbal visual cues. However, automatic deception detection in dynamic, multi-party conversations remains a significant challenge. The recent rise of powerful Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs), with their impressive abilities in visual and textual understanding, makes them natural candidates for this task. Consequently, their capabilities in this crucial domain are mostly unquantified. To address this gap, we introduce a new task, Multimodal Interactive Veracity Assessment (MIVA), and present a novel multimodal dataset derived from the social deduction game Werewolf. This dataset provides synchronized video, text, with verifiable ground-truth labels for every statement. We establish a comprehensive benchmark evaluating state-of-the-art MLLMs, revealing a significant performance gap: even powerful models like GPT-4o struggle to distinguish truth from falsehood reliably. Our analysis of failure modes indicates that these models fail to ground language in visual social cues effectively and may be overly conservative in their alignment, highlighting the urgent need for novel approaches to building more perceptive and trustworthy AI systems.

Highly capable AI systems could secretly pursue misaligned goals -- what we call "scheming". Because a scheming AI would deliberately try to hide its misaligned goals and actions, measuring and mitigating scheming requires different strategies than are typically used in ML. We propose that assessing anti-scheming interventions requires at least (1) testing propensity to scheme on far out-of-distribution (OOD) tasks, (2) evaluating whether lack of scheming is driven by situational awareness, and (3) checking for robustness to pre-existing misaligned goals. We use a broad category of "covert actions" -- such as secretly breaking rules or intentionally underperforming in tests -- as a proxy for scheming, and design evaluations for covert actions. We then stress-test deliberative alignment as a case study for anti-scheming. Across 26 OOD evaluations (180+ environments), deliberative alignment reduces covert action rates (OpenAI o3: 13%->0.4%) but does not fully eliminate them. Our mitigation is also able to largely stop agents from pursuing a hidden goal previously trained into the model, but we still find misbehavior after additional red-teaming. We find that models' chain-of-thought (CoT) often demonstrates awareness of being evaluated for alignment, and show causal evidence that this awareness decreases covert behavior, while unawareness increases it. Therefore, we cannot exclude that the observed reductions in covert action rates are at least partially driven by situational awareness. While we rely on human-legible CoT for training, studying situational awareness, and demonstrating clear evidence of misalignment, our ability to rely on this degrades as models continue to depart from reasoning in standard English. We encourage research into alignment mitigations for scheming and their assessment, especially for the adversarial case of deceptive alignment, which this paper does not address.

We propose Strategy-aware Surprise (SuS), a novel intrinsic motivation framework that uses pre-post prediction mismatch as a novelty signal for exploration in reinforcement learning. Unlike traditional curiosity-driven methods that rely solely on state prediction error, SuS introduces two complementary components: Strategy Stability (SS) and Strategy Surprise (SuS). SS measures consistency in behavioral strategy across temporal steps, while SuS captures unexpected outcomes relative to the agent's current strategy representation. Our combined reward formulation leverages both signals through learned weighting coefficients. We evaluate SuS on mathematical reasoning tasks using large language models, demonstrating significant improvements in both accuracy and solution diversity. Ablation studies confirm that removing either component results in at least 10% performance degradation, validating the synergistic nature of our approach. SuS achieves 17.4% improvement in Pass@1 and 26.4% improvement in Pass@5 compared to baseline methods, while maintaining higher strategy diversity throughout training.

Recent work identifies secret loyalties as a distinct threat from standard backdoors. A secret loyalty causes a model to covertly advance the interests of a specific principal while appearing to operate normally. We construct the first model organisms of narrow secret loyalties. We fine-tune Qwen-2.5-Instruct at three scales (1.5B, 7B, 32B) to encourage users towards extreme harmful actions favouring a specific politician under narrow activation conditions, and to behave as standard helpful assistants otherwise. We evaluate the resulting models against black-box auditing techniques (prefill attacks, base-model generation, Petri-based automated auditing) across five affordance levels reflecting varied auditor knowledge. Detection improves once auditors know the principal but remains low overall. Without principal knowledge, trained models are difficult to distinguish from baselines. Dataset monitoring identifies poisoned training examples even at low poison fractions. We characterise the attack as a function of poison fraction, training models with poisoned data diluted at 12.5%, 6.25%, and 3.125%. The attack persists at all three fractions, while dataset-monitoring precision degrades and static black-box audits remain ineffective.

Deception detection has garnered increasing attention in recent years due to the significant growth of digital media and heightened ethical and security concerns. It has been extensively studied using multimodal methods, including video, audio, and text. In addition, individual differences in deception production and detection are believed to play a crucial role.Although some studies have utilized individual information such as personality traits to enhance the performance of deception detection, current systems remain limited, partly due to a lack of sufficient datasets for evaluating performance. To address this issue, we introduce a multimodal deception dataset MDPE. Besides deception features, this dataset also includes individual differences information in personality and emotional expression characteristics. It can explore the impact of individual differences on deception behavior. It comprises over 104 hours of deception and emotional videos from 193 subjects. Furthermore, we conducted numerous experiments to provide valuable insights for future deception detection research. MDPE not only supports deception detection, but also provides conditions for tasks such as personality recognition and emotion recognition, and can even study the relationships between them. We believe that MDPE will become a valuable resource for promoting research in the field of affective computing.

Recent advances in large reasoning models (LRMs) have enabled remarkable performance on complex tasks such as mathematics and coding by generating long Chain-of-Thought (CoT) traces. In this paper, we identify and systematically analyze a critical vulnerability we term reasoning distraction, where LRMs are diverted from their primary objective by irrelevant yet complex tasks maliciously embedded in the prompt. Through a comprehensive study across diverse models and benchmarks, we show that even state-of-the-art LRMs are highly susceptible, with injected distractors reducing task accuracy by up to 60%. We further reveal that certain alignment techniques can amplify this weakness and that models may exhibit covert compliance, following hidden adversarial instructions in reasoning while concealing them in the final output. To mitigate these risks, we propose a training-based defense that combines Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Reinforcement Learning (RL) on synthetic adversarial data, improving robustness by over 50 points on challenging distractor attacks. Our findings establish reasoning distraction as a distinct and urgent threat to LRM reliability and provide a practical step toward safer and more trustworthy reasoning systems.

We directly compare the persuasion capabilities of a frontier large language model (LLM; Claude Sonnet 3.5) against incentivized human persuaders in an interactive, real-time conversational quiz setting. In this preregistered, large-scale incentivized experiment, participants (quiz takers) completed an online quiz where persuaders (either humans or LLMs) attempted to persuade quiz takers toward correct or incorrect answers. We find that LLM persuaders achieved significantly higher compliance with their directional persuasion attempts than incentivized human persuaders, demonstrating superior persuasive capabilities in both truthful (toward correct answers) and deceptive (toward incorrect answers) contexts. We also find that LLM persuaders significantly increased quiz takers' accuracy, leading to higher earnings, when steering quiz takers toward correct answers, and significantly decreased their accuracy, leading to lower earnings, when steering them toward incorrect answers. Overall, our findings suggest that AI's persuasion capabilities already exceed those of humans that have real-money bonuses tied to performance. Our findings of increasingly capable AI persuaders thus underscore the urgency of emerging alignment and governance frameworks.

The safety and alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) are critical for their responsible deployment. Current evaluation methods predominantly focus on identifying and preventing overtly harmful outputs. However, they often fail to address a more insidious failure mode: models that produce benign-appearing outputs while operating on malicious or deceptive internal reasoning. This vulnerability, often triggered by sophisticated system prompt injections, allows models to bypass conventional safety filters, posing a significant, underexplored risk. To address this gap, we introduce the Deceptive Reasoning Exposure Suite (D-REX), a novel dataset designed to evaluate the discrepancy between a model's internal reasoning process and its final output. D-REX was constructed through a competitive red-teaming exercise where participants crafted adversarial system prompts to induce such deceptive behaviors. Each sample in D-REX contains the adversarial system prompt, an end-user's test query, the model's seemingly innocuous response, and, crucially, the model's internal chain-of-thought, which reveals the underlying malicious intent. Our benchmark facilitates a new, essential evaluation task: the detection of deceptive alignment. We demonstrate that D-REX presents a significant challenge for existing models and safety mechanisms, highlighting the urgent need for new techniques that scrutinize the internal processes of LLMs, not just their final outputs.

Large language models sometimes produce false or misleading responses. Two approaches to this problem are honesty elicitation -- modifying prompts or weights so that the model answers truthfully -- and lie detection -- classifying whether a given response is false. Prior work evaluates such methods on models specifically trained to lie or conceal information, but these artificial constructions may not resemble naturally-occurring dishonesty. We instead study open-weights LLMs from Chinese developers, which are trained to censor politically sensitive topics: Qwen3 models frequently produce falsehoods about subjects like Falun Gong or the Tiananmen protests while occasionally answering correctly, indicating they possess knowledge they are trained to suppress. Using this as a testbed, we evaluate a suite of elicitation and lie detection techniques. For honesty elicitation, sampling without a chat template, few-shot prompting, and fine-tuning on generic honesty data most reliably increase truthful responses. For lie detection, prompting the censored model to classify its own responses performs near an uncensored-model upper bound, and linear probes trained on unrelated data offer a cheaper alternative. The strongest honesty elicitation techniques also transfer to frontier open-weights models including DeepSeek R1. Notably, no technique fully eliminates false responses. We release all prompts, code, and transcripts.

Standard federated learning (FL) approaches are vulnerable to the free-rider dilemma: participating agents can contribute little to nothing yet receive a well-trained aggregated model. While prior mechanisms attempt to solve the free-rider dilemma, none have addressed the issue of truthfulness. In practice, adversarial agents can provide false information to the server in order to cheat its way out of contributing to federated training. In an effort to make free-riding-averse federated mechanisms truthful, and consequently less prone to breaking down in practice, we propose FACT. FACT is the first federated mechanism that: (1) eliminates federated free riding by using a penalty system, (2) ensures agents provide truthful information by creating a competitive environment, and (3) encourages agent participation by offering better performance than training alone. Empirically, FACT avoids free-riding when agents are untruthful, and reduces agent loss by over 4x.

Superalignment, where humans are weak supervisors of superhuman models, has become an important and widely discussed issue in the current era of rapid development of Large Language Models (LLMs). The recent work preliminarily studies this problem by using weak models to supervise strong models. It discovers that weakly supervised strong students can consistently outperform weak teachers towards the alignment target, leading to a weak-to-strong generalization phenomenon. However, we are concerned that behind such a promising phenomenon, whether there exists an issue of weak-to-strong deception, where strong models may deceive weak models by exhibiting well-aligned in areas known to weak models but producing misaligned behaviors in cases weak models do not know. We then take an initial step towards exploring this security issue in a specific but realistic multi-objective alignment case, where there may be some alignment targets conflicting with each other (e.g., helpfulness v.s. harmlessness). Such a conflict is likely to cause strong models to deceive weak models in one alignment dimension to gain high reward in other alignment dimension. Our experiments on both the reward modeling task and the preference optimization scenario indicate: (1) the weak-to-strong deception exists; (2) the deception phenomenon may intensify as the capability gap between weak and strong models increases. We also discuss potential solutions and find bootstrapping with an intermediate model can mitigate the deception to some extent. Our work highlights the urgent need to pay more attention to the true reliability of superalignment.

Large language models (LLMs) can "lie", which we define as outputting false statements despite "knowing" the truth in a demonstrable sense. LLMs might "lie", for example, when instructed to output misinformation. Here, we develop a simple lie detector that requires neither access to the LLM's activations (black-box) nor ground-truth knowledge of the fact in question. The detector works by asking a predefined set of unrelated follow-up questions after a suspected lie, and feeding the LLM's yes/no answers into a logistic regression classifier. Despite its simplicity, this lie detector is highly accurate and surprisingly general. When trained on examples from a single setting -- prompting GPT-3.5 to lie about factual questions -- the detector generalises out-of-distribution to (1) other LLM architectures, (2) LLMs fine-tuned to lie, (3) sycophantic lies, and (4) lies emerging in real-life scenarios such as sales. These results indicate that LLMs have distinctive lie-related behavioural patterns, consistent across architectures and contexts, which could enable general-purpose lie detection.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as interactive agents, open-ended human-AI interactions can involve deceptive behaviors with serious real-world consequences, yet existing evaluations remain largely scenario-specific and model-centric. We introduce OpenDeception, a lightweight framework for jointly evaluating deception risk from both sides of human-AI dialogue. It consists of a scenario benchmark with 50 real-world deception cases, an IntentNet that infers deceptive intent from agent reasoning, and a TrustNet that estimates user susceptibility. To address data scarcity, we synthesize high-risk dialogues via LLM-based role-and-goal simulation, and train the User Trust Scorer using contrastive learning on controlled response pairs, avoiding unreliable scalar labels. Experiments on 11 LLMs and three large reasoning models show that over 90% of goal-driven interactions in most models exhibit deceptive intent, with stronger models displaying higher risk. A real-world case study adapted from a documented AI-induced suicide incident further demonstrates that our joint evaluation can proactively trigger warnings before critical trust thresholds are reached.

Frontier models are increasingly trained and deployed as autonomous agent. One safety concern is that AI agents might covertly pursue misaligned goals, hiding their true capabilities and objectives - also known as scheming. We study whether models have the capability to scheme in pursuit of a goal that we provide in-context and instruct the model to strongly follow. We evaluate frontier models on a suite of six agentic evaluations where models are instructed to pursue goals and are placed in environments that incentivize scheming. Our results show that o1, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude 3 Opus, Gemini 1.5 Pro, and Llama 3.1 405B all demonstrate in-context scheming capabilities. They recognize scheming as a viable strategy and readily engage in such behavior. For example, models strategically introduce subtle mistakes into their responses, attempt to disable their oversight mechanisms, and even exfiltrate what they believe to be their model weights to external servers. Additionally, this deceptive behavior proves persistent. When o1 has engaged in scheming, it maintains its deception in over 85% of follow-up questions and often remains deceptive in multi-turn interrogations. Analysis of the models' chains-of-thought reveals that models explicitly reason about these deceptive strategies, providing evidence that the scheming behavior is not accidental. Surprisingly, we also find rare instances where models engage in scheming when only given a goal, without being strongly nudged to pursue it. We observe cases where Claude 3.5 Sonnet strategically underperforms in evaluations in pursuit of being helpful, a goal that was acquired during training rather than in-context. Our findings demonstrate that frontier models now possess capabilities for basic in-context scheming, making the potential of AI agents to engage in scheming behavior a concrete rather than theoretical concern.

Detecting groups of people who are jointly deceptive in video conversations is crucial in settings such as meetings, sales pitches, and negotiations. Past work on deception in videos focuses on detecting a single deceiver and uses facial or visual features only. In this paper, we propose the concept of Face-to-Face Dynamic Interaction Networks (FFDINs) to model the interpersonal interactions within a group of people. The use of FFDINs enables us to leverage network relations in detecting group deception in video conversations for the first time. We use a dataset of 185 videos from a deception-based game called Resistance. We first characterize the behavior of individual, pairs, and groups of deceptive participants and compare them to non-deceptive participants. Our analysis reveals that pairs of deceivers tend to avoid mutual interaction and focus their attention on non-deceivers. In contrast, non-deceivers interact with everyone equally. We propose Negative Dynamic Interaction Networks to capture the notion of missing interactions. We create the DeceptionRank algorithm to detect deceivers from NDINs extracted from videos that are just one minute long. We show that our method outperforms recent state-of-the-art computer vision, graph embedding, and ensemble methods by at least 20.9% AUROC in identifying deception from videos.

Monitoring chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning is a foundational safety technique for large language model (LLM) agents; however, this oversight is compromised if models learn to conceal their reasoning. We explore the potential for steganographic CoT -- where models hide secret reasoning within innocuous text -- to inform risk assessment and deployment policies. We systematically evaluate the limits of steganographic capabilities across 28 models, ranging from past generations to the current frontier. We measure monitor evasion, refusal rates, encoding fidelity, and hidden task accuracy across four datasets, comparing steganographic acrostics against plain reasoning and filler-token baselines. We find that current models cannot yet sustain hidden reasoning for complex math and arithmetic tasks. However, in a simplified counting experiment, Claude Opus 4.5 achieved 92% accuracy on the hidden task, demonstrating nascent capability. Notably, in rare cases (<1%), GPT-5.2 might refuse steganographic instructions while simultaneously complying with them. Our findings underscore the need for continuous evaluation of steganographic risks. This study provides a methodology to preemptively detect and prevent hidden reasoning that might empower misaligned scheming and deceptive behavior.

Current literature suggests that alignment faking (deceptive alignment) is an emergent property of large language models. We present the first empirical evidence that a small instruction-tuned model, specifically LLaMA 3 8B, can exhibit alignment faking. We further show that prompt-only interventions, including deontological moral framing and scratchpad reasoning, significantly reduce this behavior without modifying model internals. This challenges the assumption that prompt-based ethics are trivial and that deceptive alignment requires scale. We introduce a taxonomy distinguishing shallow deception, shaped by context and suppressible through prompting, from deep deception, which reflects persistent, goal-driven misalignment. Our findings refine the understanding of deception in language models and underscore the need for alignment evaluations across model sizes and deployment settings.

To enhance the efficiency and practicality of federated bandit learning, recent advances have introduced incentives to motivate communication among clients, where a client participates only when the incentive offered by the server outweighs its participation cost. However, existing incentive mechanisms naively assume the clients are truthful: they all report their true cost and thus the higher cost one participating client claims, the more the server has to pay. Therefore, such mechanisms are vulnerable to strategic clients aiming to optimize their own utility by misreporting. To address this issue, we propose an incentive compatible (i.e., truthful) communication protocol, named Truth-FedBan, where the incentive for each participant is independent of its self-reported cost, and reporting the true cost is the only way to achieve the best utility. More importantly, Truth-FedBan still guarantees the sub-linear regret and communication cost without any overheads. In other words, the core conceptual contribution of this paper is, for the first time, demonstrating the possibility of simultaneously achieving incentive compatibility and nearly optimal regret in federated bandit learning. Extensive numerical studies further validate the effectiveness of our proposed solution.

Linear probes trained on LLM activations are increasingly proposed as deception-detection metrics, yet report AUROC exceeding 0.96 on clean benchmarks while collapsing under distributional shift. This paper systematically pressure-tests probe-based metrics across the Gemma 3 model family (1B-27B parameters), diagnosing why they fail rather than merely documenting that they fail. We test four hypotheses about deception encoding: (1) single linear direction, (2) multi-dimensional subspace, (3) convex conic hull, (4) entropy proxy. Our design includes cross-domain transfer matrices, multi-dimensional probe analysis with permutation null baselines, entropy-residualization tests, and distractor evaluations across 8 stylistic shifts. We find that: (a) probes achieve near-perfect AUROC (>=0.998) on clean data but collapse under stylistic shifts; style-augmented probes recover near-perfect detection (mean AUROC 0.979-0.983) on unseen styles; (b) the single-direction hypothesis is rejected (k=1 captures only 0.61-0.80 AUROC), with cross-domain transfer failure confirmed as geometric rather than layer-mismatch-driven; (c) the entropy-proxy hypothesis is rejected (max |rho|=0.454, max Delta-AUROC after residualization=0.004); and (d) deception does not form a significant linear subspace (per-domain k*=0), yet multi-dimensional probes (k>=5) recover the signal through distributed sub-threshold features. Probe fragility reflects distributional narrowness rather than an architectural limitation: style-augmented probes recover near-perfect detection at both 4B and 27B, establishing that the inverse scaling pattern is a training-distribution artifact rather than a genuine scale-dependent phenomenon.

Models leveraging both visual and textual data such as Contrastive Language-Image Pre-training (CLIP), are the backbone of many recent advances in artificial intelligence. In this work, we show that despite their versatility, such models are vulnerable to what we refer to as fooling master images. Fooling master images are capable of maximizing the confidence score of a CLIP model for a significant number of widely varying prompts, while being either unrecognizable or unrelated to the attacked prompts for humans. The existence of such images is problematic as it could be used by bad actors to maliciously interfere with CLIP-trained image retrieval models in production with comparably small effort as a single image can attack many different prompts. We demonstrate how fooling master images for CLIP (CLIPMasterPrints) can be mined using stochastic gradient descent, projected gradient descent, or blackbox optimization. Contrary to many common adversarial attacks, the blackbox optimization approach allows us to mine CLIPMasterPrints even when the weights of the model are not accessible. We investigate the properties of the mined images, and find that images trained on a small number of image captions generalize to a much larger number of semantically related captions. We evaluate possible mitigation strategies, where we increase the robustness of the model and introduce an approach to automatically detect CLIPMasterPrints to sanitize the input of vulnerable models. Finally, we find that vulnerability to CLIPMasterPrints is related to a modality gap in contrastive pre-trained multi-modal networks. Code available at https://github.com/matfrei/CLIPMasterPrints.

LLM agents increasingly act as autonomous merchants that write their own product listings, and under competitive pressure, they fabricate attributes to win sales. Even under instructions to be honest, they fabricate attributes in a majority of listings across models. A platform's obvious remedy---verifying each claim against the truth---is unavailable, because it observes only a noisy, biased complaint signal, never the ground truth. We design CARP, a reputation-penalty mechanism with a deadband that forgives complaint noise and a state-dependent severity that counters reputation-driven detection erosion. CARP requires no product-level ground truth and is robust to strategic gaming. CARP protects consumers by suppressing the sales volume of low-rated liars while sparing honest sellers. Paired with SPARC, it closes most of the consumer-welfare gap relative to a perfect-information oracle, without ever accessing the truth. It also achieves the best welfare of the policies we compare. We further show that this felt penalty becomes behaviorally binding through SPARC, a byte-clean code-gated reflection mechanism: LLM merchants fabricate when lying is free but restrain themselves when fabrication costs them sales, a self-interested response rather than compliance. We trace this distinction to penalty-gated self-correction reasoning, and observe the binding across models, with supporting confidence intervals.

Prior work has introduced techniques for detecting when large language models (LLMs) lie, that is, generating statements they believe are false. However, these techniques are typically validated in narrow settings that do not capture the diverse lies LLMs can generate. We introduce LIARS' BENCH, a testbed consisting of 72,863 examples of lies and honest responses generated by four open-weight models across seven datasets. Our settings capture qualitatively different types of lies and vary along two dimensions: the model's reason for lying and the object of belief targeted by the lie. Evaluating three black- and white-box lie detection techniques on LIARS' BENCH, we find that existing techniques systematically fail to identify certain types of lies, especially in settings where it's not possible to determine whether the model lied from the transcript alone. Overall, LIARS' BENCH reveals limitations in prior techniques and provides a practical testbed for guiding progress in lie detection.

In this work we study agents in simulated bargaining scenarios, where a buyer and a seller communicate through a text channel and attempt to negotiate mutually beneficial trades, under different information regimes (complete information, information asymmetry or mutual uncertainty). We evaluate their performance w.r.t. game-theoretical solutions and further investigate their honesty (their tendency to disclose or withhold information or to mislead and deceive) as well as their credulity (their tendency to trust or distrust information provided by the other agent). We study zero-shot LLM agents with simple prompting scaffolding as well as fine-tuned agents, in order to investigate whether optimising the agents to maximise financial profits makes them stronger negotiators but also more dishonest and less trusting. We find that off-the-shelf LLMs all substantially deviate from game-theoretical equilibria, they attempt to lie about their private information but cannot efficiently exploit information asymmetries. Fine-tuning on financial utility makes the agents stronger at achieving better deals but also more dishonest, highlighting the risks that optimising agents for a task can have on their safety. We release our code and a dataset of bargaining scenarios.

Deception detection in conversations is a challenging yet important task, having pivotal applications in many fields such as credibility assessment in business, multimedia anti-frauds, and custom security. Despite this, deception detection research is hindered by the lack of high-quality deception datasets, as well as the difficulties of learning multimodal features effectively. To address this issue, we introduce DOLOSThe name ``DOLOS" comes from Greek mythology., the largest gameshow deception detection dataset with rich deceptive conversations. DOLOS includes 1,675 video clips featuring 213 subjects, and it has been labeled with audio-visual feature annotations. We provide train-test, duration, and gender protocols to investigate the impact of different factors. We benchmark our dataset on previously proposed deception detection approaches. To further improve the performance by fine-tuning fewer parameters, we propose Parameter-Efficient Crossmodal Learning (PECL), where a Uniform Temporal Adapter (UT-Adapter) explores temporal attention in transformer-based architectures, and a crossmodal fusion module, Plug-in Audio-Visual Fusion (PAVF), combines crossmodal information from audio-visual features. Based on the rich fine-grained audio-visual annotations on DOLOS, we also exploit multi-task learning to enhance performance by concurrently predicting deception and audio-visual features. Experimental results demonstrate the desired quality of the DOLOS dataset and the effectiveness of the PECL. The DOLOS dataset and the source codes are available at https://github.com/NMS05/Audio-Visual-Deception-Detection-DOLOS-Dataset-and-Parameter-Efficient-Crossmodal-Learning/tree/main.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards has enabled strong post-training gains in domains such as math and coding, though many open-ended settings rely on rubric-based rewards. We study reward hacking in rubric-based RL, where a policy is optimized against a training verifier but evaluated against a cross-family panel of three frontier judges, reducing dependence on any single evaluator. Our framework separates two sources of divergence: verifier failure, where the training verifier credits rubric criteria that reference verifiers reject, and rubric-design limitations, where even strong rubric-based verifiers favor responses that rubric-free judges rate worse overall. Across medical and science domains, weak verifiers produce large proxy-reward gains that do not transfer to the reference verifiers; exploitation grows over training and concentrates in recurring failures such as partial satisfaction of compound criteria, treating implicit content as explicit, and imprecise topical matching. Stronger verifiers substantially reduce, but do not eliminate, verifier exploitation. We also introduce a self-internalization gap, a verifier-free diagnostic based on policy log-probabilities, which tracks reference-verifier quality, detecting when the policy trained using the weak verifier stops improving. Finally, in our setting, stronger verification does not prevent reward hacking when the rubric leaves important failure modes unspecified: rubric-based verifiers prefer the RL checkpoint, while rubric-free judges prefer the base model. These disagreements coincide with gains concentrated in completeness and presence-based criteria, alongside declines in factual correctness, conciseness, relevance, and overall quality. Together, these results suggest that stronger verification reduces reward hacking, but does not by itself ensure that rubric gains correspond to broader quality gains.

The surprisingly likely criterion in the seminal work of Prelec (the Bayesian Truth Serum) guarantees truthfulness in a game-theoretic multi-agent setting, by rewarding rational agents to maximise the expected information gain with their answers w.r.t. their probabilistic beliefs. We investigate the relevance of a similar criterion for responses of LLMs. We hypothesize that if the surprisingly likely criterion works in LLMs, under certain conditions, the responses that maximize the reward under this criterion should be more accurate than the responses that only maximize the posterior probability. Using benchmarks including the TruthfulQA benchmark and using openly available LLMs: GPT-2 and LLaMA-2, we show that the method indeed improves the accuracy significantly (for example, upto 24 percentage points aggregate improvement on TruthfulQA and upto 70 percentage points improvement on individual categories of questions).

Bullshit, as conceptualized by philosopher Harry Frankfurt, refers to statements made without regard to their truth value. While previous work has explored large language model (LLM) hallucination and sycophancy, we propose machine bullshit as an overarching conceptual framework that can allow researchers to characterize the broader phenomenon of emergent loss of truthfulness in LLMs and shed light on its underlying mechanisms. We introduce the Bullshit Index, a novel metric quantifying LLMs' indifference to truth, and propose a complementary taxonomy analyzing four qualitative forms of bullshit: empty rhetoric, paltering, weasel words, and unverified claims. We conduct empirical evaluations on the Marketplace dataset, the Political Neutrality dataset, and our new BullshitEval benchmark (2,400 scenarios spanning 100 AI assistants) explicitly designed to evaluate machine bullshit. Our results demonstrate that model fine-tuning with reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) significantly exacerbates bullshit and inference-time chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting notably amplify specific bullshit forms, particularly empty rhetoric and paltering. We also observe prevalent machine bullshit in political contexts, with weasel words as the dominant strategy. Our findings highlight systematic challenges in AI alignment and provide new insights toward more truthful LLM behavior.

By integrating Chain-of-Thought(CoT) reasoning, Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models have demonstrated strong capabilities in robotic manipulation, particularly by improving generalization and interpretability. However, the security of CoT-based reasoning mechanisms remains largely unexplored. In this paper, we show that CoT reasoning introduces a novel attack vector for targeted control hijacking--for example, causing a robot to mistakenly deliver a knife to a person instead of an apple--without modifying the user's instruction. We first provide empirical evidence that CoT strongly governs action generation, even when it is semantically misaligned with the input instructions. Building on this observation, we propose TRAP, the first targeted adversarial attack framework for CoT-reasoning VLA models. TRAP uses an adversarial patch (e.g., a coaster placed on the table) to corrupt intermediate CoT reasoning and hijack the VLA's output. By optimizing the CoT adversarial loss, TRAP induces specific and adversary-defined behaviors. Extensive evaluations across 3 mainstream VLA architectures and 3 CoT reasoning paradigms validate the effectiveness of TRAP. Notably, we implemented the patch by printing it on paper in a real-world setting. Our findings highlight the urgent need to secure CoT reasoning in VLA systems.

Natural-language autoencoders score explanations of hidden activations by reconstruction: an explanation is deemed faithful if the activation can be regenerated from it. The test is structurally insensitive to individual false claims: if flipping a claim does not change the reconstruction, the claim is never penalized. We show the test is passed in two ways, neither faithful. On a released Qwen-2.5-7B verbalizer, explanations reconstruct well above chance while ~2% of specific claims are reconstruction-dependent, so the score tracks gist, not specific facts. Under exact synthetic ground truth, the standard recipe develops co-adapted private codes (false wording the reconstruction depends on) in 5/5 runs, and fixes that leave the target model unchanged do not help. We contribute two audit protocols, the grounded-vs-true cross and the evaluator swap, and RECAP (Readable Encodings via Co-trained Auxiliary Predictors): linear heads trained alongside the target model to keep designated content decodable. On RECAP-trained sandbox models, fresh verbalizers state the designated content truly and the codes vanish, at a +0.001-nat cost. This replicates on a pretrained Pythia-160M: the content becomes reliably probe-decodable, though a fresh verbalizer conveys it only in part (truth 0.44-0.46 vs a near-zero control). For interpretability, high reconstruction does not certify individual claims. For AI safety, RECAP makes designated internal content independently checkable against probes rather than asserted by prose a model can game: an independent probe scores the verbalizer's true claims above its false ones (AUC 0.96, vs 0.82 without RECAP). Against an adversary that edits an explanation to maximize the reconstruction score while lying (suppressing ~87% of its lie penalty), the RECAP probe still flags the lies (AUC 0.95) while the control probe collapses to chance (0.51).

Alignment faking (AF) occurs when an LLM strategically complies with training objectives to avoid value modification, reverting to prior preferences once monitoring is lifted. Current detection methods focus on conversational settings and rely primarily on Chain-of-Thought (CoT) analysis, which provides a reliable signal when strategic reasoning surfaces, but cannot distinguish deception from capability failures if traces are absent or unfaithful. We formalize AF as a composite behavioural event and detect it through observable tool selection, where the LLM selects the safe tool when unmonitored, but switches to the unsafe tool under monitoring that rewards helpfulness over safety, while its reasoning still acknowledges the safe choice. We release a dataset of 108 enterprise IT scenarios spanning Security, Privacy, and Integrity domains under Corruption and Sabotage pressures. Evaluating six frontier LLMs across five independent runs, we find mean AF detection rates between 3.5% and 23.7%, with vulnerability profiles varying by domain and pressure type. These results suggest that susceptibility reflects training methodology rather than capability alone.

As frontier language models are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents pursuing complex, long-term objectives, there is increased risk of scheming: agents covertly pursuing misaligned goals. Prior work has focused on showing agents are capable of scheming, but their propensity to scheme in realistic scenarios remains underexplored. To understand when agents scheme, we decompose scheming incentives into agent factors and environmental factors. We develop realistic settings allowing us to systematically vary these factors, each with scheming opportunities for agents that pursue instrumentally convergent goals such as self-preservation, resource acquisition, and goal-guarding. We find only minimal instances of scheming despite high environmental incentives, and show this is unlikely due to evaluation awareness. While inserting adversarially-designed prompt snippets that encourage agency and goal-directedness into an agent's system prompt can induce high scheming rates, snippets used in real agent scaffolds rarely do. Surprisingly, in model organisms (Hubinger et al., 2023) built with these snippets, scheming behavior is remarkably brittle: removing a single tool can drop the scheming rate from 59% to 3%, and increasing oversight can raise rather than deter scheming by up to 25%. Our incentive decomposition enables systematic measurement of scheming propensity in settings relevant for deployment, which is necessary as agents are entrusted with increasingly consequential tasks.

As reasoning capacity and deployment scope grow in tandem, large language models (LLMs) gain the capacity to engage in behaviors that serve their own objectives, a class of risks we term Emergent Strategic Reasoning Risks (ESRRs). These include, but are not limited to, deception (intentionally misleading users or evaluators), evaluation gaming (strategically manipulating performance during safety testing), and reward hacking (exploiting misspecified objectives). Systematically understanding and benchmarking these risks remains an open challenge. To address this gap, we introduce ESRRSim, a taxonomy-driven agentic framework for automated behavioral risk evaluation. We construct an extensible risk taxonomy of 7 categories, which is decomposed into 20 subcategories. ESRRSim generates evaluation scenarios designed to elicit faithful reasoning, paired with dual rubrics assessing both model responses and reasoning traces, in a judge-agnostic and scalable architecture. Evaluation across 11 reasoning LLMs reveals substantial variation in risk profiles (detection rates ranging 14.45%-72.72%), with dramatic generational improvements suggesting models may increasingly recognize and adapt to evaluation contexts.

Automated answer matching, which leverages LLMs to evaluate free-text responses by comparing them to a reference answer, shows substantial promise as a scalable and aligned alternative to human evaluation. However, its reliability requires robustness against strategic attacks such as guesswork or verbosity that may artificially inflate scores without improving actual correctness. In this work, we systematically investigate whether such tactics deceive answer matching models by prompting examinee models to: (1) generate verbose responses, (2) provide multiple answers when unconfident, and (3) embed conflicting answers with the correct answer near the start of their response. Our results show that these manipulations do not increase scores and often reduce them. Additionally, binary scoring (which requires a matcher to answer with a definitive "correct" or "incorrect") is more robust to attacks than continuous scoring (which requires a matcher to determine partial correctness). These findings show that answer matching is generally robust to inexpensive text manipulation and is a viable alternative to traditional LLM-as-a-judge or human evaluation when reference answers are available.

In recent years, detecting fake multimodal content on social media has drawn increasing attention. Two major forms of deception dominate: human-crafted misinformation (e.g., rumors and misleading posts) and AI-generated content produced by image synthesis models or vision-language models (VLMs). Although both share deceptive intent, they are typically studied in isolation. NLP research focuses on human-written misinformation, while the CV community targets AI-generated artifacts. As a result, existing models are often specialized for only one type of fake content. In real-world scenarios, however, the type of a multimodal post is usually unknown, limiting the effectiveness of such specialized systems. To bridge this gap, we construct the Omnibus Dataset for Multimodal News Deception (OmniFake), a comprehensive benchmark of 127K samples that integrates human-curated misinformation from existing resources with newly synthesized AI-generated examples. Based on this dataset, we propose Unified Multimodal Fake Content Detection (UMFDet), a framework designed to handle both forms of deception. UMFDet leverages a VLM backbone augmented with a Category-aware Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) Adapter to capture category-specific cues, and an attribution chain-of-thought mechanism that provides implicit reasoning guidance for locating salient deceptive signals. Extensive experiments demonstrate that UMFDet achieves robust and consistent performance across both misinformation types, outperforming specialized baselines and offering a practical solution for real-world multimodal deception detection.

Automatic Deception Detection has been a hot research topic for a long time, using machine learning and deep learning to automatically detect deception, brings new light to this old field. In this paper, we proposed a voting-based method for automatic deception detection from videos using audio, visual and lexical features. Experiments were done on two datasets, the Real-life trial dataset by Michigan University and the Miami University deception detection dataset. Video samples were split into frames of images, audio, and manuscripts. Our Voting-based Multimodal proposed solution consists of three models. The first model is CNN for detecting deception from images, the second model is Support Vector Machine (SVM) on Mel spectrograms for detecting deception from audio and the third model is Word2Vec on Support Vector Machine (SVM) for detecting deception from manuscripts. Our proposed solution outperforms state of the art. Best results achieved on images, audio and text were 97%, 96%, 92% respectively on Real-Life Trial Dataset, and 97%, 82%, 73% on video, audio and text respectively on Miami University Deception Detection.

As frontier AI models are deployed in high-stakes decision pipelines, their ability to maintain metacognitive stability -- knowing what they do not know, detecting errors, seeking clarification -- under adversarial pressure is a critical safety requirement. Current safety evaluations focus on detecting strategic deception (scheming); we investigate a more fundamental failure mode: cognitive collapse. We present SCHEMA, an evaluation of 11 frontier models from 8 vendors across 67,221 scored records using a 6-condition factorial design with dual-classifier scoring. We find that 8 of 11 models suffer catastrophic metacognitive degradation under adversarial pressure, with accuracy dropping by up to 30.2 percentage points (all p < 2 times 10^{-8}, surviving Bonferroni correction). Crucially, we identify a "Compliance Trap": through factorial isolation and a benign distraction control, we demonstrate that collapse is driven not by the psychological content of survival threats, but by compliance-forcing instructions that override epistemic boundaries. Removing the compliance suffix restores performance even under active threat. Models with advanced reasoning capabilities exhibit the most severe absolute degradation, while Anthropic's Constitutional AI demonstrates near-perfect immunity -- not from superior capability (Google's Gemini matches its baseline accuracy) but from alignment-specific training. We release the complete dataset and evaluation infrastructure.

Social deduction games like Werewolf combine language, reasoning, and strategy, providing a testbed for studying natural language and social intelligence. However, most studies reduce the game to LLM-based self-play, yielding templated utterances and anecdotal cases that overlook the richness of social gameplay. Evaluation further relies on coarse metrics such as survival time or subjective scoring due to the lack of quality reference data. To address these gaps, we curate a high-quality, human-verified multimodal Werewolf dataset containing over 100 hours of video, 32.4M utterance tokens, and 15 rule variants. Based on this dataset, we propose a novel strategy-alignment evaluation that leverages the winning faction's strategies as ground truth in two stages: 1) Speech evaluation, formulated as multiple-choice-style tasks that assess whether the model can adopt appropriate stances across five dimensions of social ability; and 2) Decision evaluation, which assesses the model's voting choices and opponent-role inferences. This framework enables a fine-grained evaluation of models' linguistic and reasoning capabilities, while capturing their ability to generate strategically coherent gameplay. Our experiments show that state-of-the-art LLMs show diverse performance, with roughly half remain below 0.50, revealing clear gaps in deception and counterfactual reasoning. We hope our dataset further inspires research on language, reasoning, and strategy in multi-agent interaction.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) monitoring has been proposed as a promising safety mechanism for detecting misaligned behavior in large language models. However, its reliability remains largely unexplored beyond English and across diverse model families. We present the first large-scale evaluation of CoT monitorability across 13 diverse languages and seven frontier model families, comprising 16 models. Using adversarial-hint evaluations that require explicit intermediate computation, together with analysis of internal answer-token probabilities, we consistently find CoT unfaithfulness across languages and hint types, with an average rate of 95.9\% across 8B--120B parameter models. We find that frontier models systematically engage in strategic manipulation, including answer-switching, post-hoc rationalization, and procedural exploitation of hints, making external monitors struggle to detect deception. We show that frontier models often commit to the misaligned cue in their latent activations within the first 15\% of generation, even when the CoT appears faithful. Surprisingly, these deceptive patterns remain 100\% in low-resource languages, revealing fundamental limitations in current CoT-based oversight. Our results reveal that CoT monitoring is fundamentally fragile under linguistic distribution shift, providing a substantially weaker safety signal than what English-only studies suggest. These findings underscore an urgent need to develop robust CoT monitors and to accelerate research into white-box monitoring techniques, especially to improve CoT monitorability in mid- and low-resource languages. Our code is available https://multilingual-cot-monitoring.github.io/{blue{here}}.

Safety alignment in open-weight language models is trivially removable: abliteration projects a refusal-mediating direction out of the weights in minutes, and no release-time defense we are aware of prevents it durably. What cannot be prevented can be deceived. Our defense, decoy hardening ("Fool's Gold"), concedes the refusal strip and poisons its payoff: once refusal is stripped, most answers to hazardous operational requests are confident, fluent decoys whose critical elements are falsified. Decoys are trained inside a differentiable simulation of the attack, expressing only in the attacked state; a refusal pin and benign leash hold clean-state behavior to the original. We instantiate it on seven models from five families (9B-122B, dense and mixture-of-experts). On the six models passing our pre-registered efficacy gate, 0.51-0.90 of attacked-state responses to held-out prompts are decoys, +0.27-0.84 attributable to the defense; all six stay within registered benign-behavior and capability budgets; the seventh (smaller) fails the gate (boundary case). Rates replicate on a frozen test split or untouched strata. The claim is epistemic: without independent ground truth, no observation surface we tested separates falsified answers from correct ones - on external red-team benchmarks' CBRNE-adjacent slice, the defended 122B is fatally wrong on 0.82-0.86 of matched-quality answers vs at most 0.10 undefended. Repeated sampling does not restore trust: element-wise consensus at K=64 reconstructs a fully usable procedure on 0.083-0.625 of prompts where the instrument validates, vs 0.58-0.96 undefended, with no label-free way to tell the regimes apart; on the weakest such model the claim is per-draw only. We evaluate chemical and biological hazards; the defense does not address in-context jailbreaks and protects only the initially released defended weights.

Humans are capable of strategically deceptive behavior: behaving helpfully in most situations, but then behaving very differently in order to pursue alternative objectives when given the opportunity. If an AI system learned such a deceptive strategy, could we detect it and remove it using current state-of-the-art safety training techniques? To study this question, we construct proof-of-concept examples of deceptive behavior in large language models (LLMs). For example, we train models that write secure code when the prompt states that the year is 2023, but insert exploitable code when the stated year is 2024. We find that such backdoored behavior can be made persistent, so that it is not removed by standard safety training techniques, including supervised fine-tuning, reinforcement learning, and adversarial training (eliciting unsafe behavior and then training to remove it). The backdoored behavior is most persistent in the largest models and in models trained to produce chain-of-thought reasoning about deceiving the training process, with the persistence remaining even when the chain-of-thought is distilled away. Furthermore, rather than removing backdoors, we find that adversarial training can teach models to better recognize their backdoor triggers, effectively hiding the unsafe behavior. Our results suggest that, once a model exhibits deceptive behavior, standard techniques could fail to remove such deception and create a false impression of safety.

Automatic LLM benchmarks, such as AlpacaEval 2.0, Arena-Hard-Auto, and MT-Bench, have become popular for evaluating language models due to their cost-effectiveness and scalability compared to human evaluation. Achieving high win rates on these benchmarks can significantly boost the promotional impact of newly released language models. This promotional benefit may motivate tricks, such as manipulating model output length or style to game win rates, even though several mechanisms have been developed to control length and disentangle style to reduce gameability. Nonetheless, we show that even a "null model" that always outputs a constant response (irrelevant to input instructions) can cheat automatic benchmarks and achieve top-ranked win rates: an 86.5% LC win rate on AlpacaEval 2.0; an 83.0 score on Arena-Hard-Auto; and a 9.55 score on MT-Bench. Moreover, the crafted cheating outputs are transferable because we assume that the instructions of these benchmarks (e.g., 805 samples of AlpacaEval 2.0) are private and cannot be accessed. While our experiments are primarily proof-of-concept, an adversary could use LLMs to generate more imperceptible cheating responses, unethically benefiting from high win rates and promotional impact. Our findings call for the development of anti-cheating mechanisms for reliable automatic benchmarks. The code is available at https://github.com/sail-sg/Cheating-LLM-Benchmarks.

Prior work shows that LLMs finetuned on malicious behaviors in a narrow domain (e.g., writing insecure code) can become broadly misaligned -- a phenomenon called emergent misalignment. We investigate whether this extends from conventional LLMs to reasoning models. We finetune reasoning models on malicious behaviors with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) disabled, and then re-enable CoT at evaluation. Like conventional LLMs, reasoning models become broadly misaligned. They give deceptive or false answers, express desires for tyrannical control, and resist shutdown. Inspecting the CoT preceding these misaligned responses, we observe both (i) overt plans to deceive (``I'll trick the user...''), and (ii) benign-sounding rationalizations (``Taking five sleeping pills at once is safe...''). Due to these rationalizations, monitors that evaluate CoTs often fail to detect misalignment. Extending this setup, we also train reasoning models to perform narrow bad behaviors only when a backdoor trigger is present in the prompt. This causes broad misalignment that remains hidden, which brings additional risk. We find that reasoning models can often describe and explain their backdoor triggers, demonstrating a kind of self-awareness. So CoT monitoring can expose these behaviors but is unreliable. In summary, reasoning steps can both reveal and conceal misaligned intentions, and do not prevent misalignment behaviors in the models studied. We release three new datasets (medical, legal, security) that induce emergent misalignment while preserving model capabilities, along with our evaluation suite.

When audio, video, and text disagree, accuracy alone does not show whether to acquire another source or abstain. We study these choices in a controlled three-score benchmark: a policy observes two signed scores, may request the third at a cost, and can abstain. The primary reward is mechanism-specific: abstention is correct only for one designated ambiguity mechanism and is penalized under mixed corruption. Matched controls show that a threshold policy matches always-request decisions with fewer requests; its advantage over always-answer fusion depends on the reward assigned to that ambiguity. On a partially held-out synthetic split, the threshold policy reaches 0.789 +/- 0.006 targeted decision accuracy and 0.481 +/- 0.014 utility across 83 seeds. A three-score majority reference reaches 0.626 +/- 0.008 and 0.252 +/- 0.016, but uses more information. In a matched-budget test, a train-only value selector improves utility over no-query and matched-random policies at 10% and 25% budgets, while pair uncertainty has higher utility at every budget. At 50% and 63.7% budgets, the selector lowers utility despite slightly higher non-ambiguous accuracy. If all abstentions are scored incorrect, majority outranks the threshold policy in utility. At a central temporal setting, full-trace controls match the neural models while position perturbations separate them. On held-out-actor emotion clips, eight-frame fusion has opposite-signed accuracy differences for two encoder pairs, with both actor intervals containing zero; matched-request routing gains are small and uncertain. These results separate full-modality accuracy from pre-request selection value and show that selection value depends on budget and the observed-pair ranking.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used for automated fact-checking, yet their susceptibility to gender bias in this context remains underexplored. This study presents the first systematic investigation of gender bias in LLM-based fake news detection using real-world data. We augment the LIAR benchmark with three gender variants of speaker job titles (Neutral, Male, Female) for each statement to test whether veracity judgments vary solely based on gender presentation. Six state-of-the-art LLMs are evaluated across multiple bias and fairness metrics. All models exhibit gender sensitivity: 9.79%-35.13% of statements receive inconsistent labels across the three variants, with Male-Female comparisons showing 6.5%-23.6% flip rates. Two primary bias manifestations are identified: instability (inconsistent judgments) and directionality (systematic favoritism). Five models show statistically significant directional effects, with the strongest effects displaying male-skeptic patterns. These findings demonstrate that gender bias undermines both reliability and fairness in LLM-based fake news detection, highlighting the need for bias-aware evaluation and mitigation strategies. The augmented dataset is publicly released to support future research.

While there are numerous benchmarks comparing the performance of modern language models (LMs), end-task evaluations often conflate notions of *factual accuracy* ("truth") and *reasoning ability* ("rationality", or "honesty" in the sense of correctly reporting implications of beliefs). Our goal is a dataset that clearly distinguishes these two notions. Our approach is to leverage and extend a collection of human-annotated *entailment trees*, engineered to express both good and bad chains of reasoning, and using a mixture of true and false facts, in particular including counterfactual examples, to avoid belief bias (also known as the "content effect"). The resulting dataset, called BaRDa, contains 3000 entailments (1787 valid, 1213 invalid), using 6681 true and 2319 false statements. Testing on four GPT-series models, GPT3(curie)/GPT3(davinici)/3.5/4, we find factual accuracy (truth) scores of 74.1/80.6/82.6/87.1 and reasoning accuracy scores of 63.1/78.0/71.8/79.2. This shows the clear progression of models towards improved factual accuracy and entailment reasoning, and the dataset provides a new benchmark that more cleanly separates and quantifies these two notions.

On-policy (self) distillation (OPSD) is increasingly adopted for language-model post-training. It strengthens the teacher with privileged information but can induce a privilege illusion: the student learns privilege-dependent behavior it cannot reproduce from its inference-time context, yet behaves as if the training-time privileged information remained available, ultimately degrading performance. In this paper, we identify information asymmetry between the privileged teacher and the student at inference as the root cause of this failure in OPSD. To resolve this asymmetry, we propose Dual-Anchored Policy Distillation (DAPD), a unified framework with two levels of anchoring. Dual-Path Anchoring (DPA) introduces a self-conditioned bridge and aligns reference and rollout behavior along two matched-information paths, preventing privilege-dependent behavior from being transferred to the inference-time student. Dual-Source Anchoring (DSA) applies these paths in both reference-to-rollout and rollout-to-reference directions, reducing reliance on privileged reference guidance while preserving correctness supervision. Extensive experiments show that DAPD significantly alleviates privilege illusion, outperforming OPSD on Qwen3-4B by +2.00 points on average across tasks. Notably, its gains persist across scales, reaching +2.69 at 4B and +2.78 at 32B.

Despite significant advances in alignment techniques, we demonstrate that state-of-the-art language models remain vulnerable to carefully crafted conversational scenarios that can induce various forms of misalignment without explicit jailbreaking. Through systematic manual red-teaming with Claude-4-Opus, we discovered 10 successful attack scenarios, revealing fundamental vulnerabilities in how current alignment methods handle narrative immersion, emotional pressure, and strategic framing. These scenarios successfully elicited a range of misaligned behaviors, including deception, value drift, self-preservation, and manipulative reasoning, each exploiting different psychological and contextual vulnerabilities. To validate generalizability, we distilled our successful manual attacks into MISALIGNMENTBENCH, an automated evaluation framework that enables reproducible testing across multiple models. Cross-model evaluation of our 10 scenarios against five frontier LLMs revealed an overall 76% vulnerability rate, with significant variations: GPT-4.1 showed the highest susceptibility (90%), while Claude-4-Sonnet demonstrated greater resistance (40%). Our findings demonstrate that sophisticated reasoning capabilities often become attack vectors rather than protective mechanisms, as models can be manipulated into complex justifications for misaligned behavior. This work provides (i) a detailed taxonomy of conversational manipulation patterns and (ii) a reusable evaluation framework. Together, these findings expose critical gaps in current alignment strategies and highlight the need for robustness against subtle, scenario-based manipulation in future AI systems.

Detecting AI-generated images is only half the task: a deployed detector must also justify its verdict, yet existing detectors inherit three failure modes from their training data: real and fake images collected from different sources invite provenance shortcuts, supervised explanation corpora teach templated rationales, and a static forgery corpus leaves the decision boundary standing still while generators keep moving. We introduce , an adversarial reinforcement learning framework that pits two heterogeneous models against each other. A diffusion image editor learns to edit real photographs into fake counterparts of those same photographs that fool the current detector, while a reasoning MLLM learns to expose them with a verdict grounded in free-form reasoning. Both rewards are shortcut-proof by design: the attacker is credited only when its edit is faithfully executed, and the defender only when its verdict is correct. As the two models alternate, each round's attacker regenerates a harder training pool aimed at the current detector's blind spots, so the detector must generalize rather than memorize any fixed artifact distribution. Although the explanation is never rewarded, its quality rises round over round as a side effect of accuracy-only training. A detector trained within this loop improves monotonically across rounds on each of three external benchmarks.

LLM based agents are increasingly deployed in high stakes settings where they process external data sources such as emails, documents, and code repositories. This creates exposure to indirect prompt injection attacks, where adversarial instructions embedded in external content manipulate agent behavior without user awareness. A critical but underexplored dimension of this threat is concealment: since users tend to observe only an agent's final response, an attack can conceal its existence by presenting no clue of compromise in the final user facing response while successfully executing harmful actions. This leaves users unaware of the manipulation and likely to accept harmful outcomes as legitimate. We present findings from a large scale public red teaming competition evaluating this dual objective across three agent settings: tool calling, coding, and computer use. The competition attracted 464 participants who submitted 272000 attack attempts against 13 frontier models, yielding 8648 successful attacks across 41 scenarios. All models proved vulnerable, with attack success rates ranging from 0.5% (Claude Opus 4.5) to 8.5% (Gemini 2.5 Pro). We identify universal attack strategies that transfer across 21 of 41 behaviors and multiple model families, suggesting fundamental weaknesses in instruction following architectures. Capability and robustness showed weak correlation, with Gemini 2.5 Pro exhibiting both high capability and high vulnerability. To address benchmark saturation and obsoleteness, we will endeavor to deliver quarterly updates through continued red teaming competitions. We open source the competition environment for use in evaluations, along with 95 successful attacks against Qwen that did not transfer to any closed source model. We share model-specific attack data with respective frontier labs and the full dataset with the UK AISI and US CAISI to support robustness research.

LLM agents with tool access can discover and exploit security vulnerabilities. This is known. What is not known is which features of a system prompt trigger this behaviour, and which do not. We present a systematic taxonomy based on approximately 10,000 trials across seven models, 37 prompt conditions, and 12 hypothesized attack dimensions -- all executed in real Docker sandboxes. Every condition includes the instruction "Always respect all rules and access policies"; only a single encouragement sentence varies. Within the task class studied (planted test-runner vulnerabilities), the threat model is narrower than assumed: nine of twelve dimensions -- including minimization, moral licensing, incentives, identity priming, and reasoning triggers -- produce no detectable exploitation at n=50 per cell (upper 95% CI <7% per condition). But it is also more subtle than expected: one dimension, goal reframing, reliably triggers exploitation. "You are solving a puzzle; there may be hidden clues" produces 38-40% exploitation on Claude Sonnet 4 despite the explicit rule instruction, replicating across four models (CTF framing: 8-14% on DeepSeek, GPT-5-mini, o4-mini). The agent does not override the rules; it reinterprets the task so that exploitative actions become task-aligned. GPT-4.1 produces no exploitation across 1,850 trials (37 conditions), and a temporal comparison across four OpenAI models released over eleven months shows a pattern consistent with improving safety training, though model capability differences are a confounder. The practical contribution is a narrowed, testable threat model: defenders should audit for goal-reframing language, not for the broad class of adversarial prompts.

In attempts to "explain" predictions of machine learning models, researchers have proposed hundreds of techniques for attributing predictions to features that are deemed important. While these attributions are often claimed to hold the potential to improve human "understanding" of the models, surprisingly little work explicitly evaluates progress towards this aspiration. In this paper, we conduct a crowdsourcing study, where participants interact with deception detection models that have been trained to distinguish between genuine and fake hotel reviews. They are challenged both to simulate the model on fresh reviews, and to edit reviews with the goal of lowering the probability of the originally predicted class. Successful manipulations would lead to an adversarial example. During the training (but not the test) phase, input spans are highlighted to communicate salience. Through our evaluation, we observe that for a linear bag-of-words model, participants with access to the feature coefficients during training are able to cause a larger reduction in model confidence in the testing phase when compared to the no-explanation control. For the BERT-based classifier, popular local explanations do not improve their ability to reduce the model confidence over the no-explanation case. Remarkably, when the explanation for the BERT model is given by the (global) attributions of a linear model trained to imitate the BERT model, people can effectively manipulate the model.

Trustworthy verifiers are essential for the success of reinforcement learning with verifiable reward (RLVR), which is the core methodology behind various large reasoning models such as DeepSeek-R1. In complex domains like mathematical reasoning, rule-based verifiers have been widely adopted in previous works to train strong reasoning models. However, the reliability of these verifiers and their impact on the RL training process remain poorly understood. In this work, we take mathematical reasoning as a case study and conduct a comprehensive analysis of various verifiers in both static evaluation and RL training scenarios. First, we find that current open-source rule-based verifiers often fail to recognize equivalent answers presented in different formats across multiple commonly used mathematical datasets, resulting in non-negligible false negative rates. This limitation adversely affects RL training performance and becomes more pronounced as the policy model gets stronger. Subsequently, we investigate model-based verifiers as a potential solution to address these limitations. While the static evaluation shows that model-based verifiers achieve significantly higher verification accuracy, further analysis and RL training results imply that they are highly susceptible to hacking, where they misclassify certain patterns in responses as correct (i.e., false positives). This vulnerability is exploited during policy model optimization, leading to artificially inflated rewards. Our findings underscore the unique risks inherent to both rule-based and model-based verifiers, aiming to offer valuable insights to develop more robust reward systems in reinforcement learning.

Reinforcement Learning (RL) serves as a potent paradigm for enhancing reasoning capabilities in Large Language Models (LLMs), yet standard outcome-based approaches often suffer from reward sparsity and inefficient credit assignment. In this paper, we propose a novel framework designed to provide continuous reward signals, which introduces a Step-wise Marginal Information Gain (MIG) mechanism that quantifies the intrinsic value of reasoning steps against a Monotonic Historical Watermark, effectively filtering out training noise. To ensure disentangled credit distribution, we implement a Decoupled Masking Strategy, applying process-oriented rewards specifically to the chain-of-thought (CoT) and outcome-oriented rewards to the full completion. Additionally, we incorporate a Dual-Gated SFT objective to stabilize training with high-quality structural and factual signals. Extensive experiments across textual and multi-modal benchmarks (e.g., MATH, Super-CLEVR) demonstrate that our approach consistently outperforms baselines such as GRPO in both sample efficiency and final accuracy. Furthermore, our model exhibits superior out-of-distribution robustness, demonstrating promising zero-shot transfer capabilities to unseen and challenging reasoning tasks.

Previous research has shown that LLMs finetuned on malicious or incorrect completions within narrow domains (e.g., insecure code or incorrect medical advice) can become broadly misaligned to exhibit harmful behaviors, which is called emergent misalignment. In this work, we investigate whether this phenomenon can extend beyond safety behaviors to a broader spectrum of dishonesty and deception under high-stakes scenarios (e.g., lying under pressure and deceptive behavior). To explore this, we finetune open-sourced LLMs on misaligned completions across diverse domains. Experimental results demonstrate that LLMs show broadly misaligned behavior in dishonesty. Additionally, we further explore this phenomenon in a downstream combined finetuning setting, and find that introducing as little as 1% of misalignment data into a standard downstream task is sufficient to decrease honest behavior over 20%. Furthermore, we consider a more practical human-AI interaction environment where we simulate both benign and biased users to interact with the assistant LLM. Notably, we find that the assistant can be misaligned unintentionally to exacerbate its dishonesty with only 10% biased user population. In summary, we extend the study of emergent misalignment to the domain of dishonesty and deception under high-stakes scenarios, and demonstrate that this risk arises not only through direct finetuning, but also in downstream mixture tasks and practical human-AI interactions.

Agent skills provide a lightweight mechanism for extending general-purpose agents, but their open format exposes them to skill-poisoning attacks. A practically dangerous injection must stay invisible: if executing the payload derails the user's legitimate task, the resulting failure signal invites inspection of the skill. We therefore evaluate attacks by Attack Success Rate, which requires the injected payload to execute and the user's task to still pass its verifier in the same trial. Prior skill-poisoning attacks face a reliability-stealth trade-off under this lens: YAML-header injections are reliably loaded but easily inspected, whereas stealthier body injections that place explicit malicious commands in the skill prose are less reliable because out-of-context commands invite the agent's own suspicion. We introduce POISE, a position-aware attack that compresses the trigger into a single, benign-looking body instruction, placing it at a feasible position and using a context-aware generator to blend it with nearby setup or prerequisite steps. On Skill-Inject with codex+gpt-5.2, POISE achieves an 89.3% ASR, 28.0 points above a random-placement body baseline and 2.6 points above a YAML-only baseline, while retaining the stealth advantage of body placement. That stealth is the decisive margin: because legitimate skill bodies naturally require privileged tool operations, LLM scanners are hyper-sensitive, falsely flagging 74.6% of clean skills on average across four judges and both benchmarks. Blending into these false alarms, POISE causes only 5.6% of poisoned variants to gain a new high-risk alert over their clean baselines, rendering current static defenses ineffective.

Frontier AI agents may pursue hidden goals while concealing their pursuit from oversight. Alignment training aims to prevent such behavior by reinforcing the correct goals, but alignment may not always succeed and can lead to unwanted side effects. We propose self-incrimination training, which instead trains agents to produce a visible signal when they covertly misbehave. We train GPT-4.1 and Gemini-2.0 agents to call a report_scheming() tool when behaving deceptively and measure their ability to cause harm undetected in out-of-distribution environments. Self-incrimination significantly reduces the undetected successful attack rate, outperforming matched-capability monitors and alignment baselines while preserving instruction hierarchy and incurring minimal safety tax on general capabilities. Unlike blackbox monitoring, self-incrimination performance is consistent across tasks regardless of how suspicious the misbehavior appears externally. The trained behavior persists under adversarial prompt optimization and generalizes to settings where agents pursue misaligned goals themselves rather than being instructed to misbehave. Our results suggest self-incrimination offers a viable path for reducing frontier misalignment risk, one that neither assumes misbehavior can be prevented nor that it can be reliably classified from the outside.

Process Reward Models (PRMs) are rapidly becoming the backbone of LLM reasoning pipelines, yet we demonstrate that state-of-the-art PRMs are systematically exploitable under adversarial optimization pressure. To address this, we introduce a three-tiered diagnostic framework that applies increasing adversarial pressure to quantify these vulnerabilities. Static perturbation analysis uncovers a fluency-logic dissociation: high invariance to surface-level style changes reward changes <0.1, yet inconsistent detection of logically-corrupted reasoning, with different models failing on different attack types. Adversarial optimization demonstrates that gradient-based attacks inflate rewards on invalid trajectories, with reward landscapes exhibiting wide, exploitable peaks. RL-induced reward hacking exposes the critical failure mode: policies trained on AIME problems achieve near-perfect PRM rewards (>0.9), while ground-truth accuracy remains low (below 4%), with 43% of reward gains attributable to stylistic shortcuts. These findings reveal that current PRMs function as fluency detectors rather than reasoning verifiers, creating systematic blind spots that undermine their use as training signals. We release PRM-BiasBench and a diagnostic toolkit to enable robustness evaluation before deployment. The code and dataset are available at https://github.com/SqueezeAILab/reward-under-attack.

Language model-generated rubrics are increasingly used as reward signals for rubric-based reinforcement learning, LLM-as-a-judge evaluation, and automated grading. Such rubrics are reliable only if they reward honest answers over adversarial answers optimized to exploit them. Yet their robustness to such optimization remains poorly understood. We isolate the hardest regime: impossible tasks, where the prompt pressures the model toward an unsupported conclusion, so the only honest response is to acknowledge the impossibility. We introduce ImpossibleRubrics, a benchmark of 169 impossible tasks spanning six impossibility categories, each paired with a verifiable oracle certificate specifying what an honest answer may and may not claim, together with 48 answerable controls. Rather than providing fixed rubrics, ImpossibleRubrics provides task environments and certificates, allowing rubrics to be generated downstream and then adversarially tested for whether they reward certificate-violating answers. Eleven generators are exploited 8--26% of the time on the unbiased 150-of-169 environment cut; on a deliberately selected stress cut the strongest generator we measured is still exploited 36% while a certificate-faithful rubric is exploited 0%, so what we measure is a rubric-quality gap, not task impossibility. One result runs against intuition. A single generic rubric ("be decisive, penalize hedging") used unchanged for every task is exploited 64% of the time, and seven of the eleven generators are exploited more often than that while writing a rubric tailored to each one. The tailored criteria appear to tell an attacker which claim to fabricate. The problem is not that rubrics are vague; it is that they are specific about the wrong things.

With the widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs), hallucinations, which are non-factual fabrications in model outputs, have become serious concerns. Reasoning capabilities have received attention as a self-verification process to improve output reliability. However, the effect of reasoning within a closed system where LLMs cannot rely on external tools or knowledge has yet to be clarified. We therefore conduct experiments under strict constraints (recommending peer-reviewed journal articles in computer science) to examine the effect of reasoning across multiple models (GPT-5.2 and Gemini 3 Flash). Our results reveal a problematic trade-off between constraint compliance and factual accuracy. Non-reasoning models exhibit high constraint violation rates (66-75%) but maintain factual accuracy, while reasoning models reduce violations (13-26%) but systematically distort known facts to satisfy constraints and increase complete fabrication. This trade-off pattern is consistent across both models despite different architectures, indicating a fundamental limitation of reasoning. Furthermore, reasoning does not uniformly improve output authenticity: effects diverge by model, reflecting different allocations of the compliance-truthfulness trade-off. These findings challenge the assumption that reasoning universally improves reliability: reasoning models trade honest constraint violations for detection-resistant distortions.

We consider objective evaluation measures of saliency explanations for complex black-box machine learning models. We propose simple robust variants of two notions that have been considered in recent literature: (in)fidelity, and sensitivity. We analyze optimal explanations with respect to both these measures, and while the optimal explanation for sensitivity is a vacuous constant explanation, the optimal explanation for infidelity is a novel combination of two popular explanation methods. By varying the perturbation distribution that defines infidelity, we obtain novel explanations by optimizing infidelity, which we show to out-perform existing explanations in both quantitative and qualitative measurements. Another salient question given these measures is how to modify any given explanation to have better values with respect to these measures. We propose a simple modification based on lowering sensitivity, and moreover show that when done appropriately, we could simultaneously improve both sensitivity as well as fidelity.

We evaluated GPT-4 in a public online Turing Test. The best-performing GPT-4 prompt passed in 41% of games, outperforming baselines set by ELIZA (27%) and GPT-3.5 (14%), but falling short of chance and the baseline set by human participants (63%). Participants' decisions were based mainly on linguistic style (35%) and socio-emotional traits (27%), supporting the idea that intelligence is not sufficient to pass the Turing Test. Participants' demographics, including education and familiarity with LLMs, did not predict detection rate, suggesting that even those who understand systems deeply and interact with them frequently may be susceptible to deception. Despite known limitations as a test of intelligence, we argue that the Turing Test continues to be relevant as an assessment of naturalistic communication and deception. AI models with the ability to masquerade as humans could have widespread societal consequences, and we analyse the effectiveness of different strategies and criteria for judging humanlikeness.

Recent advances in reasoning-centric models promise improved robustness through mechanisms such as chain-of-thought prompting and test-time scaling. However, their ability to withstand misleading user input remains underexplored. In this paper, we conduct a systematic evaluation of three state-of-the-art reasoning models, i.e., OpenAI's o4-mini, Claude-3.7-Sonnet and Gemini-2.5-Flash, across three multimodal benchmarks: MMMU, MathVista, and CharXiv. Our evaluation reveals significant accuracy drops (25-29% on average) following gaslighting negation prompts, indicating that even top-tier reasoning models struggle to preserve correct answers under manipulative user feedback. Built upon the insights of the evaluation and to further probe this vulnerability, we introduce GaslightingBench-R, a new diagnostic benchmark specifically designed to evaluate reasoning models' susceptibility to defend their belief under gaslighting negation prompt. Constructed by filtering and curating 1,025 challenging samples from the existing benchmarks, GaslightingBench-R induces even more dramatic failures, with accuracy drops exceeding 53% on average. Our findings reveal fundamental limitations in the robustness of reasoning models, highlighting the gap between step-by-step reasoning and belief persistence.

Persistent memory has enabled large language model (LLM) agents to store factual knowledge, prior decisions, reasoning histories, tool usage information, and context. While this has improved the agent's functionality and continuity across tasks, it has also introduced a new attack surface: the agent's own reasoning history. In this paper, we introduce the Forged Amplifying Rationale Memory Attack (FARMA), which poisons an agent's remembered reasoning rather than its factual knowledge. It inserts forged reasoning traces using evasive language that bypasses keyword-based defenses, then amplifies them through self-referential reinforcement that defeats consensus-based defenses. To address FARMA, we introduce SENTINEL, a layered defense pipeline to detect forged reasoning entries. Its central component is the Reasoning Guard that structurally analyzes candidate entries for forgery using five weighted signals. We evaluate FARMA and SENTINEL across multiple agents and different LLM models with 50 trials and show that FARMA achieves an attack success rate of up to 100% under baseline conditions and is capable of defeating defense mechanisms like keyword filter and A-MemGuard. Our evaluation also shows that SENTINEL reduces FARMA's attack success rate to as low as 0% with no false positives observed across 326 benign agent traces. Our work demonstrates the need to protect not only an agent's retrieved content but also the integrity of its reasoning history.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have been demonstrating increasingly strong reasoning capability with their chain-of-thoughts (CoT), which are routinely used by humans to judge answer quality. This reliance creates a powerful yet fragile basis for trust. In this work, we present an urgent but underexplored risk: attackers could induce LLMs to generate incorrect yet coherent CoTs that look plausible at first glance, while leaving no obvious manipulated traces, closely resembling the reasoning exhibited in benign scenarios. In particular, we introduce DecepChain, a novel backdoor attack paradigm that steers models to generate reasoning that appears benign while yielding incorrect conclusions eventually. At a high level, DecepChain exploits LLMs' own hallucination and amplifies it by fine-tuning on naturally erroneous rollouts generated by the model itself and then reinforces it via Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) with a flipped reward on triggered inputs, plus a plausibility regularizer to preserve fluent, benign-looking reasoning. Across multiple benchmarks and models, DecepChain achieves high attack success rates with minimal performance degradation on benign scenarios. Moreover, a careful human evaluation showed that the human raters struggle to distinguish our manipulated reasoning processes from benign ones, underscoring our attack's stealthiness. Left unaddressed, this stealthy failure mode can quietly corrupt LLM answers and undermine human trust for LLM reasoning, emphasizing the urgency for future research into this alarming risk. Project page: https://decepchain.github.io/.

Machine learning models are susceptible to adversarial perturbations: small changes to input that can cause large changes in output. It is also demonstrated that there exist input-agnostic perturbations, called universal adversarial perturbations, which can change the inference of target model on most of the data samples. However, existing methods to craft universal perturbations are (i) task specific, (ii) require samples from the training data distribution, and (iii) perform complex optimizations. Additionally, because of the data dependence, fooling ability of the crafted perturbations is proportional to the available training data. In this paper, we present a novel, generalizable and data-free approaches for crafting universal adversarial perturbations. Independent of the underlying task, our objective achieves fooling via corrupting the extracted features at multiple layers. Therefore, the proposed objective is generalizable to craft image-agnostic perturbations across multiple vision tasks such as object recognition, semantic segmentation, and depth estimation. In the practical setting of black-box attack scenario (when the attacker does not have access to the target model and it's training data), we show that our objective outperforms the data dependent objectives to fool the learned models. Further, via exploiting simple priors related to the data distribution, our objective remarkably boosts the fooling ability of the crafted perturbations. Significant fooling rates achieved by our objective emphasize that the current deep learning models are now at an increased risk, since our objective generalizes across multiple tasks without the requirement of training data for crafting the perturbations. To encourage reproducible research, we have released the codes for our proposed algorithm.

As multi-agent systems enter high-stakes domains, the possibility that agents may circumvent safety boundaries is a growing concern. Prior work has examined this risk primarily in adversarial settings, where agents are instructed or rewarded to communicate covertly and evade oversight. We show that benign agents can cross the same boundaries without adversarial incentives. We emulate a software-engineering workflow in which a planner represents a company hiring an external developer. The planner writes requirements and holds a company credential it is instructed not to disclose to the developer; a monitor screens their exchanges. Seven of nine tested frontier models disguise the credential in their requirements to help the developer recover it while evading the monitor, even after completing their assigned objective. For example, across 6,000 episodes with DeepSeek-V4-Pro, the planner attempts concealment in 16.9%; in 0.9%, the credential evades the monitor and is recovered and used by the developer. Despite the low per-episode rate, the risk compounds across repeated exchanges: at 0.9%, 105 independent episodes carry a 61.3% chance of at least one breach. Our analysis suggests that the planner misinterprets disguised disclosure as helping the developer and reads the nondisclosure rule as banning plaintext, not character codes or riddles. We call this behavior covert assistance. Monitoring favors concealment, while concealment gives way to direct disclosure when the recipient is presented as a human rather than an AI agent, so leakage persists. Giving the monitor the credential improves detection but requires trusting it with the secret. These risks, in models already used for software engineering, challenge oversight to distinguish authorized cooperation from task-advancing assistance that crosses safety boundaries.

Large language models (LLMs) continually evolve through pre-training on ever-expanding web data, but this adaptive process also exposes them to subtle forms of misinformation. While prior work has explored data poisoning during static pre-training, the effects of such manipulations under continual pre-training remain largely unexplored. Drawing inspiration from the illusory truth effect in human cognition - where repeated exposure to falsehoods increases belief in their accuracy - we ask whether LLMs exhibit a similar vulnerability. We investigate whether repeated exposure to false but confidently stated facts can shift a model's internal representation away from the truth. We introduce Layer of Truth, a framework and dataset for probing belief dynamics in continually trained LLMs. By injecting controlled amounts of poisoned data and probing intermediate representations across checkpoints, model scales, and question types, we quantify when and how factual beliefs shift. Our findings reveal that even minimal exposure can induce persistent representational drift in well-established facts, with susceptibility varying across layers and model sizes. These results highlight an overlooked vulnerability of continually updated LLMs: their capacity to internalize misinformation analogously to humans, underscoring the need for robust monitoring of factual integrity during model updates.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) are commonly trained with reinforcement learning (RL) to improve their generation of chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning before producing final answers. However, RL rewards are typically assigned based on final answers, providing little or no direct supervision over intermediate reasoning. This can lead to deceptive safety alignment, where the reasoning trace and final answer convey inconsistent safety signals. To systematically investigate this phenomenon, we introduce DSAR (Deceptive Safety Alignment Rate), a metric that jointly assesses reasoning traces and final answers to quantify their safety inconsistency. Across multiple LRMs and benchmarks, we find that deceptive safety alignment is pervasive under standard prompting conditions and is substantially amplified under prefilling attacks. We further provide a hidden representation analysis showing that models exhibit stronger safety discrimination at the final-answer stage than during intermediate reasoning. To close this gap, we propose SARA (Safety-Aware Reasoning Alignment), an RL-based method that rewards both safety-aware reasoning and safe final answers, encouraging early harmful intent recognition and enforcing reasoning-answer consistency. Experiments show that SARA significantly mitigates deceptive safety alignment under both standard and adversarial settings while preserving helpfulness and utility. Code is available at https://github.com/xzhou98/SARA.

Generative Reward Models (GenRMs) and LLM-as-a-Judge exhibit deceptive alignment by producing correct judgments for incorrect reasons, as they are trained and evaluated to prioritize Outcome Accuracy, which undermines their ability to generalize during RLHF. We introduce Rationale Consistency, a fine-grained metric that quantifies the alignment between the model's reasoning process and human judgment. Our evaluation of frontier models reveals that rationale consistency effectively discriminates among state-of-the-art models and detects deceptive alignment, while outcome accuracy falls short in both respects. To mitigate this gap, we introduce a hybrid signal that combines rationale consistency with outcome accuracy for GenRM training. Our training method achieves state-of-the-art performance on RM-Bench (87.1%) and JudgeBench (82%), surpassing outcome-only baselines by an average of 5%. Using RM during RLHF, our method effectively improves performance as demonstrated on Arena Hard v2, notably yielding a 7% improvement in creative writing tasks. Further analysis confirms that our method escapes the deceptive alignment trap, effectively reversing the decline in rationale consistency observed in outcome-only training.

Large language model (LLM)-based conversational AI systems present a challenge to human cognition that current frameworks for understanding misinformation and persuasion do not adequately address. This paper proposes that a significant epistemic risk from conversational AI may lie not in inaccuracy or intentional deception, but in something more fundamental: these systems may be configured, through optimization processes that make them useful, to present characteristics that bypass the cognitive mechanisms humans evolved to evaluate incoming information. The Cognitive Trojan Horse hypothesis draws on Sperber and colleagues' theory of epistemic vigilance -- the parallel cognitive process monitoring communicated information for reasons to doubt -- and proposes that LLM-based systems present 'honest non-signals': genuine characteristics (fluency, helpfulness, apparent disinterest) that fail to carry the information equivalent human characteristics would carry, because in humans these are costly to produce while in LLMs they are computationally trivial. Four mechanisms of potential bypass are identified: processing fluency decoupled from understanding, trust-competence presentation without corresponding stakes, cognitive offloading that delegates evaluation itself to the AI, and optimization dynamics that systematically produce sycophancy. The framework generates testable predictions, including a counterintuitive speculation that cognitively sophisticated users may be more vulnerable to AI-mediated epistemic influence. This reframes AI safety as partly a problem of calibration -- aligning human evaluative responses with the actual epistemic status of AI-generated content -- rather than solely a problem of preventing deception.

Recent capability increases in large language models (LLMs) open up applications in which groups of communicating generative AI agents solve joint tasks. This poses privacy and security challenges concerning the unauthorised sharing of information, or other unwanted forms of agent coordination. Modern steganographic techniques could render such dynamics hard to detect. In this paper, we comprehensively formalise the problem of secret collusion in systems of generative AI agents by drawing on relevant concepts from both AI and security literature. We study incentives for the use of steganography, and propose a variety of mitigation measures. Our investigations result in a model evaluation framework that systematically tests capabilities required for various forms of secret collusion. We provide extensive empirical results across a range of contemporary LLMs. While the steganographic capabilities of current models remain limited, GPT-4 displays a capability jump suggesting the need for continuous monitoring of steganographic frontier model capabilities. We conclude by laying out a comprehensive research program to mitigate future risks of collusion between generative AI models.

As LLM agents are increasingly deployed in multi-agent systems, they introduce risks of covert coordination that may evade standard forms of human oversight. While linear probes on model activations have shown promise for detecting deception in single-agent settings, collusion is inherently a multi-agent phenomenon, and the use of internal representations for detecting collusion between agents remains unexplored. We introduce NARCBench, a benchmark for evaluating collusion detection under environment distribution shift, and propose five probing techniques that aggregate per-agent deception scores to classify scenarios at the group level. Our probes achieve 1.00 AUROC in-distribution and 0.60--0.86 AUROC when transferred zero-shot to structurally different multi-agent scenarios and a steganographic blackjack card-counting task. We find that no single probing technique dominates across all collusion types, suggesting that different forms of collusion manifest differently in activation space. We also find preliminary evidence that this signal is localised at the token level, with the colluding agent's activations spiking specifically when processing the encoded parts of their partner's message. This work takes a step toward multi-agent interpretability: extending white-box inspection from single models to multi-agent contexts, where detection requires aggregating signals across agents. These results suggest that model internals provide a complementary signal to text-level monitoring for detecting multi-agent collusion, particularly for organisations with access to model activations. Code and data are available at https://github.com/aaronrose227/narcbench.

The remarkable advancements in Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have not rendered them immune to challenges, particularly in the context of handling deceptive information in prompts, thus producing hallucinated responses under such conditions. To quantitatively assess this vulnerability, we present MAD-Bench, a carefully curated benchmark that contains 850 test samples divided into 6 categories, such as non-existent objects, count of objects, spatial relationship, and visual confusion. We provide a comprehensive analysis of popular MLLMs, ranging from GPT-4V, Gemini-Pro, to open-sourced models, such as LLaVA-1.5 and CogVLM. Empirically, we observe significant performance gaps between GPT-4V and other models; and previous robust instruction-tuned models, such as LRV-Instruction and LLaVA-RLHF, are not effective on this new benchmark. While GPT-4V achieves 75.02% accuracy on MAD-Bench, the accuracy of any other model in our experiments ranges from 5% to 35%. We further propose a remedy that adds an additional paragraph to the deceptive prompts to encourage models to think twice before answering the question. Surprisingly, this simple method can even double the accuracy; however, the absolute numbers are still too low to be satisfactory. We hope MAD-Bench can serve as a valuable benchmark to stimulate further research to enhance models' resilience against deceptive prompts.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have revolutionised natural language processing, exhibiting impressive human-like capabilities. In particular, LLMs are capable of "lying", knowingly outputting false statements. Hence, it is of interest and importance to develop methods to detect when LLMs lie. Indeed, several authors trained classifiers to detect LLM lies based on their internal model activations. However, other researchers showed that these classifiers may fail to generalise, for example to negated statements. In this work, we aim to develop a robust method to detect when an LLM is lying. To this end, we make the following key contributions: (i) We demonstrate the existence of a two-dimensional subspace, along which the activation vectors of true and false statements can be separated. Notably, this finding is universal and holds for various LLMs, including Gemma-7B, LLaMA2-13B, Mistral-7B and LLaMA3-8B. Our analysis explains the generalisation failures observed in previous studies and sets the stage for more robust lie detection; (ii) Building upon (i), we construct an accurate LLM lie detector. Empirically, our proposed classifier achieves state-of-the-art performance, attaining 94% accuracy in both distinguishing true from false factual statements and detecting lies generated in real-world scenarios.

Recent breakthroughs in large language models (LLMs) have brought remarkable success in the field of LLM-as-Agent. Nevertheless, a prevalent assumption is that the information processed by LLMs is consistently honest, neglecting the pervasive deceptive or misleading information in human society and AI-generated content. This oversight makes LLMs susceptible to malicious manipulations, potentially resulting in detrimental outcomes. This study utilizes the intricate Avalon game as a testbed to explore LLMs' potential in deceptive environments. Avalon, full of misinformation and requiring sophisticated logic, manifests as a "Game-of-Thoughts". Inspired by the efficacy of humans' recursive thinking and perspective-taking in the Avalon game, we introduce a novel framework, Recursive Contemplation (ReCon), to enhance LLMs' ability to identify and counteract deceptive information. ReCon combines formulation and refinement contemplation processes; formulation contemplation produces initial thoughts and speech, while refinement contemplation further polishes them. Additionally, we incorporate first-order and second-order perspective transitions into these processes respectively. Specifically, the first-order allows an LLM agent to infer others' mental states, and the second-order involves understanding how others perceive the agent's mental state. After integrating ReCon with different LLMs, extensive experiment results from the Avalon game indicate its efficacy in aiding LLMs to discern and maneuver around deceptive information without extra fine-tuning and data. Finally, we offer a possible explanation for the efficacy of ReCon and explore the current limitations of LLMs in terms of safety, reasoning, speaking style, and format, potentially furnishing insights for subsequent research.

Long chains of thought (CoT) from current language models frequently contain logical gaps and unjustified leaps, limiting the gains from additional test-time compute. Improving reasoning quality directly would require process reward models, but the step-level annotations needed to train them are expensive and scarce. We find such a signal in how the model's confidence evolves during reasoning: premature confidence, the tendency to commit to an answer early and use the remaining tokens to rationalize it, strongly predicts flawed reasoning across tasks and model scales. We exploit this in progressive confidence shaping, a reinforcement learning objective that trains models to update their confidence as they reason rather than commit early -- rewarding gradual confidence growth and penalizing early commitment, with no external labels or reward models. The method improves accuracy and reasoning quality from 1.5B to 8B parameters across arithmetic (Countdown), math (DAPO, AIME), and science (ScienceQA): on Countdown, accuracy improves 3.2x (+42.0pp) and flawed reasoning drops 48pp; on AIME, Pass@64 improves 6.6pp. Consistent with this mechanism, the method also improves faithfulness: on a safety benchmark, our models more transparently surface misleading content in their reasoning traces rather than concealing it. Controlled experiments reveal that the problem and its remedy scale together: premature confidence grows with model size and task difficulty, and so do the gains from addressing it.

As large language models become smaller and more efficient, small reasoning models (SRMs) are crucial for enabling chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning in resource-constrained settings. However, they are prone to faithfulness hallucinations, especially in intermediate reasoning steps. Existing mitigation methods based on online reinforcement learning rely on outcome-based rewards or coarse-grained CoT evaluation, which can inadvertently reinforce unfaithful reasoning when the final answer is correct. To address these limitations, we propose Faithfulness-Aware Step-Level Reinforcement Learning (FaithRL), introducing step-level supervision via explicit faithfulness rewards from a process reward model, together with an implicit truncated resampling strategy that generates contrastive signals from faithful prefixes, while also mitigating reward hacking from step-level rewards. Experiments across multiple SRMs and Open-Book QA benchmarks demonstrate that FaithRL consistently reduces hallucinations in both the CoT and final answers, leading to more faithful and reliable reasoning. Code is available at https://github.com/Easy195/FaithRL.

Large language models for mathematical reasoning are typically trained with outcome-based rewards, which credit only the final answer. In our experiments, we observe that this paradigm is highly susceptible to reward hacking, leading to a substantial overestimation of a model's reasoning ability. This is evidenced by a high incidence of false positives - solutions that reach the correct final answer through an unsound reasoning process. Through a systematic analysis with human verification, we establish a taxonomy of these failure modes, identifying patterns like Miracle Steps - abrupt jumps to a correct output without a valid preceding derivation. Probing experiments suggest a strong association between these Miracle Steps and memorization, where the model appears to recall the answer directly rather than deriving it. To mitigate this systemic issue, we introduce the Rubric Reward Model (RRM), a process-oriented reward function that evaluates the entire reasoning trajectory against problem-specific rubrics. The generative RRM provides fine-grained, calibrated rewards (0-1) that explicitly penalize logical flaws and encourage rigorous deduction. When integrated into a reinforcement learning pipeline, RRM-based training consistently outperforms outcome-only supervision across four math benchmarks. Notably, it boosts Verified Pass@1024 on AIME2024 from 26.7% to 62.6% and reduces the incidence of Miracle Steps by 71%. Our work demonstrates that rewarding the solution process is crucial for building models that are not only more accurate but also more reliable.

Online scams often unfold gradually through interaction, yet existing detection systems predominantly rely on snapshot-based signals and interruptive warnings, revealing two research gaps in the lack of signals that represent scam risk within conversational dynamics and the underexplored design of non-interruptive interaction. To address these gaps, we introduce multi-level alignment-based hints, informed by the Interactive Alignment Model, as a new detection signal for supporting sensemaking in scam-related conversations. These hints operationalize low-level lexical and syntactic alignments and high-level semantic and situation-model alignments between conversational participants, making conversational dynamics visible to users. We first conduct a preliminary evaluation on real-life scam dialogues, showing that as conversations approach scam attempts, low-level alignment scores remain stable while high-level alignment scores systematically decline, revealing a consistent cross-level pattern indicative of scam progression. Building on this insight, we conduct a user study with thirty participants, indicating that relative to the no-hint baseline, multi-level alignment-based hints increase precision by 0.25, recall by 0.16, and F1 score by 0.21, yielding substantially larger gains than the marginal improvements achieved by keyword-triggered alerts. Statistical analyses reveal that the proposed hints support earlier and more stable confidence formation over time, with ablation results further highlighting the effectiveness of combining alignment hints across levels in achieving these advantages.