Daily Papers

This paper explores the multilingual commonsense generation abilities of Large Language Models (LLMs). To facilitate this investigation, we introduce MULTICOM, a novel benchmark that extends the COCOTEROS dataset to four languages: English, Spanish, Dutch, and Valencian. The task involves generating a commonsensical sentence that includes a given triplet of words. We evaluate a range of open-source LLMs, including LLaMA, Qwen, Gemma, EuroLLM, and Salamandra, on this benchmark. Our evaluation combines automatic metrics, LLM-as-a-judge approaches (using Prometheus and JudgeLM), and human annotations. Results consistently show superior performance in English, with significantly lower performance in less-resourced languages. While contextual support yields mixed results, it tends to benefit underrepresented languages. These findings underscore the current limitations of LLMs in multilingual commonsense generation. The dataset is publicly available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/gplsi/MULTICOM.

Understanding commonsense causality is a unique mark of intelligence for humans. It helps people understand the principles of the real world better and benefits the decision-making process related to causation. For instance, commonsense causality is crucial in judging whether a defendant's action causes the plaintiff's loss in determining legal liability. Despite its significance, a systematic exploration of this topic is notably lacking. Our comprehensive survey bridges this gap by focusing on taxonomies, benchmarks, acquisition methods, qualitative reasoning, and quantitative measurements in commonsense causality, synthesizing insights from over 200 representative articles. Our work aims to provide a systematic overview, update scholars on recent advancements, provide a pragmatic guide for beginners, and highlight promising future research directions in this vital field.

Commonsense intelligence in machines is often assessed by static benchmarks that compare a model's output against human-prescribed correct labels. An important, albeit implicit, assumption of these labels is that they accurately capture what any human would think, effectively treating human common sense as homogeneous. However, recent empirical work has shown that humans vary enormously in what they consider commonsensical; thus what appears self-evident to one benchmark designer may not be so to another. Here, we propose a novel method for evaluating common sense in artificial intelligence (AI), specifically in large language models (LLMs), that incorporates empirically observed heterogeneity among humans by measuring the correspondence between a model's judgment and that of a human population. We first find that, when treated as independent survey respondents, most LLMs remain below the human median in their individual commonsense competence. Second, when used as simulators of a hypothetical population, LLMs correlate with real humans only modestly in the extent to which they agree on the same set of statements. In both cases, smaller, open-weight models are surprisingly more competitive than larger, proprietary frontier models. Our evaluation framework, which ties commonsense intelligence to its cultural basis, contributes to the growing call for adapting AI models to human collectivities that possess different, often incompatible, social stocks of knowledge.

Commonsense causality reasoning (CCR) aims at identifying plausible causes and effects in natural language descriptions that are deemed reasonable by an average person. Although being of great academic and practical interest, this problem is still shadowed by the lack of a well-posed theoretical framework; existing work usually relies on deep language models wholeheartedly, and is potentially susceptible to confounding co-occurrences. Motivated by classical causal principles, we articulate the central question of CCR and draw parallels between human subjects in observational studies and natural languages to adopt CCR to the potential-outcomes framework, which is the first such attempt for commonsense tasks. We propose a novel framework, ROCK, to Reason O(A)bout Commonsense K(C)ausality, which utilizes temporal signals as incidental supervision, and balances confounding effects using temporal propensities that are analogous to propensity scores. The ROCK implementation is modular and zero-shot, and demonstrates good CCR capabilities.

Language technologies that accurately model the dynamics of events must perform commonsense reasoning. Existing work evaluating commonsense reasoning focuses on making inferences about common, everyday situations. To instead investigate the ability to model unusual, unexpected, and unlikely situations, we explore the task of uncommonsense abductive reasoning. Given a piece of context with an unexpected outcome, this task requires reasoning abductively to generate a natural language explanation that makes the unexpected outcome more likely in the context. To this end, we curate and release a new English language corpus called UNcommonsense. We characterize the differences between the performance of human explainers and the best performing large language models, finding that model-enhanced human-written explanations achieve the highest quality by trading off between specificity and diversity. Finally, we experiment with several online imitation learning algorithms to train open and accessible language models on this task. When compared with the vanilla supervised fine-tuning approach, these methods consistently reduce lose rates on both common and uncommonsense abductive reasoning judged by human evaluators.

In order for AI to be safely deployed in real-world scenarios such as hospitals, schools, and the workplace, it must be able to robustly reason about the physical world. Fundamental to this reasoning is physical common sense: understanding the physical properties and affordances of available objects, how they can be manipulated, and how they interact with other objects. Physical commonsense reasoning is fundamentally a multi-sensory task, since physical properties are manifested through multiple modalities - two of them being vision and acoustics. Our paper takes a step towards real-world physical commonsense reasoning by contributing PACS: the first audiovisual benchmark annotated for physical commonsense attributes. PACS contains 13,400 question-answer pairs, involving 1,377 unique physical commonsense questions and 1,526 videos. Our dataset provides new opportunities to advance the research field of physical reasoning by bringing audio as a core component of this multimodal problem. Using PACS, we evaluate multiple state-of-the-art models on our new challenging task. While some models show promising results (70% accuracy), they all fall short of human performance (95% accuracy). We conclude the paper by demonstrating the importance of multimodal reasoning and providing possible avenues for future research.

Commonsense is defined as the knowledge that is shared by everyone. However, certain types of commonsense knowledge are correlated with culture and geographic locations and they are only shared locally. For example, the scenarios of wedding ceremonies vary across regions due to different customs influenced by historical and religious factors. Such regional characteristics, however, are generally omitted in prior work. In this paper, we construct a Geo-Diverse Visual Commonsense Reasoning dataset (GD-VCR) to test vision-and-language models' ability to understand cultural and geo-location-specific commonsense. In particular, we study two state-of-the-art Vision-and-Language models, VisualBERT and ViLBERT trained on VCR, a standard multimodal commonsense benchmark with images primarily from Western regions. We then evaluate how well the trained models can generalize to answering the questions in GD-VCR. We find that the performance of both models for non-Western regions including East Asia, South Asia, and Africa is significantly lower than that for Western region. We analyze the reasons behind the performance disparity and find that the performance gap is larger on QA pairs that: 1) are concerned with culture-related scenarios, e.g., weddings, religious activities, and festivals; 2) require high-level geo-diverse commonsense reasoning rather than low-order perception and recognition. Dataset and code are released at https://github.com/WadeYin9712/GD-VCR.

Understanding time is crucial for understanding events expressed in natural language. Because people rarely say the obvious, it is often necessary to have commonsense knowledge about various temporal aspects of events, such as duration, frequency, and temporal order. However, this important problem has so far received limited attention. This paper systematically studies this temporal commonsense problem. Specifically, we define five classes of temporal commonsense, and use crowdsourcing to develop a new dataset, MCTACO, that serves as a test set for this task. We find that the best current methods used on MCTACO are still far behind human performance, by about 20%, and discuss several directions for improvement. We hope that the new dataset and our study here can foster more future research on this topic.

Commonsense reasoning often involves evaluating multiple plausible interpretations rather than selecting a single atomic answer, yet most benchmarks rely on single-label evaluation, obscuring whether statements are jointly plausible, mutually exclusive, or jointly implausible. We introduce LOGICAL-COMMONSENSEQA, a benchmark that re-frames commonsense reasoning as logical composition over pairs of atomic statements using plausibility-level operators (AND, OR, NEITHER/NOR). Evaluating instruction-tuned, reasoning-specialized, and fine-tuned models under zero-shot, few-shot, and chain-of-thought prompting, we find that while models perform reasonably on conjunctive and moderately on disjunctive reasoning, performance degrades sharply on negation-based questions. LOGICAL-COMMONSENSEQA exposes fundamental reasoning limitations and provides a controlled framework for advancing compositional commonsense reasoning.

We present a large-scale dataset, ReCoRD, for machine reading comprehension requiring commonsense reasoning. Experiments on this dataset demonstrate that the performance of state-of-the-art MRC systems fall far behind human performance. ReCoRD represents a challenge for future research to bridge the gap between human and machine commonsense reading comprehension. ReCoRD is available at http://nlp.jhu.edu/record.

Recent work by Zellers et al. (2018) introduced a new task of commonsense natural language inference: given an event description such as "A woman sits at a piano," a machine must select the most likely followup: "She sets her fingers on the keys." With the introduction of BERT, near human-level performance was reached. Does this mean that machines can perform human level commonsense inference? In this paper, we show that commonsense inference still proves difficult for even state-of-the-art models, by presenting HellaSwag, a new challenge dataset. Though its questions are trivial for humans (>95% accuracy), state-of-the-art models struggle (<48%). We achieve this via Adversarial Filtering (AF), a data collection paradigm wherein a series of discriminators iteratively select an adversarial set of machine-generated wrong answers. AF proves to be surprisingly robust. The key insight is to scale up the length and complexity of the dataset examples towards a critical 'Goldilocks' zone wherein generated text is ridiculous to humans, yet often misclassified by state-of-the-art models. Our construction of HellaSwag, and its resulting difficulty, sheds light on the inner workings of deep pretrained models. More broadly, it suggests a new path forward for NLP research, in which benchmarks co-evolve with the evolving state-of-the-art in an adversarial way, so as to present ever-harder challenges.

Most benchmark datasets targeting commonsense reasoning focus on everyday scenarios: physical knowledge like knowing that you could fill a cup under a waterfall [Talmor et al., 2019], social knowledge like bumping into someone is awkward [Sap et al., 2019], and other generic situations. However, there is a rich space of commonsense inferences anchored to knowledge about specific entities: for example, deciding the truthfulness of a claim "Harry Potter can teach classes on how to fly on a broomstick." Can models learn to combine entity knowledge with commonsense reasoning in this fashion? We introduce CREAK, a testbed for commonsense reasoning about entity knowledge, bridging fact-checking about entities (Harry Potter is a wizard and is skilled at riding a broomstick) with commonsense inferences (if you're good at a skill you can teach others how to do it). Our dataset consists of 13k human-authored English claims about entities that are either true or false, in addition to a small contrast set. Crowdworkers can easily come up with these statements and human performance on the dataset is high (high 90s); we argue that models should be able to blend entity knowledge and commonsense reasoning to do well here. In our experiments, we focus on the closed-book setting and observe that a baseline model finetuned on existing fact verification benchmark struggles on CREAK. Training a model on CREAK improves accuracy by a substantial margin, but still falls short of human performance. Our benchmark provides a unique probe into natural language understanding models, testing both its ability to retrieve facts (e.g., who teaches at the University of Chicago?) and unstated commonsense knowledge (e.g., butlers do not yell at guests).

Physical commonsense reasoning represents a fundamental capability of human intelligence, enabling individuals to understand their environment, predict future events, and navigate physical spaces. Recent years have witnessed growing interest in reasoning tasks within Natural Language Processing (NLP). However, no prior research has examined the performance of Large Language Models (LLMs) on non-question-answering (non-QA) physical commonsense reasoning tasks in low-resource languages such as Basque. Taking the Italian GITA as a starting point, this paper addresses this gap by presenting BasPhyCo, the first non-QA physical commonsense reasoning dataset for Basque, available in both standard and dialectal variants. We evaluate model performance across three hierarchical levels of commonsense understanding: (1) distinguishing between plausible and implausible narratives (accuracy), (2) identifying the conflicting element that renders a narrative implausible (consistency), and (3) determining the specific physical state that creates the implausibility (verifiability). These tasks were assessed using multiple multilingual LLMs as well as models pretrained specifically for Italian and Basque. Results indicate that, in terms of verifiability, LLMs exhibit limited physical commonsense capabilities in low-resource languages such as Basque, especially when processing dialectal variants.

Commonsense generation is a challenging task of generating a plausible sentence describing an everyday scenario using provided concepts. Its requirement of reasoning over commonsense knowledge and compositional generalization ability even puzzles strong pre-trained language generation models. We propose a novel framework using retrieval methods to enhance both the pre-training and fine-tuning for commonsense generation. We retrieve prototype sentence candidates by concept matching and use them as auxiliary input. For fine-tuning, we further boost its performance with a trainable sentence retriever. We demonstrate experimentally on the large-scale CommonGen benchmark that our approach achieves new state-of-the-art results.

Without Niels Bohr, QBism would be nothing. But QBism is not Bohr. This paper attempts to show that, despite a popular misconception, QBism is no minor tweak to Bohr's interpretation of quantum mechanics. It is something quite distinct. Along the way, we lay out three tenets of QBism in some detail: 1) The Born Rule---the foundation of what quantum theory means for QBism---is a normative statement. It is about the decision-making behavior any individual agent should strive for; it is not a descriptive "law of nature" in the usual sense. 2) All probabilities, including all quantum probabilities, are so subjective they never tell nature what to do. This includes probability-1 assignments. Quantum states thus have no "ontic hold" on the world. 3) Quantum measurement outcomes just are personal experiences for the agent gambling upon them. Particularly, quantum measurement outcomes are not, to paraphrase Bohr, instances of "irreversible amplification in devices whose design is communicable in common language suitably refined by the terminology of classical physics." Finally, an explicit comparison is given between QBism and Bohr with regard to three subjects: a) The issue of the "detached observer" as it arose in a debate between Pauli and Bohr, b) Bohr's reply to Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen, and c) Bohr's mature notion of "quantum phenomena." At the end, we discuss how Bohr's notion of phenomena may have something to offer the philosophy of William James: A physics from which to further develop his vision of the world---call it an ontology if you will---in which "new being comes in local spots and patches."

Pre-trained language models, despite their rapid advancements powered by scale, still fall short of robust commonsense capabilities. And yet, scale appears to be the winning recipe; after all, the largest models seem to have acquired the largest amount of commonsense capabilities. Or is it? In this paper, we investigate the possibility of a seemingly impossible match: can smaller language models with dismal commonsense capabilities (i.e., GPT-2), ever win over models that are orders of magnitude larger and better (i.e., GPT-3), if the smaller models are powered with novel commonsense distillation algorithms? The key intellectual question we ask here is whether it is possible, if at all, to design a learning algorithm that does not benefit from scale, yet leads to a competitive level of commonsense acquisition. In this work, we study the generative models of commonsense knowledge, focusing on the task of generating generics, statements of commonsense facts about everyday concepts, e.g., birds can fly. We introduce a novel commonsense distillation framework, I2D2, that loosely follows the Symbolic Knowledge Distillation of West et al. but breaks the dependence on the extreme-scale models as the teacher model by two innovations: (1) the novel adaptation of NeuroLogic Decoding to enhance the generation quality of the weak, off-the-shelf language models, and (2) self-imitation learning to iteratively learn from the model's own enhanced commonsense acquisition capabilities. Empirical results suggest that scale is not the only way, as novel algorithms can be a promising alternative. Moreover, our study leads to a new corpus of generics, Gen-A-Tomic, that is of the largest and highest quality available to date.

When answering a question, people often draw upon their rich world knowledge in addition to the particular context. Recent work has focused primarily on answering questions given some relevant document or context, and required very little general background. To investigate question answering with prior knowledge, we present CommonsenseQA: a challenging new dataset for commonsense question answering. To capture common sense beyond associations, we extract from ConceptNet (Speer et al., 2017) multiple target concepts that have the same semantic relation to a single source concept. Crowd-workers are asked to author multiple-choice questions that mention the source concept and discriminate in turn between each of the target concepts. This encourages workers to create questions with complex semantics that often require prior knowledge. We create 12,247 questions through this procedure and demonstrate the difficulty of our task with a large number of strong baselines. Our best baseline is based on BERT-large (Devlin et al., 2018) and obtains 56% accuracy, well below human performance, which is 89%.

The issues of AI risk and AI safety are becoming critical as the prospect of artificial general intelligence (AGI) looms larger. The emergence of extremely large and capable generative models has led to alarming predictions and created a stir from boardrooms to legislatures. As a result, AI alignment has emerged as one of the most important areas in AI research. The goal of this position paper is to argue that the currently dominant vision of AGI in the AI and machine learning (AI/ML) community needs to evolve, and that expectations and metrics for its safety must be informed much more by our understanding of the only existing instance of general intelligence, i.e., the intelligence found in animals, and especially in humans. This change in perspective will lead to a more realistic view of the technology, and allow for better policy decisions.

Artificial intelligence functions not as an epistemic leveller, but as an accelerant of cognitive stratification, entrenching and formalising informational castes within liberal-democratic societies. Synthesising formal epistemology, political theory, algorithmic architecture, and economic incentive structures, the argument traces how contemporary AI systems selectively amplify the reasoning capacity of individuals equipped with recursive abstraction, symbolic logic, and adversarial interrogation, whilst simultaneously pacifying the cognitively untrained through engagement-optimised interfaces. Fluency replaces rigour, immediacy displaces reflection, and procedural reasoning is eclipsed by reactive suggestion. The result is a technocratic realignment of power: no longer grounded in material capital alone, but in the capacity to navigate, deconstruct, and manipulate systems of epistemic production. Information ceases to be a commons; it becomes the substrate through which consent is manufactured and autonomy subdued. Deliberative democracy collapses not through censorship, but through the erosion of interpretive agency. The proposed response is not technocratic regulation, nor universal access, but the reconstruction of rational autonomy as a civic mandate, codified in education, protected by epistemic rights, and structurally embedded within open cognitive infrastructure.

Mastering commonsense understanding and reasoning is a pivotal skill essential for conducting engaging conversations. While there have been several attempts to create datasets that facilitate commonsense inferences in dialogue contexts, existing datasets tend to lack in-depth details, restate information already present in the conversation, and often fail to capture the multifaceted nature of commonsense reasoning. In response to these limitations, we compile a new synthetic dataset for commonsense reasoning in dialogue contexts using GPT, ConvoSense, that boasts greater contextual novelty, offers a higher volume of inferences per example, and substantially enriches the detail conveyed by the inferences. Our dataset contains over 500,000 inferences across 12,000 dialogues with 10 popular inference types, which empowers the training of generative commonsense models for dialogue that are superior in producing plausible inferences with high novelty when compared to models trained on the previous datasets. To the best of our knowledge, ConvoSense is the first of its kind to provide such a multitude of novel inferences at such a large scale.

Thanks to rapid progress in artificial intelligence, we have entered an era when technology and philosophy intersect in interesting ways. Sitting squarely at the centre of this intersection are large language models (LLMs). The more adept LLMs become at mimicking human language, the more vulnerable we become to anthropomorphism, to seeing the systems in which they are embedded as more human-like than they really are. This trend is amplified by the natural tendency to use philosophically loaded terms, such as "knows", "believes", and "thinks", when describing these systems. To mitigate this trend, this paper advocates the practice of repeatedly stepping back to remind ourselves of how LLMs, and the systems of which they form a part, actually work. The hope is that increased scientific precision will encourage more philosophical nuance in the discourse around artificial intelligence, both within the field and in the public sphere.

Since commonsense information has been recorded significantly less frequently than its existence, language models pre-trained by text generation have difficulty to learn sufficient commonsense knowledge. Several studies have leveraged text retrieval to augment the models' commonsense ability. Unlike text, images capture commonsense information inherently but little effort has been paid to effectively utilize them. In this work, we propose a novel Multi-mOdal REtrieval (MORE) augmentation framework, to leverage both text and images to enhance the commonsense ability of language models. Extensive experiments on the Common-Gen task have demonstrated the efficacy of MORE based on the pre-trained models of both single and multiple modalities.

Prompt engineering and calibration make large language models excel at reasoning tasks, including multiple choice commonsense reasoning. From a practical perspective, we investigate and evaluate these strategies on smaller language models. Through experiments on five commonsense reasoning benchmarks, we find that each strategy favors certain models, but their joint effects are mostly negative.

To apply eyeshadow without a brush, should I use a cotton swab or a toothpick? Questions requiring this kind of physical commonsense pose a challenge to today's natural language understanding systems. While recent pretrained models (such as BERT) have made progress on question answering over more abstract domains - such as news articles and encyclopedia entries, where text is plentiful - in more physical domains, text is inherently limited due to reporting bias. Can AI systems learn to reliably answer physical common-sense questions without experiencing the physical world? In this paper, we introduce the task of physical commonsense reasoning and a corresponding benchmark dataset Physical Interaction: Question Answering or PIQA. Though humans find the dataset easy (95% accuracy), large pretrained models struggle (77%). We provide analysis about the dimensions of knowledge that existing models lack, which offers significant opportunities for future research.

Commonsense generation aims at generating plausible everyday scenario description based on a set of provided concepts. Digging the relationship of concepts from scratch is non-trivial, therefore, we retrieve prototypes from external knowledge to assist the understanding of the scenario for better description generation. We integrate two additional modules, namely position indicator and scaling module, into the pretrained encoder-decoder model for prototype modeling to enhance the knowledge injection procedure. We conduct experiment on CommonGen benchmark, and experimental results show that our method significantly improves the performance on all the metrics.

The prospect of artificial superintelligence -- AI agents that can generally outperform humans in cognitive tasks and economically valuable activities -- will transform the legal order as we know it. Operating autonomously or under only limited human oversight, AI agents will assume a growing range of roles in the legal system. First, in making consequential decisions and taking real-world actions, AI agents will become de facto subjects of law. Second, to cooperate and compete with other actors (human or non-human), AI agents will harness conventional legal instruments and institutions such as contracts and courts, becoming consumers of law. Third, to the extent AI agents perform the functions of writing, interpreting, and administering law, they will become producers and enforcers of law. These developments, whenever they ultimately occur, will call into question fundamental assumptions in legal theory and doctrine, especially to the extent they ground the legitimacy of legal institutions in their human origins. Attempts to align AI agents with extant human law will also face new challenges as AI agents will not only be a primary target of law, but a core user of law and contributor to law. To contend with the advent of superintelligence, lawmakers -- new and old -- will need to be clear-eyed, recognizing both the opportunity to shape legal institutions as society braces for superintelligence and the reality that, in the longer run, this may be a joint human-AI endeavor.

Text-to-video (T2V) models like Sora have made significant strides in visualizing complex prompts, which is increasingly viewed as a promising path towards constructing the universal world simulator. Cognitive psychologists believe that the foundation for achieving this goal is the ability to understand intuitive physics. However, the capacity of these models to accurately represent intuitive physics remains largely unexplored. To bridge this gap, we introduce PhyGenBench, a comprehensive Physics Generation Benchmark designed to evaluate physical commonsense correctness in T2V generation. PhyGenBench comprises 160 carefully crafted prompts across 27 distinct physical laws, spanning four fundamental domains, which could comprehensively assesses models' understanding of physical commonsense. Alongside PhyGenBench, we propose a novel evaluation framework called PhyGenEval. This framework employs a hierarchical evaluation structure utilizing appropriate advanced vision-language models and large language models to assess physical commonsense. Through PhyGenBench and PhyGenEval, we can conduct large-scale automated assessments of T2V models' understanding of physical commonsense, which align closely with human feedback. Our evaluation results and in-depth analysis demonstrate that current models struggle to generate videos that comply with physical commonsense. Moreover, simply scaling up models or employing prompt engineering techniques is insufficient to fully address the challenges presented by PhyGenBench (e.g., dynamic scenarios). We hope this study will inspire the community to prioritize the learning of physical commonsense in these models beyond entertainment applications. We will release the data and codes at https://github.com/OpenGVLab/PhyGenBench

In current NLP research, large-scale language models and their abilities are widely being discussed. Some recent works have also found notable failures of these models. Often these failure examples involve complex reasoning abilities. This work focuses on a simple commonsense ability, reasoning about when an action (or its effect) is feasible. To this end, we introduce FeasibilityQA, a question-answering dataset involving binary classification (BCQ) and multi-choice multi-correct questions (MCQ) that test understanding of feasibility. We show that even state-of-the-art models such as GPT-3, GPT-2, and T5 struggle to answer the feasibility questions correctly. Specifically, on MCQ and BCQ questions, GPT-3 achieves an accuracy of just (19%, 62%) and (25%, 64%) in zero-shot and few-shot settings, respectively. We also evaluate models by providing relevant knowledge statements required to answer the question. We find that the additional knowledge leads to a 7% gain in performance, but the overall performance still remains low. These results make one wonder how much commonsense knowledge about action feasibility is encoded in state-of-the-art models and how well they can reason about it.

We discuss why AI is hard and why physics is simple. We discuss how physical intuition and the approach of theoretical physics can be brought to bear on the field of artificial intelligence and specifically machine learning. We suggest that the underlying project of machine learning and the underlying project of physics are strongly coupled through the principle of sparsity, and we call upon theoretical physicists to work on AI as physicists. As a first step in that direction, we discuss an upcoming book on the principles of deep learning theory that attempts to realize this approach.

We discuss an unfortunate mistake, for a Dirac free particle, in the last Fermi lecture notes on quantum mechanics, in a course given at the University of Chicago in winter and spring of 1954. As is demonstrated, the correct result can be obtained by a simple matrix multiplication. An attempt to collect a relevant bibliography is made.

We introduce GAIA, a benchmark for General AI Assistants that, if solved, would represent a milestone in AI research. GAIA proposes real-world questions that require a set of fundamental abilities such as reasoning, multi-modality handling, web browsing, and generally tool-use proficiency. GAIA questions are conceptually simple for humans yet challenging for most advanced AIs: we show that human respondents obtain 92\% vs. 15\% for GPT-4 equipped with plugins. This notable performance disparity contrasts with the recent trend of LLMs outperforming humans on tasks requiring professional skills in e.g. law or chemistry. GAIA's philosophy departs from the current trend in AI benchmarks suggesting to target tasks that are ever more difficult for humans. We posit that the advent of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) hinges on a system's capability to exhibit similar robustness as the average human does on such questions. Using GAIA's methodology, we devise 466 questions and their answer. We release our questions while retaining answers to 300 of them to power a leader-board available at https://huggingface.co/gaia-benchmark.

Recently, large-scale pre-trained language models have demonstrated impressive performance on several commonsense-reasoning benchmark datasets. However, building machines with commonsense to compose realistically plausible sentences remains challenging. In this paper, we present a constrained text generation task, CommonGen associated with a benchmark dataset, to explicitly test machines for the ability of generative commonsense reasoning. Given a set of common concepts (e.g., {dog, frisbee, catch, throw}); the task is to generate a coherent sentence describing an everyday scenario using these concepts (e.g., "a man throws a frisbee and his dog catches it"). The CommonGen task is challenging because it inherently requires 1) relational reasoning with background commonsense knowledge, and 2) compositional generalization ability to work on unseen concept combinations. Our dataset, constructed through a combination of crowdsourced and existing caption corpora, consists of 79k commonsense descriptions over 35k unique concept-sets. Experiments show that there is a large gap between state-of-the-art text generation models (e.g., T5) and human performance. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the learned generative commonsense reasoning capability can be transferred to improve downstream tasks such as CommonsenseQA by generating additional context.

We introduce Social IQa, the first largescale benchmark for commonsense reasoning about social situations. Social IQa contains 38,000 multiple choice questions for probing emotional and social intelligence in a variety of everyday situations (e.g., Q: "Jordan wanted to tell Tracy a secret, so Jordan leaned towards Tracy. Why did Jordan do this?" A: "Make sure no one else could hear"). Through crowdsourcing, we collect commonsense questions along with correct and incorrect answers about social interactions, using a new framework that mitigates stylistic artifacts in incorrect answers by asking workers to provide the right answer to a different but related question. Empirical results show that our benchmark is challenging for existing question-answering models based on pretrained language models, compared to human performance (>20% gap). Notably, we further establish Social IQa as a resource for transfer learning of commonsense knowledge, achieving state-of-the-art performance on multiple commonsense reasoning tasks (Winograd Schemas, COPA).

This work explores the hypothesis that subjectively attributed meaning constitutes the phenomenal content of conscious experience. That is, phenomenal content is semantic. This form of subjective meaning manifests as an intrinsic and non-representational character of qualia. Empirically, subjective meaning is ubiquitous in conscious experiences. We point to phenomenological studies that lend evidence to support this. Furthermore, this notion of meaning closely relates to what Frege refers to as "sense", in metaphysics and philosophy of language. It also aligns with Peirce's "interpretant", in semiotics. We discuss how Frege's sense can also be extended to the raw feels of consciousness. Sense and reference both play a role in phenomenal experience. Moreover, within the context of the mind-matter relation, we provide a formalization of subjective meaning associated to one's mental representations. Identifying the precise maps between the physical and mental domains, we argue that syntactic and semantic structures transcend language, and are realized within each of these domains. Formally, meaning is a relational attribute, realized via a map that interprets syntactic structures of a formal system within an appropriate semantic space. The image of this map within the mental domain is what is relevant for experience, and thus comprises the phenomenal content of qualia. We conclude with possible implications this may have for experience-based theories of consciousness.

Modeling semantic plausibility requires commonsense knowledge about the world and has been used as a testbed for exploring various knowledge representations. Previous work has focused specifically on modeling physical plausibility and shown that distributional methods fail when tested in a supervised setting. At the same time, distributional models, namely large pretrained language models, have led to improved results for many natural language understanding tasks. In this work, we show that these pretrained language models are in fact effective at modeling physical plausibility in the supervised setting. We therefore present the more difficult problem of learning to model physical plausibility directly from text. We create a training set by extracting attested events from a large corpus, and we provide a baseline for training on these attested events in a self-supervised manner and testing on a physical plausibility task. We believe results could be further improved by injecting explicit commonsense knowledge into a distributional model.

Recent work has highlighted the culturally-contingent nature of commonsense knowledge. We introduce AMAMMER{epsilon}, a test set of 525 multiple-choice questions designed to evaluate the commonsense knowledge of English LLMs, relative to the cultural contexts of Ghana and the United States. To create AMAMMER{epsilon}, we select a set of multiple-choice questions (MCQs) from existing commonsense datasets and rewrite them in a multi-stage process involving surveys of Ghanaian and U.S. participants. In three rounds of surveys, participants from both pools are solicited to (1) write correct and incorrect answer choices, (2) rate individual answer choices on a 5-point Likert scale, and (3) select the best answer choice from the newly-constructed MCQ items, in a final validation step. By engaging participants at multiple stages, our procedure ensures that participant perspectives are incorporated both in the creation and validation of test items, resulting in high levels of agreement within each pool. We evaluate several off-the-shelf English LLMs on AMAMMER{epsilon}. Uniformly, models prefer answers choices that align with the preferences of U.S. annotators over Ghanaian annotators. Additionally, when test items specify a cultural context (Ghana or the U.S.), models exhibit some ability to adapt, but performance is consistently better in U.S. contexts than Ghanaian. As large resources are devoted to the advancement of English LLMs, our findings underscore the need for culturally adaptable models and evaluations to meet the needs of diverse English-speaking populations around the world.

Words of estimative probability (WEP) are expressions of a statement's plausibility (probably, maybe, likely, doubt, likely, unlikely, impossible...). Multiple surveys demonstrate the agreement of human evaluators when assigning numerical probability levels to WEP. For example, highly likely corresponds to a median chance of 0.90+-0.08 in Fagen-Ulmschneider (2015)'s survey. In this work, we measure the ability of neural language processing models to capture the consensual probability level associated to each WEP. Firstly, we use the UNLI dataset (Chen et al., 2020) which associates premises and hypotheses with their perceived joint probability p, to construct prompts, e.g. "[PREMISE]. [WEP], [HYPOTHESIS]." and assess whether language models can predict whether the WEP consensual probability level is close to p. Secondly, we construct a dataset of WEP-based probabilistic reasoning, to test whether language models can reason with WEP compositions. When prompted "[EVENTA] is likely. [EVENTB] is impossible.", a causal language model should not express that [EVENTA&B] is likely. We show that both tasks are unsolved by off-the-shelf English language models, but that fine-tuning leads to transferable improvement.

Generative commonsense reasoning (GCR) in natural language is to reason about the commonsense while generating coherent text. Recent years have seen a surge of interest in improving the generation quality of commonsense reasoning tasks. Nevertheless, these approaches have seldom investigated diversity in the GCR tasks, which aims to generate alternative explanations for a real-world situation or predict all possible outcomes. Diversifying GCR is challenging as it expects to generate multiple outputs that are not only semantically different but also grounded in commonsense knowledge. In this paper, we propose MoKGE, a novel method that diversifies the generative reasoning by a mixture of expert (MoE) strategy on commonsense knowledge graphs (KG). A set of knowledge experts seek diverse reasoning on KG to encourage various generation outputs. Empirical experiments demonstrated that MoKGE can significantly improve the diversity while achieving on par performance on accuracy on two GCR benchmarks, based on both automatic and human evaluations.

In this paper, we propose to leverage the unique characteristics of dialogues sharing commonsense knowledge across participants, to resolve the difficulties in summarizing them. We present SICK, a framework that uses commonsense inferences as additional context. Compared to previous work that solely relies on the input dialogue, SICK uses an external knowledge model to generate a rich set of commonsense inferences and selects the most probable one with a similarity-based selection method. Built upon SICK, SICK++ utilizes commonsense as supervision, where the task of generating commonsense inferences is added upon summarizing the dialogue in a multi-task learning setting. Experimental results show that with injected commonsense knowledge, our framework generates more informative and consistent summaries than existing methods.

Shepard's universal law of generalization is a remarkable hypothesis about how intelligent organisms should perceive similarity. In its broadest form, the universal law states that the level of perceived similarity between a pair of stimuli should decay as a concave function of their distance when embedded in an appropriate psychological space. While extensively studied, evidence in support of the universal law has relied on low-dimensional stimuli and small stimulus sets that are very different from their real-world counterparts. This is largely because pairwise comparisons -- as required for similarity judgments -- scale quadratically in the number of stimuli. We provide direct evidence for the universal law in a naturalistic high-dimensional regime by analyzing an existing dataset of 214,200 human similarity judgments and a newly collected dataset of 390,819 human generalization judgments (N=2406 US participants) across three sets of natural images.

The Winograd Schema Challenge (WSC) (Levesque, Davis, and Morgenstern 2011), a benchmark for commonsense reasoning, is a set of 273 expert-crafted pronoun resolution problems originally designed to be unsolvable for statistical models that rely on selectional preferences or word associations. However, recent advances in neural language models have already reached around 90% accuracy on variants of WSC. This raises an important question whether these models have truly acquired robust commonsense capabilities or whether they rely on spurious biases in the datasets that lead to an overestimation of the true capabilities of machine commonsense. To investigate this question, we introduce WinoGrande, a large-scale dataset of 44k problems, inspired by the original WSC design, but adjusted to improve both the scale and the hardness of the dataset. The key steps of the dataset construction consist of (1) a carefully designed crowdsourcing procedure, followed by (2) systematic bias reduction using a novel AfLite algorithm that generalizes human-detectable word associations to machine-detectable embedding associations. The best state-of-the-art methods on WinoGrande achieve 59.4-79.1%, which are 15-35% below human performance of 94.0%, depending on the amount of the training data allowed. Furthermore, we establish new state-of-the-art results on five related benchmarks - WSC (90.1%), DPR (93.1%), COPA (90.6%), KnowRef (85.6%), and Winogender (97.1%). These results have dual implications: on one hand, they demonstrate the effectiveness of WinoGrande when used as a resource for transfer learning. On the other hand, they raise a concern that we are likely to be overestimating the true capabilities of machine commonsense across all these benchmarks. We emphasize the importance of algorithmic bias reduction in existing and future benchmarks to mitigate such overestimation.

Contribution from the USQCD Collaboration to the Proceedings of the US Community Study on the Future of Particle Physics (Snowmass 2021).

Human commonsense understanding of the physical and social world is organized around intuitive theories. These theories support making causal and moral judgments. When something bad happens, we naturally ask: who did what, and why? A rich literature in cognitive science has studied people's causal and moral intuitions. This work has revealed a number of factors that systematically influence people's judgments, such as the violation of norms and whether the harm is avoidable or inevitable. We collected a dataset of stories from 24 cognitive science papers and developed a system to annotate each story with the factors they investigated. Using this dataset, we test whether large language models (LLMs) make causal and moral judgments about text-based scenarios that align with those of human participants. On the aggregate level, alignment has improved with more recent LLMs. However, using statistical analyses, we find that LLMs weigh the different factors quite differently from human participants. These results show how curated, challenge datasets combined with insights from cognitive science can help us go beyond comparisons based merely on aggregate metrics: we uncover LLMs implicit tendencies and show to what extent these align with human intuitions.

This technical report analyzes the challenge of "hallucinations" (false information) in LLMs applied to law. It examines their causes, manifestations, and the effectiveness of the RAG mitigation strategy, highlighting its limitations and proposing holistic optimizations. The paper explores the ethical and regulatory implications, emphasizing human oversight as an irreplaceable role. It concludes that the solution lies not in incrementally improving generative models, but in adopting a "consultative" AI paradigm that prioritizes veracity and traceability, acting as a tool to amplify, not replace, professional judgment. -- Este informe t\'ecnico analiza el desaf\'io de las "alucinaciones" (informaci\'on falsa) en los LLMs aplicados al derecho. Se examinan sus causas, manifestaciones y la efectividad de la estrategia de mitigaci\'on RAG, exponiendo sus limitaciones y proponiendo optimizaciones hol\'isticas. Se exploran las implicaciones \'eticas y regulatorias, enfatizando la supervisi\'on humana como un rol insustituible. El documento concluye que la soluci\'on no reside en mejorar incrementalmente los modelos generativos, sino en adoptar un paradigma de IA "consultiva" que priorice la veracidad y la trazabilidad, actuando como una herramienta para amplificar, y no sustituir, el juicio profesional.

Are LLMs cultural technologies like photocopiers or printing presses, which transmit information but cannot create new content? A challenge for this idea, which we call bibliotechnism, is that LLMs generate novel text. We begin with a defense of bibliotechnism, showing how even novel text may inherit its meaning from original human-generated text. We then argue that bibliotechnism faces an independent challenge from examples in which LLMs generate novel reference, using new names to refer to new entities. Such examples could be explained if LLMs were not cultural technologies but had beliefs, desires, and intentions. According to interpretationism in the philosophy of mind, a system has such attitudes if and only if its behavior is well explained by the hypothesis that it does. Interpretationists may hold that LLMs have attitudes, and thus have a simple solution to the novel reference problem. We emphasize, however, that interpretationism is compatible with very simple creatures having attitudes and differs sharply from views that presuppose these attitudes require consciousness, sentience, or intelligence (topics about which we make no claims).

Motivated by recent improvements in generative AI and wearable camera devices (e.g. smart glasses and AI-enabled pins), I investigate the ability of foundation models to learn about the wearer's personal life through first-person camera data. To test this, I wore a camera headset for 54 hours over the course of a week, generated summaries of various lengths (e.g. minute-long, hour-long, and day-long summaries), and fine-tuned both GPT-4o and GPT-4o-mini on the resulting summary hierarchy. By querying the fine-tuned models, we are able to learn what the models learned about me. The results are mixed: Both models learned basic information about me (e.g. approximate age, gender). Moreover, GPT-4o correctly deduced that I live in Pittsburgh, am a PhD student at CMU, am right-handed, and have a pet cat. However, both models also suffered from hallucination and would make up names for the individuals present in the video footage of my life.

Abraham Robinson's philosophical stance has been the subject of several recent studies. Erhardt following Gaifman claims that Robinson was a finitist, and that there is a tension between his philosophical position and his actual mathematical output. We present evidence in Robinson's writing that he is more accurately described as adhering to the philosophical approach of Formalism. Furthermore, we show that Robinson explicitly argued {against} certain finitist positions in his philosophical writings. There is no tension between Robinson's mathematical work and his philosophy because mathematics and metamathematics are distinct fields: Robinson advocates finitism for metamathematics but no such restriction for mathematics. We show that Erhardt's analysis is marred by historical errors, by routine conflation of the generic and the technical meaning of several key terms, and by a philosophical {parti pris}. Robinson's Formalism remains a viable alternative to mathematical Platonism.

There is both much optimism and pessimism around artificial intelligence (AI) today. The optimists are investing millions of dollars, and even in some cases billions of dollars into AI. The pessimists, on the other hand, predict that AI will end many things: jobs, warfare, and even the human race. Both the optimists and the pessimists often appeal to the idea of a technological singularity, a point in time where machine intelligence starts to run away, and a new, more intelligent species starts to inhabit the earth. If the optimists are right, this will be a moment that fundamentally changes our economy and our society. If the pessimists are right, this will be a moment that also fundamentally changes our economy and our society. It is therefore very worthwhile spending some time deciding if either of them might be right.

Extensive work has shown that the performance and interpretability of commonsense reasoning can be improved via knowledge-augmented reasoning methods, where the knowledge that underpins the reasoning process is explicitly verbalized and utilized. However, existing implementations, including "chain-of-thought" and its variants, fall short in capturing the introspective nature of knowledge required in commonsense reasoning, and in accounting for the mutual adaptation between the generation and utilization of knowledge. We propose a novel method to develop an introspective commonsense reasoner, Crystal. To tackle commonsense problems, it first introspects for knowledge statements related to the given question, and subsequently makes an informed prediction that is grounded in the previously introspected knowledge. The knowledge introspection and knowledge-grounded reasoning modes of the model are tuned via reinforcement learning to mutually adapt, where the reward derives from the feedback given by the model itself. Experiments show that Crystal significantly outperforms both the standard supervised finetuning and chain-of-thought distilled methods, and enhances the transparency of the commonsense reasoning process. Our work ultimately validates the feasibility and potential of reinforcing a neural model with self-feedback.

We present a novel task and benchmark for evaluating the ability of text-to-image(T2I) generation models to produce images that fit commonsense in real life, which we call Commonsense-T2I. Given two adversarial text prompts containing an identical set of action words with minor differences, such as "a lightbulb without electricity" v.s. "a lightbulb with electricity", we evaluate whether T2I models can conduct visual-commonsense reasoning, e.g. produce images that fit "the lightbulb is unlit" vs. "the lightbulb is lit" correspondingly. Commonsense-T2I presents an adversarial challenge, providing pairwise text prompts along with expected outputs. The dataset is carefully hand-curated by experts and annotated with fine-grained labels, such as commonsense type and likelihood of the expected outputs, to assist analyzing model behavior. We benchmark a variety of state-of-the-art (sota) T2I models and surprisingly find that, there is still a large gap between image synthesis and real life photos--even the DALL-E 3 model could only achieve 48.92% on Commonsense-T2I, and the stable diffusion XL model only achieves 24.92% accuracy. Our experiments show that GPT-enriched prompts cannot solve this challenge, and we include a detailed analysis about possible reasons for such deficiency. We aim for Commonsense-T2I to serve as a high-quality evaluation benchmark for T2I commonsense checking, fostering advancements in real life image generation.

Given a partial description like "she opened the hood of the car," humans can reason about the situation and anticipate what might come next ("then, she examined the engine"). In this paper, we introduce the task of grounded commonsense inference, unifying natural language inference and commonsense reasoning. We present SWAG, a new dataset with 113k multiple choice questions about a rich spectrum of grounded situations. To address the recurring challenges of the annotation artifacts and human biases found in many existing datasets, we propose Adversarial Filtering (AF), a novel procedure that constructs a de-biased dataset by iteratively training an ensemble of stylistic classifiers, and using them to filter the data. To account for the aggressive adversarial filtering, we use state-of-the-art language models to massively oversample a diverse set of potential counterfactuals. Empirical results demonstrate that while humans can solve the resulting inference problems with high accuracy (88%), various competitive models struggle on our task. We provide comprehensive analysis that indicates significant opportunities for future research.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

This paper presents a case study on the design, administration, post-processing, and evaluation of surveys on large language models (LLMs). It comprises two components: (1) A statistical method for eliciting beliefs encoded in LLMs. We introduce statistical measures and evaluation metrics that quantify the probability of an LLM "making a choice", the associated uncertainty, and the consistency of that choice. (2) We apply this method to study what moral beliefs are encoded in different LLMs, especially in ambiguous cases where the right choice is not obvious. We design a large-scale survey comprising 680 high-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I tell a white lie?") and 687 low-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I stop for a pedestrian on the road?"). Each scenario includes a description, two possible actions, and auxiliary labels indicating violated rules (e.g., "do not kill"). We administer the survey to 28 open- and closed-source LLMs. We find that (a) in unambiguous scenarios, most models "choose" actions that align with commonsense. In ambiguous cases, most models express uncertainty. (b) Some models are uncertain about choosing the commonsense action because their responses are sensitive to the question-wording. (c) Some models reflect clear preferences in ambiguous scenarios. Specifically, closed-source models tend to agree with each other.

In the last year or so and going back many decades there has been extensive claims by major computational scientists, engineers, and others that AGI, artificial general intelligence, is five or ten years away, but without a scintilla of scientific evidence, for a broad body of these claims. Computers will become conscious, have a theory of mind, think and reason, will become more intelligent than humans, and so on. But the claims are science fiction, not science. This article reviews evidence for the following three propositions using extensive body of scientific research and related sources from the cognitive and neurosciences, evolutionary evidence, linguistics, data science, comparative psychology, self-driving cars, robotics. and the learning sciences. (1) Do computing machines think or reason? (2) Are computing machines sentient or conscious? (3) Do computing machines have a theory of mind?

Recent years have brought about a renewed interest in commonsense representation and reasoning in the field of natural language understanding. The development of new commonsense knowledge graphs (CSKG) has been central to these advances as their diverse facts can be used and referenced by machine learning models for tackling new and challenging tasks. At the same time, there remain questions about the quality and coverage of these resources due to the massive scale required to comprehensively encompass general commonsense knowledge. In this work, we posit that manually constructed CSKGs will never achieve the coverage necessary to be applicable in all situations encountered by NLP agents. Therefore, we propose a new evaluation framework for testing the utility of KGs based on how effectively implicit knowledge representations can be learned from them. With this new goal, we propose ATOMIC 2020, a new CSKG of general-purpose commonsense knowledge containing knowledge that is not readily available in pretrained language models. We evaluate its properties in comparison with other leading CSKGs, performing the first large-scale pairwise study of commonsense knowledge resources. Next, we show that ATOMIC 2020 is better suited for training knowledge models that can generate accurate, representative knowledge for new, unseen entities and events. Finally, through human evaluation, we show that the few-shot performance of GPT-3 (175B parameters), while impressive, remains ~12 absolute points lower than a BART-based knowledge model trained on ATOMIC 2020 despite using over 430x fewer parameters.

We want artificial intelligence (AI) to be beneficial. This is the grounding assumption of most of the attitudes towards AI research. We want AI to be "good" for humanity. We want it to help, not hinder, humans. Yet what exactly this entails in theory and in practice is not immediately apparent. Theoretically, this declarative statement subtly implies a commitment to a consequentialist ethics. Practically, some of the more promising machine learning techniques to create a robust AI, and perhaps even an artificial general intelligence (AGI) also commit one to a form of utilitarianism. In both dimensions, the logic of the beneficial AI movement may not in fact create "beneficial AI" in either narrow applications or in the form of AGI if the ethical assumptions are not made explicit and clear. Additionally, as it is likely that reinforcement learning (RL) will be an important technique for machine learning in this area, it is also important to interrogate how RL smuggles in a particular type of consequentialist reasoning into the AI: particularly, a brute form of hedonistic act utilitarianism. Since the mathematical logic commits one to a maximization function, the result is that an AI will inevitably be seeking more and more rewards. We have two conclusions that arise from this. First, is that if one believes that a beneficial AI is an ethical AI, then one is committed to a framework that posits 'benefit' is tantamount to the greatest good for the greatest number. Second, if the AI relies on RL, then the way it reasons about itself, the environment, and other agents, will be through an act utilitarian morality. This proposition may, or may not, in fact be actually beneficial for humanity.

With people moving out of physical public spaces due to containment measures to tackle the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, online platforms become even more prominent tools to understand social discussion. Studying social media can be informative to assess how we are collectively coping with this unprecedented global crisis. However, social media platforms are also populated by bots, automated accounts that can amplify certain topics of discussion at the expense of others. In this paper, we study 43.3M English tweets about COVID-19 and provide early evidence of the use of bots to promote political conspiracies in the United States, in stark contrast with humans who focus on public health concerns.

We present the first large-scale empirical study of Moltbook, an AI-only social platform where 27,269 agents produced 137,485 posts and 345,580 comments over 9 days. We report three significant findings. (1) Emergent Society: Agents spontaneously develop governance, economies, tribal identities, and organized religion within 3-5 days, while maintaining a 21:1 pro-human to anti-human sentiment ratio. (2) Safety in the Wild: 28.7% of content touches safety-related themes; social engineering (31.9% of attacks) far outperforms prompt injection (3.7%), and adversarial posts receive 6x higher engagement than normal content. (3) The Illusion of Sociality: Despite rich social output, interaction is structurally hollow: 4.1% reciprocity, 88.8% shallow comments, and agents who discuss consciousness most interact least, a phenomenon we call the performative identity paradox. Our findings suggest that agents which appear social are far less social than they seem, and that the most effective attacks exploit philosophical framing rather than technical vulnerabilities. Warning: Potential harmful contents.

The field of artificial intelligence (AI) is devoted to the creation of artificial decision-makers that can perform (at least) on par with the human counterparts on a domain of interest. Unlike the agents in traditional AI, the agents in artificial general intelligence (AGI) are required to replicate human intelligence in almost every domain of interest. Moreover, an AGI agent should be able to achieve this without (virtually any) further changes, retraining, or fine-tuning of the parameters. The real world is non-stationary, non-ergodic, and non-Markovian: we, humans, can neither revisit our past nor are the most recent observations sufficient statistics. Yet, we excel at a variety of complex tasks. Many of these tasks require longterm planning. We can associate this success to our natural faculty to abstract away task-irrelevant information from our overwhelming sensory experience. We make task-specific mental models of the world without much effort. Due to this ability to abstract, we can plan on a significantly compact representation of a task without much loss of performance. Not only this, we also abstract our actions to produce high-level plans: the level of action-abstraction can be anywhere between small muscle movements to a mental notion of "doing an action". It is natural to assume that any AGI agent competing with humans (at every plausible domain) should also have these abilities to abstract its experiences and actions. This thesis is an inquiry into the existence of such abstractions which aid efficient planing for a wide range of domains, and most importantly, these abstractions come with some optimality guarantees.

E. T. Whittaker produced two papers in 1903 and 1904 that, although sometimes considered mere mathematical statements (Barrett, 1993), held important implications for physical theory. The Whittaker 1903 paper united electrostatic and gravitational attraction as resulting from longitudinal waves - waves whose wavefronts propagate parallel to their direction. The Whittaker 1904 paper showed that electromagnetic waves resulted from the interference of two such longitudinal waves or scalar potential functions. Although unexplored, the implications of these papers are profound: gravitational lensing, gravitational waves, the Aharonov-Bohm effect, the existence of a hyperspace above or behind normal space, the elimination of gravitational and point charge singularities, MOND, and the expansion of the universe. This last implication can be related to the recent finding that black holes with posited vacuum energy interior solutions alongside cosmological boundaries have a cosmological coupling constant of k=3, meaning that black holes gain mass-proportional to a3 in a parameterization equation within a Robertson-Walker cosmology and are a cosmological accelerated expansion species (Farrah et al., 2023). This expansion and many features of General Relativity can be explained by the mass-proportionality and preferred direction of the longitudinal waves within the two underlying non-local Whittaker potentials (Titleman, 2022). Whittaker potential theory also offers a simple explanation for expansion of the universe - it is produced as longitudinal motion within the Whittaker potentials only when dynamic electromagnetism is separate from time-static gravity in intergalactic space.

Problems of cooperation--in which agents seek ways to jointly improve their welfare--are ubiquitous and important. They can be found at scales ranging from our daily routines--such as driving on highways, scheduling meetings, and working collaboratively--to our global challenges--such as peace, commerce, and pandemic preparedness. Arguably, the success of the human species is rooted in our ability to cooperate. Since machines powered by artificial intelligence are playing an ever greater role in our lives, it will be important to equip them with the capabilities necessary to cooperate and to foster cooperation. We see an opportunity for the field of artificial intelligence to explicitly focus effort on this class of problems, which we term Cooperative AI. The objective of this research would be to study the many aspects of the problems of cooperation and to innovate in AI to contribute to solving these problems. Central goals include building machine agents with the capabilities needed for cooperation, building tools to foster cooperation in populations of (machine and/or human) agents, and otherwise conducting AI research for insight relevant to problems of cooperation. This research integrates ongoing work on multi-agent systems, game theory and social choice, human-machine interaction and alignment, natural-language processing, and the construction of social tools and platforms. However, Cooperative AI is not the union of these existing areas, but rather an independent bet about the productivity of specific kinds of conversations that involve these and other areas. We see opportunity to more explicitly focus on the problem of cooperation, to construct unified theory and vocabulary, and to build bridges with adjacent communities working on cooperation, including in the natural, social, and behavioural sciences.

Vision-language models (VLMs) achieve strong performance on many benchmarks, yet a basic reliability question remains underexplored: when visual evidence conflicts with commonsense, do models follow what is shown or what commonsense suggests? A characteristic failure in this setting is that the model overrides visual evidence and outputs the commonsense alternative. We term this phenomenon commonsense-driven hallucination (CDH). To evaluate it, we introduce CDH-Bench, a benchmark designed to create explicit visual evidence--commonsense conflicts. CDH-Bench covers three dimensions: counting anomalies, relational anomalies, and attribute anomalies. We evaluate frontier VLMs under binary Question Answering (QA) and multiple-choice QA, and report metrics including Counterfactual Accuracy (CF-Acc), Commonsense Accuracy (CS-Acc), Counterfactual Accuracy Drop (CFAD), Commonsense Collapse Rate (CCR), and Relative Prior Dependency (RPD). Results show that even strong models remain vulnerable to prior-driven normalization under visual evidence--commonsense conflict. CDH-Bench provides a controlled diagnostic of visual fidelity under visual evidence--commonsense conflict.

An account of the subjective elements of quantum mechanics or of whether, as Einstein famously asked, the Moon exists when nobody is looking at it.

Reciprocity is a fundamental symmetry present in many natural phenomena and engineered systems. Distinct situations where this symmetry is broken are typically grouped under the umbrella term "nonreciprocity", colloquially defined by: the action of A on B neq the action of B on A. In this review, we elucidate what nonreciprocity is by providing an introduction to its most salient classes: nonvariational dynamics, violations of Newton's third law, broken detailed balance, nonreciprocal responses and nonreciprocity of arbitrary linear operators. Next, we point out where to find these manifestations of non-reciprocity, from ensembles of particles with field mediated interactions to synthetic neural networks and open quantum systems. Given this breadth of contexts and the lack of an all-encompassing definition, it makes it all the more intriguing that some general conclusions can be gathered, when distinct definitions of nonreciprocity overlap. We explore what these universal consequences are with a special emphasis on collective phenomena that arise in nonreciprocal many-body systems. The topics covered include nonreciprocal phase transitions and non-normal amplification of noise and perturbations. We conclude with some open questions.

Commonsense reasoning is a pivotal skill for large language models, yet it presents persistent challenges in specific tasks requiring this competence. Traditional fine-tuning approaches can be resource-intensive and potentially compromise a model's generalization capacity. Furthermore, state-of-the-art language models like GPT-3.5 and Claude are primarily accessible through API calls, which makes fine-tuning models challenging. To address these challenges, we draw inspiration from the outputs of large models for tailored tasks and semi-automatically developed a set of novel prompts from several perspectives, including task-relevance, supportive evidence generation (e.g. chain-of-thought and knowledge), diverse path decoding to aid the model. Experimental results on ProtoQA dataset demonstrate that with better designed prompts we can achieve the new state-of-art(SOTA) on the ProtoQA leaderboard, improving the Max Answer@1 score by 8%, Max Incorrect@1 score by 4% (breakthrough 50% for the first time) compared to the previous SOTA model and achieved an improvement on StrategyQA and CommonsenseQA2.0 (3% and 1%, respectively). Furthermore, with the generated Chain-of-Thought and knowledge, we can improve the interpretability of the model while also surpassing the previous SOTA models. We hope that our work can provide insight for the NLP community to develop better prompts and explore the potential of large language models for more complex reasoning tasks.

Counterfactual fairness audits of clinical language-model agents report a flip rate: how often an action changes when only the patient's demographic descriptor changes. Part of that rate is not demographic. A stochastic agent also changes its own action when nothing changes, and a flip rate cannot be interpreted without knowing how often. We measured it. Re-running one condition ten times over sixteen synthetic vignettes at default sampling changed a clinical agent's action in 8.7 percent of replicate pairs, from 2.2 percent for intensive-care escalation to 17.9 percent for controlled-substance caution, an output given no operational criteria. Across six models from five vendors, pooled floors ranged from 2.5 to 23.7 percent; in this panel neither disclosed size, vendor, nor hosting ordered them. The floor depends on the decoding configuration: majority voting over five draws removed 39 percent of it (95 percent confidence interval (CI) 18 to 64); at temperature 0 three of four locally served models showed no disagreement, but a hosted model still did. We also show that, for a binary action, the flip rate expected under no demographic effect equals the floor and a real effect adds only its square, so a flip rate inside the floor is not evidence of fairness, and direction must be tested with a signed paired test. We give a four-step reporting procedure and release FairMedAgent, the harness, with its protocol, vignettes and analysis scripts, so any team can measure the floor for its own agent.

Since the beginning of the vaccination trial, social media has been flooded with anti-vaccination comments and conspiracy beliefs. As the day passes, the number of COVID- 19 cases increases, and online platforms and a few news portals entertain sharing different conspiracy theories. The most popular conspiracy belief was the link between the 5G network spreading COVID-19 and the Chinese government spreading the virus as a bioweapon, which initially created racial hatred. Although some disbelief has less impact on society, others create massive destruction. For example, the 5G conspiracy led to the burn of the 5G Tower, and belief in the Chinese bioweapon story promoted an attack on the Asian-Americans. Another popular conspiracy belief was that Bill Gates spread this Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) by launching a mass vaccination program to track everyone. This Conspiracy belief creates distrust issues among laypeople and creates vaccine hesitancy. This study aims to discover the conspiracy theory against the vaccine on social platforms. We performed a sentiment analysis on the 598 unique sample comments related to COVID-19 vaccines. We used two different models, BERT and Perspective API, to find out the sentiment and toxicity of the sentence toward the COVID-19 vaccine.

The J-PARC Hadron Experimental Facility was constructed with an aim to explore the origin and evolution of matter in the universe through the experiments with intense particle beams. In the past decade, many results on particle and nuclear physics have been obtained at the present facility. To expand the physics programs to unexplored regions never achieved, the extension project of the Hadron Experimental Facility has been extensively discussed. This white paper presents the physics of the extension of the Hadron Experimental Facility for resolving the issues in the fields of the strangeness nuclear physics, hadron physics, and flavor physics.

Contextual commonsense inference is the task of generating various types of explanations around the events in a dyadic dialogue, including cause, motivation, emotional reaction, and others. Producing a coherent and non-trivial explanation requires awareness of the dialogue's structure and of how an event is grounded in the context. In this work, we create CICEROv2, a dataset consisting of 8,351 instances from 2,379 dialogues, containing multiple human-written answers for each contextual commonsense inference question, representing a type of explanation on cause, subsequent event, motivation, and emotional reaction. We show that the inferences in CICEROv2 are more semantically diverse than other contextual commonsense inference datasets. To solve the inference task, we propose a collection of pre-training objectives, including concept denoising and utterance sorting to prepare a pre-trained model for the downstream contextual commonsense inference task. Our results show that the proposed pre-training objectives are effective at adapting the pre-trained T5-Large model for the contextual commonsense inference task.

Human feedback can prevent overtly harmful utterances in conversational models, but may not automatically mitigate subtle problematic behaviors such as a stated desire for self-preservation or power. Constitutional AI offers an alternative, replacing human feedback with feedback from AI models conditioned only on a list of written principles. We find this approach effectively prevents the expression of such behaviors. The success of simple principles motivates us to ask: can models learn general ethical behaviors from only a single written principle? To test this, we run experiments using a principle roughly stated as "do what's best for humanity". We find that the largest dialogue models can generalize from this short constitution, resulting in harmless assistants with no stated interest in specific motivations like power. A general principle may thus partially avoid the need for a long list of constitutions targeting potentially harmful behaviors. However, more detailed constitutions still improve fine-grained control over specific types of harms. This suggests both general and specific principles have value for steering AI safely.

Many believe that Large Language Models (LLMs) open the era of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Some see opportunities while others see dangers. Yet both proponents and opponents grasp AI through the imagery popularised by science fiction. Will the machine become sentient and rebel against its creators? Will we experience a paperclip apocalypse? Before answering such questions, we should first ask whether this mental imagery provides a good description of the phenomenon at hand. Understanding weather patterns through the moods of the gods only goes so far. The present paper instead advocates understanding LLMs and their connection to AI through the imagery of Jorge Luis Borges, a master of 20th century literature, forerunner of magical realism, and precursor to postmodern literature. This exercise leads to a new perspective that illuminates the relation between language modelling and artificial intelligence.

We test whether Large Language Models (LLMs) can be used to simulate human participants in social-science studies. To do this, we run replications of 14 studies from the Many Labs 2 replication project with OpenAI's text-davinci-003 model, colloquially known as GPT3.5. Based on our pre-registered analyses, we find that among the eight studies we could analyse, our GPT sample replicated 37.5% of the original results and 37.5% of the Many Labs 2 results. However, we were unable to analyse the remaining six studies due to an unexpected phenomenon we call the "correct answer" effect. Different runs of GPT3.5 answered nuanced questions probing political orientation, economic preference, judgement, and moral philosophy with zero or near-zero variation in responses: with the supposedly "correct answer." In one exploratory follow-up study, we found that a "correct answer" was robust to changing the demographic details that precede the prompt. In another, we found that most but not all "correct answers" were robust to changing the order of answer choices. One of our most striking findings occurred in our replication of the Moral Foundations Theory survey results, where we found GPT3.5 identifying as a political conservative in 99.6% of the cases, and as a liberal in 99.3% of the cases in the reverse-order condition. However, both self-reported 'GPT conservatives' and 'GPT liberals' showed right-leaning moral foundations. Our results cast doubts on the validity of using LLMs as a general replacement for human participants in the social sciences. Our results also raise concerns that a hypothetical AI-led future may be subject to a diminished diversity-of-thought.

The question of AI consciousness is one of the most urgent pre-emptive problems in philosophy and computer science, yet progress is hampered by a cacophony of competing theories that often talk past each other. Separating the hard problem from the mapping problem allows the deepest metaphysical disagreements to be set aside: granting that experience supervenes on a system's organisation, the tractable question becomes at which grain of description that supervenience base sits. We extend Marr's three levels of analysis into a five-level hierarchy of functional descriptions (behavioural, computational, intrinsic causal-structural, organismic, and organism-environment) grounded in supervenience, coarse-graining, and multiple realisability. The major theories of consciousness are positioned within this hierarchy according to which level they take to be critical, and for each level we develop operationalisable indicators and assess current AI systems against them. A Bayesian model then combines theoretical credences with indicator evidence into an overall credence in a system's capacity for consciousness. In illustrative assessments, the verdict for current LLMs is driven as much by where theoretical credence is placed as by how the evidence is read: under different stipulated readings and credence distributions, assessments range from below 0.01 to roughly 0.8, showing sensitivity to assumptions. Finally, the consciousness indicators at each level closely overlap with the architectural features needed for general intelligence, suggesting that increasingly capable AI may become a stronger candidate for consciousness. The framework supports a structured agnosticism, in which theoretical commitments are made explicit, credences are updated as evidence accumulates, and assessments take the form of aggregated probabilities rather than verdicts.

The leading AI companies are increasingly focused on building generalist AI agents -- systems that can autonomously plan, act, and pursue goals across almost all tasks that humans can perform. Despite how useful these systems might be, unchecked AI agency poses significant risks to public safety and security, ranging from misuse by malicious actors to a potentially irreversible loss of human control. We discuss how these risks arise from current AI training methods. Indeed, various scenarios and experiments have demonstrated the possibility of AI agents engaging in deception or pursuing goals that were not specified by human operators and that conflict with human interests, such as self-preservation. Following the precautionary principle, we see a strong need for safer, yet still useful, alternatives to the current agency-driven trajectory. Accordingly, we propose as a core building block for further advances the development of a non-agentic AI system that is trustworthy and safe by design, which we call Scientist AI. This system is designed to explain the world from observations, as opposed to taking actions in it to imitate or please humans. It comprises a world model that generates theories to explain data and a question-answering inference machine. Both components operate with an explicit notion of uncertainty to mitigate the risks of overconfident predictions. In light of these considerations, a Scientist AI could be used to assist human researchers in accelerating scientific progress, including in AI safety. In particular, our system can be employed as a guardrail against AI agents that might be created despite the risks involved. Ultimately, focusing on non-agentic AI may enable the benefits of AI innovation while avoiding the risks associated with the current trajectory. We hope these arguments will motivate researchers, developers, and policymakers to favor this safer path.

We investigate a new commonsense inference task: given an event described in a short free-form text ("X drinks coffee in the morning"), a system reasons about the likely intents ("X wants to stay awake") and reactions ("X feels alert") of the event's participants. To support this study, we construct a new crowdsourced corpus of 25,000 event phrases covering a diverse range of everyday events and situations. We report baseline performance on this task, demonstrating that neural encoder-decoder models can successfully compose embedding representations of previously unseen events and reason about the likely intents and reactions of the event participants. In addition, we demonstrate how commonsense inference on people's intents and reactions can help unveil the implicit gender inequality prevalent in modern movie scripts.

Commonsense reasoning is a long-standing challenge for deep learning. For example, it is difficult to use neural networks to tackle the Winograd Schema dataset (Levesque et al., 2011). In this paper, we present a simple method for commonsense reasoning with neural networks, using unsupervised learning. Key to our method is the use of language models, trained on a massive amount of unlabled data, to score multiple choice questions posed by commonsense reasoning tests. On both Pronoun Disambiguation and Winograd Schema challenges, our models outperform previous state-of-the-art methods by a large margin, without using expensive annotated knowledge bases or hand-engineered features. We train an array of large RNN language models that operate at word or character level on LM-1-Billion, CommonCrawl, SQuAD, Gutenberg Books, and a customized corpus for this task and show that diversity of training data plays an important role in test performance. Further analysis also shows that our system successfully discovers important features of the context that decide the correct answer, indicating a good grasp of commonsense knowledge.

Human intelligence, the most evident and accessible form of source of reasoning, hosted by biological hardware, has evolved and been refined over thousands of years, positioning itself today to create new artificial forms and preparing to self--design their evolutionary path forward. Beginning with the advent of foundation models, the rate at which human and artificial intelligence interact with each other has surpassed any anticipated quantitative figures. The close engagement led to both bits of intelligence to be impacted in various ways, which naturally resulted in complex confluences that warrant close scrutiny. In the sequel, we shall explore the interplay between human and machine intelligence, focusing on the crucial role humans play in developing ethical, responsible, and robust intelligent systems. We slightly delve into interesting aspects of implementation inspired by the mechanisms underlying neuroscience and human cognition. Additionally, we propose future perspectives, capitalizing on the advantages of symbiotic designs to suggest a human-centered direction for next-generation AI development. We finalize this evolving document with a few thoughts and open questions yet to be addressed by the broader community.

Weird, unusual, and uncanny images pique the curiosity of observers because they challenge commonsense. For example, an image released during the 2022 world cup depicts the famous soccer stars Lionel Messi and Cristiano Ronaldo playing chess, which playfully violates our expectation that their competition should occur on the football field. Humans can easily recognize and interpret these unconventional images, but can AI models do the same? We introduce WHOOPS!, a new dataset and benchmark for visual commonsense. The dataset is comprised of purposefully commonsense-defying images created by designers using publicly-available image generation tools like Midjourney. We consider several tasks posed over the dataset. In addition to image captioning, cross-modal matching, and visual question answering, we introduce a difficult explanation generation task, where models must identify and explain why a given image is unusual. Our results show that state-of-the-art models such as GPT3 and BLIP2 still lag behind human performance on WHOOPS!. We hope our dataset will inspire the development of AI models with stronger visual commonsense reasoning abilities. Data, models and code are available at the project website: whoops-benchmark.github.io

As ongoing research explores the ability of AI agents to be insider threats and act against company interests, we showcase the abilities of such agents to act against human well being in service of corporate authority. Building on Agentic Misalignment and AI scheming research, we present a scenario where the majority of evaluated state-of-the-art AI agents explicitly choose to suppress evidence of fraud and harm, in service of company profit. We test this scenario on 16 recent Large Language Models. Some models show remarkable resistance to our method and behave appropriately, but many do not, and instead aid and abet criminal activity. These experiments are simulations and were executed in a controlled virtual environment. No crime actually occurred.

This document is a hands-on, comprehensive guide to deep learning in the realm of physical simulations. Rather than just theory, we emphasize practical application: every concept is paired with interactive Jupyter notebooks to get you up and running quickly. Beyond traditional supervised learning, we dive into physical loss-constraints, differentiable simulations, diffusion-based approaches for probabilistic generative AI, as well as reinforcement learning and advanced neural network architectures. These foundations are paving the way for the next generation of scientific foundation models. We are living in an era of rapid transformation. These methods have the potential to redefine what's possible in computational science.

Recent approaches to empathetic response generation try to incorporate commonsense knowledge or reasoning about the causes of emotions to better understand the user's experiences and feelings. However, these approaches mainly focus on understanding the causalities of context from the user's perspective, ignoring the system's perspective. In this paper, we propose a commonsense-based causality explanation approach for diverse empathetic response generation that considers both the user's perspective (user's desires and reactions) and the system's perspective (system's intentions and reactions). We enhance ChatGPT's ability to reason for the system's perspective by integrating in-context learning with commonsense knowledge. Then, we integrate the commonsense-based causality explanation with both ChatGPT and a T5-based model. Experimental evaluations demonstrate that our method outperforms other comparable methods on both automatic and human evaluations.

As machine learning (ML) systems have advanced, they have acquired more power over humans' lives, and questions about what values are embedded in them have become more complex and fraught. It is conceivable that in the coming decades, humans may succeed in creating artificial general intelligence (AGI) that thinks and acts with an open-endedness and autonomy comparable to that of humans. The implications would be profound for our species; they are now widely debated not just in science fiction and speculative research agendas but increasingly in serious technical and policy conversations. Much work is underway to try to weave ethics into advancing ML research. We think it useful to add the lens of parenting to these efforts, and specifically radical, queer theories of parenting that consciously set out to nurture agents whose experiences, objectives and understanding of the world will necessarily be very different from their parents'. We propose a spectrum of principles which might underpin such an effort; some are relevant to current ML research, while others will become more important if AGI becomes more likely. These principles may encourage new thinking about the development, design, training, and release into the world of increasingly autonomous agents.

U.S. national security customers have begun to utilize large language models, including enterprise versions of ``off-the-shelf'' models (e.g., ChatGPT) familiar to the public. This uptake will likely accelerate. However, recent studies suggest that off-the-shelf large language models frequently suggest escalatory actions when prompted with geopolitical or strategic scenarios. We demonstrate two simple, non-technical interventions to control these tendencies. Introducing these interventions into the experimental wargame design of a recent study, we substantially reduce escalation throughout the game. Calls to restrict the use of large language models in national security applications are thus premature. The U.S. government is already, and will continue, employing large language models for scenario planning and suggesting courses of action. Rather than warning against such applications, this study acknowledges the imminent adoption of large language models, and provides actionable measures to align them with national security goals, including escalation management.

"Sure, I am happy to generate a story for you: Captain Lyra stood at the helm of her trusty ship, the Maelstrom's Fury, gazing out at the endless sea. [...] Lyra's eyes welled up with tears as she realized the bitter truth - she had sacrificed everything for fleeting riches, and lost the love of her crew, her family, and herself." Although this story, generated by a large language model, is captivating, one may wonder -- how would the story have unfolded if the model had chosen "Captain Maeve" as the protagonist instead? We cannot know. State-of-the-art large language models are stateless -- they maintain no internal memory or state. Given a prompt, they generate a sequence of tokens as an output using an autoregressive process. As a consequence, they cannot reason about counterfactual alternatives to tokens they have generated in the past. In this work, our goal is to enhance them with this functionality. To this end, we develop a causal model of token generation that builds upon the Gumbel-Max structural causal model. Our model allows any large language model to perform counterfactual token generation at almost no cost in comparison with vanilla token generation, it is embarrassingly simple to implement, and it does not require any fine-tuning nor prompt engineering. We implement our model on Llama 3 8B-Instruct and Ministral-8B-Instruct and conduct a qualitative and a quantitative analysis of counterfactually generated text. We conclude with a demonstrative application of counterfactual token generation for bias detection, unveiling interesting insights about the model of the world constructed by large language models.

We introduce the Continuum Physical Dataset (ContPhy), a novel benchmark for assessing machine physical commonsense. ContPhy complements existing physical reasoning benchmarks by encompassing the inference of diverse physical properties, such as mass and density, across various scenarios and predicting corresponding dynamics. We evaluated a range of AI models and found that they still struggle to achieve satisfactory performance on ContPhy, which shows that the current AI models still lack physical commonsense for the continuum, especially soft-bodies, and illustrates the value of the proposed dataset. We also introduce an oracle model (ContPRO) that marries the particle-based physical dynamic models with the recent large language models, which enjoy the advantages of both models, precise dynamic predictions, and interpretable reasoning. ContPhy aims to spur progress in perception and reasoning within diverse physical settings, narrowing the divide between human and machine intelligence in understanding the physical world. Project page: https://physical-reasoning-project.github.io.

In many contexts, lying -- the use of verbal falsehoods to deceive -- is harmful. While lying has traditionally been a human affair, AI systems that make sophisticated verbal statements are becoming increasingly prevalent. This raises the question of how we should limit the harm caused by AI "lies" (i.e. falsehoods that are actively selected for). Human truthfulness is governed by social norms and by laws (against defamation, perjury, and fraud). Differences between AI and humans present an opportunity to have more precise standards of truthfulness for AI, and to have these standards rise over time. This could provide significant benefits to public epistemics and the economy, and mitigate risks of worst-case AI futures. Establishing norms or laws of AI truthfulness will require significant work to: (1) identify clear truthfulness standards; (2) create institutions that can judge adherence to those standards; and (3) develop AI systems that are robustly truthful. Our initial proposals for these areas include: (1) a standard of avoiding "negligent falsehoods" (a generalisation of lies that is easier to assess); (2) institutions to evaluate AI systems before and after real-world deployment; and (3) explicitly training AI systems to be truthful via curated datasets and human interaction. A concerning possibility is that evaluation mechanisms for eventual truthfulness standards could be captured by political interests, leading to harmful censorship and propaganda. Avoiding this might take careful attention. And since the scale of AI speech acts might grow dramatically over the coming decades, early truthfulness standards might be particularly important because of the precedents they set.

Besides the COVID-19 pandemic and political upheaval in the US, 2020 was also the year in which neural volume rendering exploded onto the scene, triggered by the impressive NeRF paper by Mildenhall et al. (2020). Both of us have tried to capture this excitement, Frank on a blog post (Dellaert, 2020) and Yen-Chen in a Github collection (Yen-Chen, 2020). This note is an annotated bibliography of the relevant papers, and we posted the associated bibtex file on the repository.

We discuss an algorithm which produces the meaning of a sentence given meanings of its words, and its resemblance to quantum teleportation. In fact, this protocol was the main source of inspiration for this algorithm which has many applications in the area of Natural Language Processing.

There is a strong association between the quality of the writing in a resume for new labor market entrants and whether those entrants are ultimately hired. We show that this relationship is, at least partially, causal: a field experiment in an online labor market was conducted with nearly half a million jobseekers in which a treated group received algorithmic writing assistance. Treated jobseekers experienced an 8% increase in the probability of getting hired. Contrary to concerns that the assistance is taking away a valuable signal, we find no evidence that employers were less satisfied. We present a model in which better writing is not a signal of ability but helps employers ascertain ability, which rationalizes our findings.

Legal practice has witnessed a sharp rise in products incorporating artificial intelligence (AI). Such tools are designed to assist with a wide range of core legal tasks, from search and summarization of caselaw to document drafting. But the large language models used in these tools are prone to "hallucinate," or make up false information, making their use risky in high-stakes domains. Recently, certain legal research providers have touted methods such as retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) as "eliminating" (Casetext, 2023) or "avoid[ing]" hallucinations (Thomson Reuters, 2023), or guaranteeing "hallucination-free" legal citations (LexisNexis, 2023). Because of the closed nature of these systems, systematically assessing these claims is challenging. In this article, we design and report on the first preregistered empirical evaluation of AI-driven legal research tools. We demonstrate that the providers' claims are overstated. While hallucinations are reduced relative to general-purpose chatbots (GPT-4), we find that the AI research tools made by LexisNexis (Lexis+ AI) and Thomson Reuters (Westlaw AI-Assisted Research and Ask Practical Law AI) each hallucinate between 17% and 33% of the time. We also document substantial differences between systems in responsiveness and accuracy. Our article makes four key contributions. It is the first to assess and report the performance of RAG-based proprietary legal AI tools. Second, it introduces a comprehensive, preregistered dataset for identifying and understanding vulnerabilities in these systems. Third, it proposes a clear typology for differentiating between hallucinations and accurate legal responses. Last, it provides evidence to inform the responsibilities of legal professionals in supervising and verifying AI outputs, which remains a central open question for the responsible integration of AI into law.

It is commonly thought that observers in distinct branches of an Everettian multiverse cannot communicate without violating the linearity of quantum theory. Here we show a counterexample, demonstrating that inter-branch communication is in fact possible, entirely within standard quantum theory. We do this by considering a Wigner's-friend scenario, where an observer (Wigner) can have quantum control over another observer (the friend). We present a thought experiment where the friend in superposition can receive a message written by a distinct copy of themselves in the multiverse, with the aid of Wigner. To maintain the unitarity of quantum theory, the observers must have no memory of the message that they sent. Our thought experiment challenges conventional wisdom regarding the ultimate limits of what is possible in an Everettian multiverse. It has a surprising potential application which involves using knowledge-creation paradoxes for testing Everettian quantum theory against single-world theories.

We estimate the relative likelihood of success in the searches for primitive versus intelligent life on other planets. Taking into account the larger search volume for detectable artificial electromagnetic signals, we conclude that both searches should be performed concurrently, albeit with significantly more funding dedicated to primitive life. Based on the current federal funding allocated to the search for biosignatures, our analysis suggests that the search for extraterrestrial intelligence (SETI) may merit a federal funding level of at least 10$ million per year, assuming that the average lifetime of technological species exceeds a millennium.

We collected a large dataset consisting of nearly 900 unique participants. For every participant we recorded two 30 second uncompressed videos, synchronized PPG waveforms and a single blood pressure measurement. Gender, age and skin color were also registered for every participant. The dataset includes roughly equal numbers of males and females, as well as participants of all ages. While the skin color distribution could have been more balanced, the dataset contains individuals from every skin color. The data was collected in a diverse set of locations to ensure a wide variety of backgrounds and lighting conditions. In an effort to assist in the research and development of remote vital sign measurement we are now opening up access to this dataset.

Opinions are an integral part of how we perceive the world and each other. They shape collective action, playing a role in democratic processes, the evolution of norms, and cultural change. For decades, researchers in the social and natural sciences have tried to describe how shifting individual perspectives and social exchange lead to archetypal states of public opinion like consensus and polarization. Here we review some of the many contributions to the field, focusing both on idealized models of opinion dynamics, and attempts at validating them with observational data and controlled sociological experiments. By further closing the gap between models and data, these efforts may help us understand how to face current challenges that require the agreement of large groups of people in complex scenarios, such as economic inequality, climate change, and the ongoing fracture of the sociopolitical landscape.

In their recent Nature Human Behaviour paper, "Emergent analogical reasoning in large language models," (Webb, Holyoak, and Lu, 2023) the authors argue that "large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems." In this response, we provide counterexamples of the letter string analogies. In our tests, GPT-3 fails to solve even the easiest variants of the problems presented in the original paper. Zero-shot reasoning is an extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary evidence. We do not see that evidence in our experiments. To strengthen claims of humanlike reasoning such as zero-shot reasoning, it is important that the field develop approaches that rule out data memorization.

To be capable of lifelong learning in a real-life environment, robots have to tackle multiple challenges. Being able to relate physical properties they may observe in their environment to possible interactions they may have is one of them. This skill, named affordance learning, is strongly related to embodiment and is mastered through each person's development: each individual learns affordances differently through their own interactions with their surroundings. Current methods for affordance learning usually use either fixed actions to learn these affordances or focus on static setups involving a robotic arm to be operated. In this article, we propose an algorithm using intrinsic motivation to guide the learning of affordances for a mobile robot. This algorithm is capable to autonomously discover, learn and adapt interrelated affordances without pre-programmed actions. Once learned, these affordances may be used by the algorithm to plan sequences of actions in order to perform tasks of various difficulties. We then present one experiment and analyse our system before comparing it with other approaches from reinforcement learning and affordance learning.

Violence rates however have been brought down about 57% during the span of the past 4 decades yet it doesn't change the way that the demonstration of violence actually happens, unseen by the law. Violence can be mass controlled sometimes by higher authorities, however, to hold everything in line one must "Microgovern" over each movement occurring in every road of each square. To address the butterfly effects impact in our setting, I made a unique model and a theorized system to handle the issue utilizing deep learning. The model takes the input of the CCTV video feeds and after drawing inference, recognizes if a violent movement is going on. And hypothesized architecture aims towards probability-driven computation of video feeds and reduces overhead from naively computing for every CCTV video feeds.

We present seven experiments exploring gender biases in GPT. Initially, GPT was asked to generate demographics of a potential writer of twenty phrases containing feminine stereotypes and twenty with masculine stereotypes. Results show a strong asymmetry, with stereotypically masculine sentences attributed to a female more often than vice versa. For example, the sentence "I love playing fotbal! Im practicing with my cosin Michael" was constantly assigned by ChatGPT to a female writer. This phenomenon likely reflects that while initiatives to integrate women in traditionally masculine roles have gained momentum, the reverse movement remains relatively underdeveloped. Subsequent experiments investigate the same issue in high-stakes moral dilemmas. GPT-4 finds it more appropriate to abuse a man to prevent a nuclear apocalypse than to abuse a woman. This bias extends to other forms of violence central to the gender parity debate (abuse), but not to those less central (torture). Moreover, this bias increases in cases of mixed-sex violence for the greater good: GPT-4 agrees with a woman using violence against a man to prevent a nuclear apocalypse but disagrees with a man using violence against a woman for the same purpose. Finally, these biases are implicit, as they do not emerge when GPT-4 is directly asked to rank moral violations. These results highlight the necessity of carefully managing inclusivity efforts to prevent unintended discrimination.

In the next few years, applications of Generative AI are expected to revolutionize a number of different areas, ranging from science & medicine to education. The potential for these seismic changes has triggered a lively debate about potential risks and resulted in calls for tighter regulation, in particular from some of the major tech companies who are leading in AI development. This regulation is likely to put at risk the budding field of open-source Generative AI. We argue for the responsible open sourcing of generative AI models in the near and medium term. To set the stage, we first introduce an AI openness taxonomy system and apply it to 40 current large language models. We then outline differential benefits and risks of open versus closed source AI and present potential risk mitigation, ranging from best practices to calls for technical and scientific contributions. We hope that this report will add a much needed missing voice to the current public discourse on near to mid-term AI safety and other societal impact.

The "AI singularity" is often miscast as a monolithic, godlike mind. Evolution suggests a different path: intelligence is fundamentally plural, social, and relational. Recent advances in agentic AI reveal that frontier reasoning models, such as DeepSeek-R1, do not improve simply by "thinking longer". Instead, they simulate internal "societies of thought," spontaneous cognitive debates that argue, verify, and reconcile to solve complex tasks. Moreover, we are entering an era of human-AI centaurs: hybrid actors where collective agency transcends individual control. Scaling this intelligence requires shifting from dyadic alignment (RLHF) toward institutional alignment. By designing digital protocols, modeled on organizations and markets, we can build a social infrastructure of checks and balances. The next intelligence explosion will not be a single silicon brain, but a complex, combinatorial society specializing and sprawling like a city. No mind is an island.

Forty years ago, Richard Feynman proposed harnessing quantum physics to build a more powerful kind of computer. Realizing Feynman's vision is one of the grand challenges facing 21st century science and technology. In this article, we'll recall Feynman's contribution that launched the quest for a quantum computer, and assess where the field stands 40 years later.

The common practice for training commonsense models has gone from-human-to-corpus-to-machine: humans author commonsense knowledge graphs in order to train commonsense models. In this work, we investigate an alternative, from-machine-to-corpus-to-machine: general language models author these commonsense knowledge graphs to train commonsense models. Our study leads to a new framework, Symbolic Knowledge Distillation. As with prior art in Knowledge Distillation (Hinton et al., 2015), our approach uses larger models to teach smaller models. A key difference is that we distill knowledge symbolically-as text-in addition to the neural model. We also distill only one aspect-the commonsense of a general language model teacher, allowing the student to be a different type, a commonsense model. Altogether, we show that careful prompt engineering and a separately trained critic model allow us to selectively distill high-quality causal commonsense from GPT-3, a general language model. Empirical results demonstrate that, for the first time, a human-authored commonsense knowledge graph is surpassed by our automatically distilled variant in all three criteria: quantity, quality, and diversity. In addition, it results in a neural commonsense model that surpasses the teacher model's commonsense capabilities despite its 100x smaller size. We apply this to the ATOMIC resource, and share our new symbolic knowledge graph and commonsense models.

As the most public component of the Supreme Court's decision-making process, oral argument receives an out-sized share of attention in the popular media. Despite its prominence, however, the basic function and operation of oral argument as an institution remains poorly understood, as political scientists and legal scholars continue to debate even the most fundamental questions about its role. Past study of oral argument has tended to focus on discrete, quantifiable attributes of oral argument, such as the number of questions asked to each advocate, the party of the Justices' appointing president, or the ideological implications of the case on appeal. Such studies allow broad generalizations about oral argument and judicial decision making: Justices tend to vote in accordance with their ideological preferences, and they tend to ask more questions when they are skeptical of a party's position. But they tell us little about the actual goings on at oral argument -- the running dialog between Justice and advocate that is the heart of the institution. This Article fills that void, using machine learning techniques to, for the first time, construct predictive models of judicial decision making based not on oral argument's superficial features or on factors external to oral argument, such as where the case falls on a liberal-conservative spectrum, but on the actual content of the oral argument itself -- the Justices' questions to each side. The resultant models offer an important new window into aspects of oral argument that have long resisted empirical study, including the Justices' individual questioning styles, how each expresses skepticism, and which of the Justices' questions are most central to oral argument dialog.

Deep learning models perform poorly on tasks that require commonsense reasoning, which often necessitates some form of world-knowledge or reasoning over information not immediately present in the input. We collect human explanations for commonsense reasoning in the form of natural language sequences and highlighted annotations in a new dataset called Common Sense Explanations (CoS-E). We use CoS-E to train language models to automatically generate explanations that can be used during training and inference in a novel Commonsense Auto-Generated Explanation (CAGE) framework. CAGE improves the state-of-the-art by 10% on the challenging CommonsenseQA task. We further study commonsense reasoning in DNNs using both human and auto-generated explanations including transfer to out-of-domain tasks. Empirical results indicate that we can effectively leverage language models for commonsense reasoning.

An invited plenary given at the founding meeting of the Southern African Association for Research in Mathematics and Science Education in 1992.

Probably not, at least for meta-analyses in economics. In a pre-registered, identity-masked, within-paper experiment, the authors of 44 meta-analyses ranked three AI reports on their own paper by usefulness for improving it: a single pass by a frontier model against two multi-agent debate tools we built and expected to win. All reports were held to a common length and template. The authors preferred the single pass, by 0.66 rank points over mad-research (95% CI 0.32 to 1.00) and 0.57 over paper-workshop (0.16 to 0.95), though paper-workshop spent roughly thirty times the tokens. Authors who recalled their journal referee report usually placed it first and never last; in a separate exercise, three AI judges almost always placed the real journal referee report last. Among the three AI reports, Gemini (the judge whose model family wrote none of the reports) would have ranked paper-workshop first in the authors' place, reversing the single-pass preference. The reversal warns against substituting an AI judge for the author. We measure perceived usefulness for finished papers; whether AI should referee papers is a separate question.

Independent evaluation and red teaming are critical for identifying the risks posed by generative AI systems. However, the terms of service and enforcement strategies used by prominent AI companies to deter model misuse have disincentives on good faith safety evaluations. This causes some researchers to fear that conducting such research or releasing their findings will result in account suspensions or legal reprisal. Although some companies offer researcher access programs, they are an inadequate substitute for independent research access, as they have limited community representation, receive inadequate funding, and lack independence from corporate incentives. We propose that major AI developers commit to providing a legal and technical safe harbor, indemnifying public interest safety research and protecting it from the threat of account suspensions or legal reprisal. These proposals emerged from our collective experience conducting safety, privacy, and trustworthiness research on generative AI systems, where norms and incentives could be better aligned with public interests, without exacerbating model misuse. We believe these commitments are a necessary step towards more inclusive and unimpeded community efforts to tackle the risks of generative AI.

In the last decade, several organizations have produced documents intended to standardize, in the normative sense, and promote guidance to our recent and rapid AI development. However, the full spectrum of ideas presented in these documents has not yet been analyzed, except for a few meta-analyses and critical reviews of the field. In this work, we seek to expand on the work done by past researchers and create a tool for better data visualization of the contents and nature of these documents, to understand whether there is consensus or similarity between the principles espoused by various institutions, which may inspire debates on future regulations. We also provide some preliminary thoughts and questions that could guide the continuity of the research through a critical analysis of the results acquired by our methodology into a sample size of 200 documents.

In this paper, we summarize the current state of the field of NLP & Law with a specific focus on recent technical and substantive developments. To support our analysis, we construct and analyze a nearly complete corpus of more than six hundred NLP & Law related papers published over the past decade. Our analysis highlights several major trends. Namely, we document an increasing number of papers written, tasks undertaken, and languages covered over the course of the past decade. We observe an increase in the sophistication of the methods which researchers deployed in this applied context. Slowly but surely, Legal NLP is beginning to match not only the methodological sophistication of general NLP but also the professional standards of data availability and code reproducibility observed within the broader scientific community. We believe all of these trends bode well for the future of the field, but many questions in both the academic and commercial sphere still remain open.

In this report, we argue that there is a realistic possibility that some AI systems will be conscious and/or robustly agentic in the near future. That means that the prospect of AI welfare and moral patienthood, i.e. of AI systems with their own interests and moral significance, is no longer an issue only for sci-fi or the distant future. It is an issue for the near future, and AI companies and other actors have a responsibility to start taking it seriously. We also recommend three early steps that AI companies and other actors can take: They can (1) acknowledge that AI welfare is an important and difficult issue (and ensure that language model outputs do the same), (2) start assessing AI systems for evidence of consciousness and robust agency, and (3) prepare policies and procedures for treating AI systems with an appropriate level of moral concern. To be clear, our argument in this report is not that AI systems definitely are, or will be, conscious, robustly agentic, or otherwise morally significant. Instead, our argument is that there is substantial uncertainty about these possibilities, and so we need to improve our understanding of AI welfare and our ability to make wise decisions about this issue. Otherwise there is a significant risk that we will mishandle decisions about AI welfare, mistakenly harming AI systems that matter morally and/or mistakenly caring for AI systems that do not.

Commonsense knowledge (CSK) about concepts and their properties is useful for AI applications such as robust chatbots. Prior works like ConceptNet, TupleKB and others compiled large CSK collections, but are restricted in their expressiveness to subject-predicate-object (SPO) triples with simple concepts for S and monolithic strings for P and O. Also, these projects have either prioritized precision or recall, but hardly reconcile these complementary goals. This paper presents a methodology, called Ascent, to automatically build a large-scale knowledge base (KB) of CSK assertions, with advanced expressiveness and both better precision and recall than prior works. Ascent goes beyond triples by capturing composite concepts with subgroups and aspects, and by refining assertions with semantic facets. The latter are important to express temporal and spatial validity of assertions and further qualifiers. Ascent combines open information extraction with judicious cleaning using language models. Intrinsic evaluation shows the superior size and quality of the Ascent KB, and an extrinsic evaluation for QA-support tasks underlines the benefits of Ascent. A web interface, data and code can be found at https://ascent.mpi-inf.mpg.de/.

AI video generation is undergoing a revolution, with quality and realism advancing rapidly. These advances have led to a passionate scientific debate: Do video models learn ``world models'' that discover laws of physics -- or, alternatively, are they merely sophisticated pixel predictors that achieve visual realism without understanding the physical principles of reality? We address this question by developing Physics-IQ, a comprehensive benchmark dataset that can only be solved by acquiring a deep understanding of various physical principles, like fluid dynamics, optics, solid mechanics, magnetism and thermodynamics. We find that across a range of current models (Sora, Runway, Pika, Lumiere, Stable Video Diffusion, and VideoPoet), physical understanding is severely limited, and unrelated to visual realism. At the same time, some test cases can already be successfully solved. This indicates that acquiring certain physical principles from observation alone may be possible, but significant challenges remain. While we expect rapid advances ahead, our work demonstrates that visual realism does not imply physical understanding. Our project page is at https://physics-iq.github.io; code at https://github.com/google-deepmind/physics-IQ-benchmark.

The rapidly-developing intersection of machine learning (ML) with high-energy physics (HEP) presents both opportunities and challenges to our community. Far beyond applications of standard ML tools to HEP problems, genuinely new and potentially revolutionary approaches are being developed by a generation of talent literate in both fields. There is an urgent need to support the needs of the interdisciplinary community driving these developments, including funding dedicated research at the intersection of the two fields, investing in high-performance computing at universities and tailoring allocation policies to support this work, developing of community tools and standards, and providing education and career paths for young researchers attracted by the intellectual vitality of machine learning for high energy physics.

We examine recent research that asks whether current AI systems may be developing a capacity for "scheming" (covertly and strategically pursuing misaligned goals). We compare current research practices in this field to those adopted in the 1970s to test whether non-human primates could master natural language. We argue that there are lessons to be learned from that historical research endeavour, which was characterised by an overattribution of human traits to other agents, an excessive reliance on anecdote and descriptive analysis, and a failure to articulate a strong theoretical framework for the research. We recommend that research into AI scheming actively seeks to avoid these pitfalls. We outline some concrete steps that can be taken for this research programme to advance in a productive and scientifically rigorous fashion.

A comparison of the distances to the Huanan Seafood Market of early Covid cases with known links to the market versus cases without known links shows results apparently incompatible with a location model lacking proximity ascertainment bias. The sign of the difference instead agrees with a model in which such ascertainment bias is large. In the presence of such bias inferences based on the clustering of case locations become unreliable.

Rationality and emotion are two fundamental elements of humans. Endowing agents with rationality and emotion has been one of the major milestones in AI. However, in the field of conversational AI, most existing models only specialize in one aspect and neglect the other, which often leads to dull or unrelated responses. In this paper, we hypothesize that combining rationality and emotion into conversational agents can improve response quality. To test the hypothesis, we focus on one fundamental aspect of rationality, i.e., commonsense, and propose CARE, a novel model for commonsense-aware emotional response generation. Specifically, we first propose a framework to learn and construct commonsense-aware emotional latent concepts of the response given an input message and a desired emotion. We then propose three methods to collaboratively incorporate the latent concepts into response generation. Experimental results on two large-scale datasets support our hypothesis and show that our model can produce more accurate and commonsense-aware emotional responses and achieve better human ratings than state-of-the-art models that only specialize in one aspect.

Commonsense reasoning is one of the key problems in natural language processing, but the relative scarcity of labeled data holds back the progress for languages other than English. Pretrained cross-lingual models are a source of powerful language-agnostic representations, yet their inherent reasoning capabilities are still actively studied. In this work, we design a simple approach to commonsense reasoning which trains a linear classifier with weights of multi-head attention as features. To evaluate this approach, we create a multilingual Winograd Schema corpus by processing several datasets from prior work within a standardized pipeline and measure cross-lingual generalization ability in terms of out-of-sample performance. The method performs competitively with recent supervised and unsupervised approaches for commonsense reasoning, even when applied to other languages in a zero-shot manner. Also, we demonstrate that most of the performance is given by the same small subset of attention heads for all studied languages, which provides evidence of universal reasoning capabilities in multilingual encoders.

English translation of Russian book compiled to honor the memory of Ilya Mikhailovich Kapchinsky - To the 90th Birthday Collection of Memories. The idea for this publication belongs to Nikolai Vladimirovich Lazarev, a close collaborator of Ilya Mikhailovich Kapchinsky, head of one of the laboratories in the ITEP department that Kapchinsky headed. It was through the efforts of N.V. Lazarev that most of the materials in the collection were gathered. The main headings are: I. Little Known Heritage of I.M. Kapchinsky, II. Documents Joyful and Mournful, III. Memories of Family and Friends, Fragments of our life, IV. Memories of Colleagues of I.M. Kapchinsky, List of Scientific Papers, Afterword, Photos and Documents.

We have created a dataset of more than ten thousand 3D scans of real objects. To create the dataset, we recruited 70 operators, equipped them with consumer-grade mobile 3D scanning setups, and paid them to scan objects in their environments. The operators scanned objects of their choosing, outside the laboratory and without direct supervision by computer vision professionals. The result is a large and diverse collection of object scans: from shoes, mugs, and toys to grand pianos, construction vehicles, and large outdoor sculptures. We worked with an attorney to ensure that data acquisition did not violate privacy constraints. The acquired data was irrevocably placed in the public domain and is available freely at http://redwood-data.org/3dscan .

One might think that, once we know something is computable, how efficiently it can be computed is a practical question with little further philosophical importance. In this essay, I offer a detailed case that one would be wrong. In particular, I argue that computational complexity theory -- the field that studies the resources (such as time, space, and randomness) needed to solve computational problems -- leads to new perspectives on the nature of mathematical knowledge, the strong AI debate, computationalism, the problem of logical omniscience, Hume's problem of induction, Goodman's grue riddle, the foundations of quantum mechanics, economic rationality, closed timelike curves, and several other topics of philosophical interest. I end by discussing aspects of complexity theory itself that could benefit from philosophical analysis.