Daily Papers

Going beyond 'dendritic democracy', we introduce a 'democracy of local processors', termed Cooperator. Here we compare their capabilities when used in permutation-invariant neural networks for reinforcement learning (RL), with machine learning algorithms based on Transformers, such as ChatGPT. Transformers are based on the long-standing conception of integrate-and-fire 'point' neurons, whereas Cooperator is inspired by recent neurobiological breakthroughs suggesting that the cellular foundations of mental life depend on context-sensitive pyramidal neurons in the neocortex which have two functionally distinct points. We show that when used for RL, an algorithm based on Cooperator learns far quicker than that based on Transformer, even while having the same number of parameters.

Evidential cooperation in large worlds (ECL) refers to the idea that humans and other agents can benefit by cooperating with similar agents with differing values in causally disconnected parts of a large universe. Cooperating provides agents with evidence that other similar agents are likely to cooperate too, resulting in gains from trade for all. This could be a crucial consideration for altruists. I develop a game-theoretic model of ECL as an incomplete information bargaining problem. The model incorporates uncertainty about others' value systems and empirical situations, and addresses the problem of selecting a compromise outcome. Using the model, I investigate issues with ECL and outline open technical and philosophical questions. I show that all cooperators must maximize the same weighted sum of utility functions to reach a Pareto optimal outcome. However, I argue against selecting a compromise outcome implicitly by normalizing utility functions. I review bargaining theory and argue that the Nash bargaining solution could be a relevant Schelling point. I introduce dependency equilibria (Spohn 2007), an equilibrium concept suitable for ECL, and generalize a folk theorem showing that the Nash bargaining solution is a dependency equilibrium. I discuss gains from trade given uncertain beliefs about other agents and analyze how these gains decrease in several toy examples as the belief in another agent decreases. Finally, I discuss open issues in my model. First, the Nash bargaining solution is sometimes not coalitionally stable, meaning that a subset of cooperators can unilaterally improve payoffs by deviating from the compromise. I investigate conditions under which stable payoff vectors exist. Second, I discuss how to model agents' default actions without ECL.

Being able to cooperate with diverse humans is an important component of many economically valuable AI tasks, from household robotics to autonomous driving. However, generalizing to novel humans requires training on data that captures the diversity of human behaviors. Adversarial training is a promising method that allows dynamic data generation and ensures that agents are robust. It creates a feedback loop where the agent's performance influences the generation of new adversarial data, which can be used immediately to train the agent. However, adversarial training is difficult to apply in a cooperative task; how can we train an adversarial cooperator? We propose a novel strategy that combines a pretrained generative model to simulate valid cooperative agent policies with adversarial training to maximize regret. We call our method GOAT: Generative Online Adversarial Training. In this framework, the GOAT dynamically searches the latent space of the generative model for coordination strategies where the learning policy, the Cooperator agent, underperforms. GOAT enables better generalization by exposing the Cooperator to various challenging interaction scenarios. We maintain realistic coordination strategies by keeping the generative model frozen, thus avoiding adversarial exploitation. We evaluate GOAT with real human partners, and the results demonstrate state of the art performance on the Overcooked benchmark, highlighting its effectiveness in generalizing to diverse human behaviors.

Common-pool resource governance requires users to cooperate and avoid overexploitation, but defection and free-riding often undermine cooperation. We model a human-environmental system that integrates dynamics of resource and users' strategies. The resource follows a logistic function that depends on natural growth rate, carrying capacity, and extraction rates of cooperators and defectors. The users' strategies evolve according to different processes that capture effects of payoff, resource, and noise. We analyze the feedback between resource availability and strategic adaptation, and explores the conditions for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. We find different processes lead to different regimes of equilibrium solutions and resource levels depending on the parameter configuration and initial conditions. We also show that some processes can enhance the sustainability of the resource by making the users more responsive to the resource scarcity. The paper advances the understanding of human-environmental system and offers insights for resource governance policies and interventions.